Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 เม.ย. 2004 - 348 หน้า Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 61
หน้า
... requires moving beyond a policy framework based on calls to limit IMF lending at some unspecified point in the future - calls that lack credibility , as recent experience suggests they will be ignored in the heat of crisis . Far better ...
... requires moving beyond a policy framework based on calls to limit IMF lending at some unspecified point in the future - calls that lack credibility , as recent experience suggests they will be ignored in the heat of crisis . Far better ...
หน้า 2
... requires at least the implicit threat that the country will halt pay- ments if the creditors do not agree . The IMF , G - 7 , and others can tell the country that it must reach agreement with its creditors in order to receive an IMF ...
... requires at least the implicit threat that the country will halt pay- ments if the creditors do not agree . The IMF , G - 7 , and others can tell the country that it must reach agreement with its creditors in order to receive an IMF ...
หน้า 3
... requires that the country , with the implicit backing of the IMF , break its contractual promise to pay creditors in full and on time . Doing so risks triggering a broader loss of confidence in the country's cur- rency and banking ...
... requires that the country , with the implicit backing of the IMF , break its contractual promise to pay creditors in full and on time . Doing so risks triggering a broader loss of confidence in the country's cur- rency and banking ...
หน้า 13
... requires defining a number of often poorly understood terms . " Bailout " sounds pejorative . But there is a meaningful difference between the type of " bailouts " the IMF has provided to crisis countries 16. For details of the IMF's ...
... requires defining a number of often poorly understood terms . " Bailout " sounds pejorative . But there is a meaningful difference between the type of " bailouts " the IMF has provided to crisis countries 16. For details of the IMF's ...
หน้า 14
... require giving a troubled bank a government bond — a new financial asset - to make up for its bad loan portfolio . This bond is a true financial loss to taxpayers , but it also avoids the need for depositors ( and sometimes even the ...
... require giving a troubled bank a government bond — a new financial asset - to make up for its bad loan portfolio . This bond is a true financial loss to taxpayers , but it also avoids the need for depositors ( and sometimes even the ...
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
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หน้า 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
หน้า 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as