Definitions of the term "conduct," p. 202 sq.-The meaning of the word "
p. 203 sq.-The meaning of the word "intention," p. 204.-There can be
only one intention in one act, p. 204 sq.-The moral judgments which we
pass on acts do not really relate to the event, but to the intention, p. 205 sq.
-A person morally accountable also for his deliberate wishes, p. 206.—A
deliberate wish is a volition, p. 206 sq.-The meaning of the word “ motive,"
p. 207.-Motives which are volitions fall within the sphere of moral valuation,
ibid. The motive of an act may be an intention, but an intention belonging
to another act, ibid.-Even motives which consist of non-volitional cona-
tions may indirectly exercise much influence on moral judgments, p.
207 sq.-Refutation of Mill's statement that "the motive has nothing to
do with the morality of the action," p. 208 sq.-Moral judgments really
passed upon men as acting or willing, not upon acts or volitions in the abstract,
p. 209.-Forbearances morally equivalent to acts, p. 209 sq.-Distinction
between forbearances and omissions, p. 210.-Moral judgments refer not
only to willing, but to not-willing as well, not only to acts and forbearances,
but to omissions, p. 210 sq.-Negligence, heedlessness, and rashness, p. 211.
-Moral judgments of blame concerned with not-willing only in so far as this
not-willing is attributed to a defect of the "will," p. 211 sq.-Distinction
between conscious omissions and forbearances, and between not-willing to
refrain from doing and willing to do, p. 212.-The "known concomitants of
acts," p. 213.-Absence of volitions also gives rise to moral praise, p. 213 sq.
-The meaning of the term "conduct," p. 214.-The subject of a moral
judgment is, strictly speaking, a person's will, or character, conceived as the
cause either of volitions or of the absence of volitions, p. 214 sq.-Moral judg-
ments that are passed on emotions or opinions really refer to the will, p. 215 sq.