Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 àÁ.Â. 2004 - 348 ˹éÒ Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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... effectively . We therefore focus on practical ideas for improving the official sector's capacity to respond to emerging - market financial crises . Some institutional reforms might make a bond restructuring or an interbank rollover ...
... effectively . We therefore focus on practical ideas for improving the official sector's capacity to respond to emerging - market financial crises . Some institutional reforms might make a bond restructuring or an interbank rollover ...
˹éÒ 6
... effectively to crises . Despite recent efforts to clarify the IMF's access policy , its major shareholders - the countries that control the majority of the voting power on the IMF's Executive Board - simply don't agree on the right ...
... effectively to crises . Despite recent efforts to clarify the IMF's access policy , its major shareholders - the countries that control the majority of the voting power on the IMF's Executive Board - simply don't agree on the right ...
˹éÒ 38
... effectively bet that the one - to - one parity between the dollar and peso , which was embedded in Argentina's currency board , 13. See Calvo and Vegh ( 1999 ) for an analysis of such exchange rate - based stabilization programs . would ...
... effectively bet that the one - to - one parity between the dollar and peso , which was embedded in Argentina's currency board , 13. See Calvo and Vegh ( 1999 ) for an analysis of such exchange rate - based stabilization programs . would ...
˹éÒ 52
... effectively fixed exchange rate resulted in significant real appreci- ation of the peso and a large and growing current account deficit . Fis- cal deficits were moderate and not the primary drivers of the current account deficit ...
... effectively fixed exchange rate resulted in significant real appreci- ation of the peso and a large and growing current account deficit . Fis- cal deficits were moderate and not the primary drivers of the current account deficit ...
˹éÒ 53
... Asian - crisis countries had effectively , even if not for- mally , fixed or semi - fixed exchange rates . Most of them favored financing these deficits with debt rather than equity : The external NEW NATURE OF EMERGING - MARKET CRISES 53.
... Asian - crisis countries had effectively , even if not for- mally , fixed or semi - fixed exchange rates . Most of them favored financing these deficits with debt rather than equity : The external NEW NATURE OF EMERGING - MARKET CRISES 53.
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adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
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˹éÒ 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
˹éÒ 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as