Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 àÁ.Â. 2004 - 348 ˹éÒ Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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... agreement - which was always difficult to achieve with the crisis country's creditors to defer payments , the coun- try would default . Few international economic issues have generated more controversy among policymakers than deciding ...
... agreement - which was always difficult to achieve with the crisis country's creditors to defer payments , the coun- try would default . Few international economic issues have generated more controversy among policymakers than deciding ...
˹éÒ 2
... agreement with its creditors in order to receive an IMF loan , or they can go one step further and help the country orga- nize a rollover agreement or a bond exchange . Both an IMF loan and a debt restructuring are ways of giving a ...
... agreement with its creditors in order to receive an IMF loan , or they can go one step further and help the country orga- nize a rollover agreement or a bond exchange . Both an IMF loan and a debt restructuring are ways of giving a ...
˹éÒ 3
... agreement with its creditors on a consensual rollover agreement or restructuring to avoid an outright default . Even if a restructuring were to leave both the country and its creditors collectively better off , every individual creditor ...
... agreement with its creditors on a consensual rollover agreement or restructuring to avoid an outright default . Even if a restructuring were to leave both the country and its creditors collectively better off , every individual creditor ...
˹éÒ 6
... agreement with its creditors ? Could protection from litigation substitute for official lending or , at least , make it easier for the IMF and the G - 7 to refuse the country asking for a large bailout ? The official sector remains ...
... agreement with its creditors ? Could protection from litigation substitute for official lending or , at least , make it easier for the IMF and the G - 7 to refuse the country asking for a large bailout ? The official sector remains ...
˹éÒ 7
... agreement on the role the IMF and the G - 7 should play when a country needs to restructure its debts to avoid sinking deeper into crisis . The Bush administration believes that sovereign debt problems should be left to the markets to ...
... agreement on the role the IMF and the G - 7 should play when a country needs to restructure its debts to avoid sinking deeper into crisis . The Bush administration believes that sovereign debt problems should be left to the markets to ...
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˹éÒ 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
˹éÒ 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as