Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 เม.ย. 2004 - 348 หน้า Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 77
หน้า
... sovereign bonds have not been the most important source of financial pressure on crisis countries , that the absence of formal protection from ex- ternal litigation is not the most important problem that arises in a sover- eign debt ...
... sovereign bonds have not been the most important source of financial pressure on crisis countries , that the absence of formal protection from ex- ternal litigation is not the most important problem that arises in a sover- eign debt ...
หน้า 11
... sovereign debt of an emerging economy , even though this combination is particularly risky . At the end of 2000 , banks held $ 530 billion of a total of $ 875 billion in external claims on nine major emerging economies ; bonds held ...
... sovereign debt of an emerging economy , even though this combination is particularly risky . At the end of 2000 , banks held $ 530 billion of a total of $ 875 billion in external claims on nine major emerging economies ; bonds held ...
หน้า 23
... sovereign debt restructurings could be made less disorderly and costly if claims against a sovereign could be ranked according to a more precise system of priorities , as well as the practical obstacles to establish- ing an enforceable ...
... sovereign debt restructurings could be made less disorderly and costly if claims against a sovereign could be ranked according to a more precise system of priorities , as well as the practical obstacles to establish- ing an enforceable ...
หน้า 26
... sovereign pay- ments crises . Several reasons exist for the strong correlation between the collapse of an exchange rate peg - or for that matter sharp falls in the value of a float- ing currency and payments problems . The need to let ...
... sovereign pay- ments crises . Several reasons exist for the strong correlation between the collapse of an exchange rate peg - or for that matter sharp falls in the value of a float- ing currency and payments problems . The need to let ...
หน้า 77
... sovereign government creates a potential " unwilling- ness to pay " problem . A sovereign that has the ability to pay may refuse to do so and default " opportunistically . " This is a particular risk with sovereign borrowing because a ...
... sovereign government creates a potential " unwilling- ness to pay " problem . A sovereign that has the ability to pay may refuse to do so and default " opportunistically . " This is a particular risk with sovereign borrowing because a ...
ฉบับอื่นๆ - ดูทั้งหมด
คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
บทความที่เป็นที่นิยม
หน้า 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
หน้า 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as