Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 àÁ.Â. 2004 - 348 ˹éÒ Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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... Liquidity Shortages 207 When Is Official Liquidity Support Warranted ? 208 Are Targeted Debt Reschedulings Inequitable ? Risks of Gradual Escalation 219 220 Case for Pragmatism 220 Private - Sector Financial Difficulties 221 Alternative ...
... Liquidity Shortages 207 When Is Official Liquidity Support Warranted ? 208 Are Targeted Debt Reschedulings Inequitable ? Risks of Gradual Escalation 219 220 Case for Pragmatism 220 Private - Sector Financial Difficulties 221 Alternative ...
˹éÒ 5
... liquidity crisis , just as holding reserves can be viewed as a form of insurance . The analogy to 6. Payments to the IMF are traditionally given priority over payments to other unsecured creditors . Using an IMF loan to repay existing ...
... liquidity crisis , just as holding reserves can be viewed as a form of insurance . The analogy to 6. Payments to the IMF are traditionally given priority over payments to other unsecured creditors . Using an IMF loan to repay existing ...
˹éÒ 20
... liquidity insurance " to emerging economies , not a game plan for getting out of the business of providing liquidity insurance altogether . Insisting that limits are around the corner has become a way to avoid carefully considering ...
... liquidity insurance " to emerging economies , not a game plan for getting out of the business of providing liquidity insurance altogether . Insisting that limits are around the corner has become a way to avoid carefully considering ...
˹éÒ 28
... Liquidity / rollover risk Short - term foreign debt ( percent of reserves ) 203 289 136 158 M2 / reserves High 6.2 4.0 6.6 3.5 995 49 255 6.2 Country solvency risk External debt ( percent of GDP ) 33 31 60 43 38 38 335 External debt ...
... Liquidity / rollover risk Short - term foreign debt ( percent of reserves ) 203 289 136 158 M2 / reserves High 6.2 4.0 6.6 3.5 995 49 255 6.2 Country solvency risk External debt ( percent of GDP ) 33 31 60 43 38 38 335 External debt ...
˹éÒ 32
... liquidity runs and increased the risk of a fall in the ex- change rate leading to a debt crisis because of the depreciation's " bal- ance sheet " effect ; □ doubts about the credibility of a country's commitment to take the policy ...
... liquidity runs and increased the risk of a fall in the ex- change rate leading to a debt crisis because of the depreciation's " bal- ance sheet " effect ; □ doubts about the credibility of a country's commitment to take the policy ...
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˹éÒ 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
˹éÒ 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as