Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 àÁ.Â. 2004 - 348 ˹éÒ Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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... offers over safer financial as- sets like US treasuries implies at least the occasional restructuring , if not outright default . Many look to the corporate bond market and dream of a world where sovereign governments - or , for that ...
... offers over safer financial as- sets like US treasuries implies at least the occasional restructuring , if not outright default . Many look to the corporate bond market and dream of a world where sovereign governments - or , for that ...
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... offers the best way to help cushion the blow to the domestic economy likely to re- sult from decisive action by an emerging - market government to address its debt problem . A run on the currency that leads the country's exchange rate ...
... offers the best way to help cushion the blow to the domestic economy likely to re- sult from decisive action by an emerging - market government to address its debt problem . A run on the currency that leads the country's exchange rate ...
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... offering a chronological account of what happened in each case , the chapter is orga- nized around the official sector's experience with different policy tools . Chapter 5 reviews the evolution of " official " G - 7 and IMF policy . It ...
... offering a chronological account of what happened in each case , the chapter is orga- nized around the official sector's experience with different policy tools . Chapter 5 reviews the evolution of " official " G - 7 and IMF policy . It ...
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... offer a skeptical perspective of the benefits of capital account liberalization . 2. Mexico , Thailand , Korea , Indonesia , Malaysia , Russia , Brazil , and Uruguay all had had soft pegs or pegged but adjustable exchange rates before ...
... offer a skeptical perspective of the benefits of capital account liberalization . 2. Mexico , Thailand , Korea , Indonesia , Malaysia , Russia , Brazil , and Uruguay all had had soft pegs or pegged but adjustable exchange rates before ...
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... offering investors insurance against the risk of devaluation ) to defend the baht - dollar peg . This scale of its for- ward book was hidden from the public . In the end , the central bank's commitment to sell dollars in the future ...
... offering investors insurance against the risk of devaluation ) to defend the baht - dollar peg . This scale of its for- ward book was hidden from the public . In the end , the central bank's commitment to sell dollars in the future ...
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˹éÒ 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
˹éÒ 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as