Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 àÁ.Â. 2004 - 348 ˹éÒ Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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˹éÒ 9
... increased its outstanding credit by $ 48 billion in response to the crises in Turkey and a series of Latin American economies.10 10. As important , three years after the Asian crisis , the crisis countries made large net re- payments to ...
... increased its outstanding credit by $ 48 billion in response to the crises in Turkey and a series of Latin American economies.10 10. As important , three years after the Asian crisis , the crisis countries made large net re- payments to ...
˹éÒ 15
... increase in conces- sional , multilateral development aid to jumpstart growth in the poorest countries ( Jeffrey Sachs , " Doing the Sums on Africa , " The Economist , May 20 , 2004 ) . 20. Eichengreen , Hausmann , and Panizza ( 2003 ) ...
... increase in conces- sional , multilateral development aid to jumpstart growth in the poorest countries ( Jeffrey Sachs , " Doing the Sums on Africa , " The Economist , May 20 , 2004 ) . 20. Eichengreen , Hausmann , and Panizza ( 2003 ) ...
˹éÒ 17
... increase sharply after a large devaluation . Those that de- pend on oil for most of their revenues often are vulnerable to adverse oil- price shocks . The ability of countries with the same level of debt to deliver on promises to change ...
... increase sharply after a large devaluation . Those that de- pend on oil for most of their revenues often are vulnerable to adverse oil- price shocks . The ability of countries with the same level of debt to deliver on promises to change ...
˹éÒ 20
... increase in size , despite the IMF's very real effort to improve the analytics behind its assessment of debt ... increase as the amount of ef- fort that is required increases . Similar crises should be treated similarly , but not all 20 ...
... increase in size , despite the IMF's very real effort to improve the analytics behind its assessment of debt ... increase as the amount of ef- fort that is required increases . Similar crises should be treated similarly , but not all 20 ...
˹éÒ 26
... increase in the burden of these foreign- currency debts after the exchange rate collapses makes it harder for banks , firms , and the government alike to service their long - term debts , let alone convince creditors to refinance ...
... increase in the burden of these foreign- currency debts after the exchange rate collapses makes it harder for banks , firms , and the government alike to service their long - term debts , let alone convince creditors to refinance ...
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˹éÒ 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
˹éÒ 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as