Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 àÁ.Â. 2004 - 348 ˹éÒ Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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˹éÒ 1
... standstill . This book is about how to answer that phone call . The list of countries that have asked the official sector1 for help since 1994 is long and covers all parts of the globe . It includes major emerging economies like Mexico ...
... standstill . This book is about how to answer that phone call . The list of countries that have asked the official sector1 for help since 1994 is long and covers all parts of the globe . It includes major emerging economies like Mexico ...
˹éÒ 18
... standstill or default ) . However , this works only if creditors and domestic investors that are not locked in opt not to flee . Creditors and investors who have not been forced to defer payments need to be convinced that the partial ...
... standstill or default ) . However , this works only if creditors and domestic investors that are not locked in opt not to flee . Creditors and investors who have not been forced to defer payments need to be convinced that the partial ...
˹éÒ 19
... stand- still that locks in everyone who has invested in or lent to the country at the early stages of a crisis . A total standstill - full suspension of sovereign payments , comprehensive capital controls on private payments , suspen ...
... stand- still that locks in everyone who has invested in or lent to the country at the early stages of a crisis . A total standstill - full suspension of sovereign payments , comprehensive capital controls on private payments , suspen ...
˹éÒ 77
... standstill is only equivalent to a lender of last resort if there are no doubts about the debtor's solvency , and creditors are not risk averse . In practice , those who worry most about the risk of a run tend to emphasize the need for ...
... standstill is only equivalent to a lender of last resort if there are no doubts about the debtor's solvency , and creditors are not risk averse . In practice , those who worry most about the risk of a run tend to emphasize the need for ...
˹éÒ 93
... standstill and a rescue loan from an institu- tion like the IMF , which provides sufficient liquidity to cover all near - term payments . This raises two issues : First , how strong is the argument that a standstill offers as effective ...
... standstill and a rescue loan from an institu- tion like the IMF , which provides sufficient liquidity to cover all near - term payments . This raises two issues : First , how strong is the argument that a standstill offers as effective ...
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adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
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˹éÒ 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
˹éÒ 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as