Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 àÁ.Â. 2004 - 348 ˹éÒ Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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... lending at some unspecified point in the future - calls that lack credibility , as recent experience suggests they will be ignored in the heat of crisis . Far better , the authors argue , is to define the set of problems that large ...
... lending at some unspecified point in the future - calls that lack credibility , as recent experience suggests they will be ignored in the heat of crisis . Far better , the authors argue , is to define the set of problems that large ...
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... lending limits compared with actual lending Exposure of official sector , annual data 132 353 380 Table A.2 Exposure of private creditors , annual data 382 Table A.3 Summary of past restructuring cases 383 Figures Figure 1.1 IMF loans ...
... lending limits compared with actual lending Exposure of official sector , annual data 132 353 380 Table A.2 Exposure of private creditors , annual data 382 Table A.3 Summary of past restructuring cases 383 Figures Figure 1.1 IMF loans ...
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... lending to countries that discover macroeconomic virtue only when they are close to default and that instead it lend large sums only to countries with good policies that qualified in advance for extra protection - assuming those ...
... lending to countries that discover macroeconomic virtue only when they are close to default and that instead it lend large sums only to countries with good policies that qualified in advance for extra protection - assuming those ...
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... lending acceptable only if it is balanced by a commensurate commitment by private creditors to restructure their claims to help the crisis country ? If the IMF is going to lend less , should the IMF or the G - 7 countries - do more to ...
... lending acceptable only if it is balanced by a commensurate commitment by private creditors to restructure their claims to help the crisis country ? If the IMF is going to lend less , should the IMF or the G - 7 countries - do more to ...
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... lending . Figure 1.2 IMF lending , 1997-98 versus 2000-02 billions of INTRODUCTION 9 VII.
... lending . Figure 1.2 IMF lending , 1997-98 versus 2000-02 billions of INTRODUCTION 9 VII.
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˹éÒ 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
˹éÒ 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as