Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 àÁ.Â. 2004 - 348 ˹éÒ Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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... pressure on crisis countries , that the absence of formal protection from ex- ternal litigation is not the most important problem that arises in a sover- eign debt restructuring , and that the recent success of efforts to introduce ...
... pressure on crisis countries , that the absence of formal protection from ex- ternal litigation is not the most important problem that arises in a sover- eign debt restructuring , and that the recent success of efforts to introduce ...
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... pressure on crisis countries . The pressures that can come from cross - border bank lending and the roll - off of domestic debts and bank de- posits can overwhelm even large IMF packages.12 11. The IMF ( September 2003a ) estimated the ...
... pressure on crisis countries . The pressures that can come from cross - border bank lending and the roll - off of domestic debts and bank de- posits can overwhelm even large IMF packages.12 11. The IMF ( September 2003a ) estimated the ...
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... pressure on reserves . 13. Data are from the World Bank's Global Development Finance ( 2003 ) . Bond data include bonds issued both by the public and private sectors , and bank loan data include bank loans to both the public and private ...
... pressure on reserves . 13. Data are from the World Bank's Global Development Finance ( 2003 ) . Bond data include bonds issued both by the public and private sectors , and bank loan data include bank loans to both the public and private ...
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... pressure on the bonds ' market price , not on the country's reserves . Hold- ers of short - term debt , in contrast , have a contractual right to exchange their claims for the country's scarce cash the day their debt comes due . The ...
... pressure on the bonds ' market price , not on the country's reserves . Hold- ers of short - term debt , in contrast , have a contractual right to exchange their claims for the country's scarce cash the day their debt comes due . The ...
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... pressure on the country's re- serves under a fixed exchange rate , on its exchange rate under a float , or if the country has a managed float , on both reserves and the exchange rate . Sergei Dubinin , the chairman of Russia's central ...
... pressure on the country's re- serves under a fixed exchange rate , on its exchange rate under a float , or if the country has a managed float , on both reserves and the exchange rate . Sergei Dubinin , the chairman of Russia's central ...
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˹éÒ 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
˹éÒ 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as