Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesInstitute for International Economics, 2004 - 427 หน้า Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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... moral hazard Adverse selection and moral hazard are the two main market failures associated with the presence of insurance . Insurance companies worry that their client base will be bi- ased toward those most at risk : A person who ...
... moral hazard ) and reckless lending by creditors in industrial countries ( creditor moral hazard ) . Just as the literature on sovereign runs draws heavily on bank runs , the literature on sovereign moral hazard draws heavily on mod ...
... Moral Hazard in Practice Moral hazard is inherent in all forms of insurance . The core issue is not whether IMF lending has the potential to introduce moral hazard , since it would clearly create moral hazard by lending in unlimited ...
เนื้อหา
Introduction | 1 |
Appendix A Tables 379 | 8 |
New Nature of EmergingMarket Crises | 25 |
ลิขสิทธิ์ | |
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