Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 เม.ย. 2004 - 348 หน้า Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 83
หน้า 3
... loss of confidence in the country's cur- rency and banking system . Moreover , there is no guarantee that the coun- try will be able to reach agreement with its creditors on a consensual rollover agreement or restructuring to avoid an ...
... loss of confidence in the country's cur- rency and banking system . Moreover , there is no guarantee that the coun- try will be able to reach agreement with its creditors on a consensual rollover agreement or restructuring to avoid an ...
หน้า 5
... losses from an uncontained crisis typically spill over beyond the crisis country's borders , and its policy choices will influ- ence expectations about how other countries will act when they get into trouble . 6 Yet spending large ...
... losses from an uncontained crisis typically spill over beyond the crisis country's borders , and its policy choices will influ- ence expectations about how other countries will act when they get into trouble . 6 Yet spending large ...
หน้า 14
... loss to taxpayers , but it also avoids the need for depositors ( and sometimes even the shareholders ) in the bad bank to take losses . To be sure , international taxpayers put up the money needed to make an IMF loan . But they also ...
... loss to taxpayers , but it also avoids the need for depositors ( and sometimes even the shareholders ) in the bad bank to take losses . To be sure , international taxpayers put up the money needed to make an IMF loan . But they also ...
หน้า 19
... loss of confidence has eliminated all other options . Targeted restructurings are more common . Academic models often try to clarify the core choice between a bailout and a bail - in . In practice , however , it is often possible to ...
... loss of confidence has eliminated all other options . Targeted restructurings are more common . Academic models often try to clarify the core choice between a bailout and a bail - in . In practice , however , it is often possible to ...
หน้า 21
... ger fall in output , and its creditors avoid bigger losses . Of course , any steps to soften the blow of a restructuring could , at the margin , reduce a country's incentives for prudent policies . We think that this INTRODUCTION 21 X.
... ger fall in output , and its creditors avoid bigger losses . Of course , any steps to soften the blow of a restructuring could , at the margin , reduce a country's incentives for prudent policies . We think that this INTRODUCTION 21 X.
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
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หน้า 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
หน้า 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as