Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 àÁ.Â. 2004 - 348 ˹éÒ Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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... loan or an agreement - which was always difficult to achieve with the crisis country's creditors to defer payments ... loans with analysis of attempts to con- vince private creditors to provide emergency financing to crisis countries ...
... loan or an agreement - which was always difficult to achieve with the crisis country's creditors to defer payments ... loans with analysis of attempts to con- vince private creditors to provide emergency financing to crisis countries ...
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... loans outstanding Figure 4.2 IMF and ESF loans outstanding Figure 4.3 IMF and bilateral loans outstanding Figure 9.1 Net private debt flows to emerging markets , 1993-2004 Figure 9.2 Matrix formulation of crisis resolution approach 9 10 ...
... loans outstanding Figure 4.2 IMF and ESF loans outstanding Figure 4.3 IMF and bilateral loans outstanding Figure 9.1 Net private debt flows to emerging markets , 1993-2004 Figure 9.2 Matrix formulation of crisis resolution approach 9 10 ...
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... loans are not gifts : IMF loans have to be repaid with interest , as do loans from the G - 7 or G - 10 , the World Bank , and other multilateral development banks ( MDBs ) . The other option is to encourage the country to ask its ...
... loans are not gifts : IMF loans have to be repaid with interest , as do loans from the G - 7 or G - 10 , the World Bank , and other multilateral development banks ( MDBs ) . The other option is to encourage the country to ask its ...
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... loans " and " bailouts " as shorthand to refer to the IMF's financial support to crisis countries . Other terms sound too bland or too euphemistic . Analytically , though , we do not want to endorse fully either the positive con ...
... loans " and " bailouts " as shorthand to refer to the IMF's financial support to crisis countries . Other terms sound too bland or too euphemistic . Analytically , though , we do not want to endorse fully either the positive con ...
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... loans to countries that have temporary financial difficulties risks pushing them into an eco- nomic and financial ... loan to repay existing private debts therefore substitutes debt that can be restructured with debt that by tradition is ...
... loans to countries that have temporary financial difficulties risks pushing them into an eco- nomic and financial ... loan to repay existing private debts therefore substitutes debt that can be restructured with debt that by tradition is ...
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˹éÒ 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
˹éÒ 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as