Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 àÁ.Â. 2004 - 348 ˹éÒ Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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˹éÒ 7
... billion of its $ 22 billion IMF credit line ( 8 percent of precrisis GDP ) before defaulting . Turkey has received $ 23 billion from the IMF , around 11 percent of its precrisis GDP . It also recently reached agreement to get an ...
... billion of its $ 22 billion IMF credit line ( 8 percent of precrisis GDP ) before defaulting . Turkey has received $ 23 billion from the IMF , around 11 percent of its precrisis GDP . It also recently reached agreement to get an ...
˹éÒ 8
... billions of dollars As percent As percent In billions As percent of GDP of quota of dollars of GDP Mexico ( 1995 ) 688 18.0 4.4 500 13.1 3.2 500 13.1 3.2 Thailand ( 1997 ) 505 3.9 2.2 470 3.7 2.0 366 2.8 1.6 Indonesia ( 1997 ) 557 11.3 ...
... billions of dollars As percent As percent In billions As percent of GDP of quota of dollars of GDP Mexico ( 1995 ) 688 18.0 4.4 500 13.1 3.2 500 13.1 3.2 Thailand ( 1997 ) 505 3.9 2.2 470 3.7 2.0 366 2.8 1.6 Indonesia ( 1997 ) 557 11.3 ...
˹éÒ 9
... billion- before it defaulted . Between mid - 1996 and the end of 1998 , the IMF in- creased its outstanding credit by $ 38 billion in response to the crises in Asia , Russia , and Brazil . Between September 2000 and September 2003 , the ...
... billion- before it defaulted . Between mid - 1996 and the end of 1998 , the IMF in- creased its outstanding credit by $ 38 billion in response to the crises in Asia , Russia , and Brazil . Between September 2000 and September 2003 , the ...
˹éÒ 10
... billion . A reasonable estimate of the amount of outstand- ing international sovereign bonds issued by emerging economies is $ 370 billion.11 Bonds are long - term obligations , so the IMF can usually put more money into a country than ...
... billion . A reasonable estimate of the amount of outstand- ing international sovereign bonds issued by emerging economies is $ 370 billion.11 Bonds are long - term obligations , so the IMF can usually put more money into a country than ...
˹éÒ 11
... billion of a total of $ 875 billion in external claims on nine major emerging economies ; bonds held abroad accounted for $ 345 billion . At the end of 2001 , total exposure had fallen to $ 809 billion , bank claims to $ 477 billion ...
... billion of a total of $ 875 billion in external claims on nine major emerging economies ; bonds held abroad accounted for $ 345 billion . At the end of 2001 , total exposure had fallen to $ 809 billion , bank claims to $ 477 billion ...
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adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
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˹éÒ 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
˹éÒ 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as