JACKSON, J., dissenting. 347 U.S. The Court's opinion presupposes, and I do not disagree, that Congress has power to regulate lobbying for hire as a business or profession and to require such agents to disclose their principals, their activities, and their receipts. However, to reach the real evils of lobbying without cutting into the constitutional right of petition is a difficult and delicate task for which the Court's action today gives little guidance. I am in doubt whether the Act as construed does not permit applications which would abridge the right of petition, for which clear, safe and workable channels must be maintained. I think we should point out the defects and limitations which condemn this Act so clearly that the Court cannot sustain it as written, and leave its rewriting to Congress. After all, it is Congress that should know from experience both the good in the right of petition and the evils of professional lobbying. Syllabus. BARBER, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, v. GONZALES. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. No. 431. Argued March 10, 1954. Decided June 7, 1954. Respondent was born a national of the United States in the Philippine Islands, came to the continental United States from the Philippine Islands as a national prior to the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, has remained within this country ever since his arrival, and was sentenced to imprisonment in 1941 and 1950 for terms of one year or more for crimes involving moral turpitude. Held: He may not now be deported under § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 as an alien who had been so sentenced "after entry." Pp. 638-643. (a) Respondent is not deportable under § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 unless he made an "entry" within the meaning of that provision, notwithstanding §8 (a) (1) of the Philippine Independence Act which provides that citizens of the Philippine Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall be considered aliens for immigration purposes. Pp. 639-640. (b) When respondent came to the United States from the Philippine Islands as a national prior to enactment of the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, he did not make an "entry" into the United States within the meaning of § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917, since he did not come from some "foreign port or place." Pp. 640-643. 207 F. 2d 398, affirmed. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Robert L. Stern, then Acting Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General Olney and Beatrice Rosenberg. Blanch Freedman argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Lloyd E. McMurray. Opinion of the Court. 347 U.S. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent was born in the Philippine Islands in 1913 and came therefrom to the continental United States in 1930. He has lived here ever since. In 1941, he was convicted in the State of California of assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year in the Alameda County jail. In 1950, he was convicted in the State of Washington of second degree burglary and was sentenced under the indeterminate sentence law of that State to a minimum term of two years in the state penitentiary. In 1951, after an administrative hearing, he was ordered deported to the Philippine Islands under § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 as an alien who "after entry" had been sentenced more than once to imprisonment for terms of one year or more for crimes involving moral turpitude. 39 Stat. 889, as amended, formerly 8 U. S. C. § 155 (a). After respondent was taken into custody, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The petition attacked the validity of the deportation order on the ground, among others, that he was not subject to deportation under § 19 (a) since he had not made an "entry" within the meaning of that section. The District Court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, reversed the District Court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to order respondent's release from custody. 207 F. 2d 398. We granted certiorari. 346 U. S. 914. The sole question presented is whether respondentwho was born a national of the United States in the Philippine Islands, who came to the continental United States as a national prior to the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, and who was sentenced to imprisonment in 1941 637 Opinion of the Court. and 1950 for crimes involving moral turpitude-may now be deported under § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917. It is conceded that respondent was born a national of the United States; that as such he owed permanent allegiance to the United States, including the obligation of military service; that he retained this status when he came to the continental United States in 1930 and hence was not then subject to the Immigration Act of 1917 or any other federal statute relating to the exclusion or deportation of aliens.' The Government, however, contends that respondent's status as a national was changed by the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 456, which provided for the eventual independence of the Philippines, subsequently achieved in 1946, 60 Stat. 1352. Section 8 (a)(1) of the 1934 Act provides: "For the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1917, . . . this section, and all other laws of the United States relating to the immigration, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, citizens of the Philippine Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall be considered as if they were aliens. For such purposes the Philippine Islands shall be considered as a separate country and shall have for each fiscal year a quota of fifty." 1 From the Spanish cession in 1898 until final independence in 1946, the Philippine Islands were American territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 674-676. Persons born in the Philippines during this period were American nationals entitled to the protection of the United States and conversely owing permanent allegiance to the United States. They could not be excluded from this country under a general statute relating to the exclusion of "aliens." See Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1, 12-13; Toyota v. United States, 268 U. S. 402, 411. But, until 1946, neither could they become United States citizens. See Toyota v. United States, supra; 60 Stat. 416. Opinion of the Court. 347 U.S. The Government urges that the reference in § 8 (a)(1) to "citizens of the Philippine Islands" includes Filipinos then residing in the United States; that by virtue of this provision the respondent was assimilated to the status of an alien for purposes of "immigration, exclusion, or expulsion"; and that, having been twice convicted thereafter of crimes involving moral turpitude, he is deportable under § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917. The Government's argument is premised on the assumption that respondent made an "entry" within the meaning of § 19 (a). If he did not make such an "entry," then he is not deportable under that section, even assuming that the Government is correct in its broad construction of the 1934 Philippine Independence Act. Section 19 (a) provides: . . . except as hereinafter provided, any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States, or who is hereafter sentenced more than once to such a term of imprisonment because of conviction in this country of any crime involving moral turpitude, committed at any time after entry . . . shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported. . . ." (Italics added.) The Court of Appeals sustained respondent's contention that he had never made the requisite "entry." With this conclusion, we agree. The Government would have us interpret "entry" in § 19 (a) in its "ordinary, everyday sense" of a "coming into the United States." Under this view, respondent's "coming into the United States" from the Philippine |