Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 àÁ.Â. 2004 - 348 ˹éÒ Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
¨Ò¡´éÒ¹ã¹Ë¹Ñ§Ê×Í
¼Å¡Òäé¹ËÒ 1 - 5 ¨Ò¡ 79
˹éÒ 12
... allow a supermajority of bondholders to amend the bond's fi- nancial terms . Some bond contracts also include provisions that make it difficult for an in- dividual creditor to initiate litigation and keep all the proceeds of the ...
... allow a supermajority of bondholders to amend the bond's fi- nancial terms . Some bond contracts also include provisions that make it difficult for an in- dividual creditor to initiate litigation and keep all the proceeds of the ...
˹éÒ 15
... contrast , emphasize that sound policies sustained over time can allow a country to build a market for its own local - currency debt . Different Countries , Different Crises , Different Solutions A surge INTRODUCTION 15 VIII.
... contrast , emphasize that sound policies sustained over time can allow a country to build a market for its own local - currency debt . Different Countries , Different Crises , Different Solutions A surge INTRODUCTION 15 VIII.
˹éÒ 50
... allows it to retain the confidence of investors even in times of stress , preventing potential financial weaknesses ... allow for multiple equilibria . Both the good no - run equilibrium and the bad - run equilibrium are possible . Such ...
... allows it to retain the confidence of investors even in times of stress , preventing potential financial weaknesses ... allow for multiple equilibria . Both the good no - run equilibrium and the bad - run equilibrium are possible . Such ...
˹éÒ 54
... allowed to fail created distorted incentives , with too much borrowing from abroad and too much investment in mar- ginal projects . These distorted incentives became particularly dangerous when combined with partial capital account ...
... allowed to fail created distorted incentives , with too much borrowing from abroad and too much investment in mar- ginal projects . These distorted incentives became particularly dangerous when combined with partial capital account ...
˹éÒ 57
... allow local banks to borrow from abroad before it lifted restrictions on FDI , a particularly dan- gerous way of sequencing capital account liberalization . The result was a clear mismatch between the short - term external borrowing of ...
... allow local banks to borrow from abroad before it lifted restrictions on FDI , a particularly dan- gerous way of sequencing capital account liberalization . The result was a clear mismatch between the short - term external borrowing of ...
©ºÑºÍ×è¹æ - ´Ù·Ñé§ËÁ´
¤ÓáÅÐÇÅÕ·Õ辺ºèÍÂ
adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
º·¤ÇÒÁ·Õèà»ç¹·Õè¹ÔÂÁ
˹éÒ 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
˹éÒ 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as