Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 àÁ.Â. 2004 - 348 ˹éÒ Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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˹éÒ 2
... able the crisis country to make payments on at least those debts that are coming due immediately . The country uses the financial reprieve to take steps to correct its macroeconomic problems . If all goes well , it regains ac- cess to ...
... able the crisis country to make payments on at least those debts that are coming due immediately . The country uses the financial reprieve to take steps to correct its macroeconomic problems . If all goes well , it regains ac- cess to ...
˹éÒ 3
... able to reach agreement with its creditors on a consensual rollover agreement or restructuring to avoid an outright default . Even if a restructuring were to leave both the country and its creditors collectively better off , every ...
... able to reach agreement with its creditors on a consensual rollover agreement or restructuring to avoid an outright default . Even if a restructuring were to leave both the country and its creditors collectively better off , every ...
˹éÒ 4
... able to put enough money on the table to be sure that it could stop runs on countries . Back in 1995 , Jeffrey Sachs laid out the case for both an inter- national lender of last resort and a sovereign bankruptcy regime.4 Others have ...
... able to put enough money on the table to be sure that it could stop runs on countries . Back in 1995 , Jeffrey Sachs laid out the case for both an inter- national lender of last resort and a sovereign bankruptcy regime.4 Others have ...
˹éÒ 5
... able to lend more to try to avert a deeper crisis . Rather than being in a position to help shape the country's policies during its restructuring , the IMF is left negotiating to get its money back as the crisis country falls off a ...
... able to lend more to try to avert a deeper crisis . Rather than being in a position to help shape the country's policies during its restructuring , the IMF is left negotiating to get its money back as the crisis country falls off a ...
˹éÒ 15
... able to borrow from private banks and private capital markets at home and from abroad when times are good but that cannot always access cap- ital markets when financial trouble emerges . They are not the advanced economies such as the G ...
... able to borrow from private banks and private capital markets at home and from abroad when times are good but that cannot always access cap- ital markets when financial trouble emerges . They are not the advanced economies such as the G ...
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adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
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˹éÒ 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
˹éÒ 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as