Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 เม.ย. 2004 - 348 หน้า Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 79
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... incentives of the country and its creditors alike . If countries are spared the costs of run- ning dangerous policies and if creditors do not pay any price for financing sketchy countries , then risky policies and bets become more ...
... incentives of the country and its creditors alike . If countries are spared the costs of run- ning dangerous policies and if creditors do not pay any price for financing sketchy countries , then risky policies and bets become more ...
หน้า 21
... - ger fall in output , and its creditors avoid bigger losses . Of course , any steps to soften the blow of a restructuring could , at the margin , reduce a country's incentives for prudent policies . We think that this INTRODUCTION 21 X.
... - ger fall in output , and its creditors avoid bigger losses . Of course , any steps to soften the blow of a restructuring could , at the margin , reduce a country's incentives for prudent policies . We think that this INTRODUCTION 21 X.
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Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini, Brad Setser. country's incentives for prudent policies . We think that this risk is man- ageable , though , and it is better to step in and help than run the risk that ...
Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini, Brad Setser. country's incentives for prudent policies . We think that this risk is man- ageable , though , and it is better to step in and help than run the risk that ...
หน้า 40
... incentives in the finan- cial sector can be particularly dangerous when combined with the early stages of capital account liberalization , as the opportunity for domestic fi- nancial and nonfinancial institutions to borrow from abroad ...
... incentives in the finan- cial sector can be particularly dangerous when combined with the early stages of capital account liberalization , as the opportunity for domestic fi- nancial and nonfinancial institutions to borrow from abroad ...
หน้า 54
... incentives , with too much borrowing from abroad and too much investment in mar- ginal projects . These distorted incentives became particularly dangerous when combined with partial capital account liberalization in the 1990s , as ...
... incentives , with too much borrowing from abroad and too much investment in mar- ginal projects . These distorted incentives became particularly dangerous when combined with partial capital account liberalization in the 1990s , as ...
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adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
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หน้า 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
หน้า 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as