Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 àÁ.Â. 2004 - 348 ˹éÒ Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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... capital markets , and that it has perhaps even lost the confidence of its own citizens . Without a large rescue loan , the coun- try will be forced to devalue its currency and either default on its govern- ment debt or be unable to help ...
... capital markets , and that it has perhaps even lost the confidence of its own citizens . Without a large rescue loan , the coun- try will be forced to devalue its currency and either default on its govern- ment debt or be unable to help ...
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... capital markets at home and from abroad when times are good but that cannot always access cap- ital markets when financial trouble emerges . They are not the advanced economies such as the G - 7 - whose government debt is considered to ...
... capital markets at home and from abroad when times are good but that cannot always access cap- ital markets when financial trouble emerges . They are not the advanced economies such as the G - 7 - whose government debt is considered to ...
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... capital flight . A rescue loan typically covers only the most obvious sources of payment difficulties . It works only if additional sources of financial pressure do not materialize . Countries are also extremely relucant to impose a ...
... capital flight . A rescue loan typically covers only the most obvious sources of payment difficulties . It works only if additional sources of financial pressure do not materialize . Countries are also extremely relucant to impose a ...
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... capital account liberalization is highly contested : Stiglitz ( 2002 ) and Rodrik and Kaplan ( 2001 ) offer a skeptical perspective of the benefits of capital account liberalization . 2. Mexico , Thailand , Korea , Indonesia , Malaysia ...
... capital account liberalization is highly contested : Stiglitz ( 2002 ) and Rodrik and Kaplan ( 2001 ) offer a skeptical perspective of the benefits of capital account liberalization . 2. Mexico , Thailand , Korea , Indonesia , Malaysia ...
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... capital flows into the crisis country . This fall in capital flows , in turn , often cre- ates financial difficulties for banks , firms , and sovereign governments , which count on continuous access to market financing both to cover ...
... capital flows into the crisis country . This fall in capital flows , in turn , often cre- ates financial difficulties for banks , firms , and sovereign governments , which count on continuous access to market financing both to cover ...
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˹éÒ 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
˹éÒ 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as