Political Corruption: In Beyond the Nation StateRoutledge, 16 ¸.¤. 2003 - 264 ˹éÒ This book, combining scholarship with readability, shows that political corruption must itself be analysed politically. Spectacularly corrupt politicians - the exception rather than the rule - are usually symptoms, not causes, and much political corruption is simply normal politics taken to excess. But in a world in which anti-corruption strategies themselves are often thinly disguised examples of political corruption, the ways in which political systems address their own corruption are as varied and fascinating in character as crucial to comprehend. A valuable read for anyone studying social science disciplines such as politics, international relations, sociology, anthropology, criminology and public policy. As well as the global community of anti-corruption activists, professional politicians, police, business people and lawyers. |
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... President, the President's freedom to govern is inhibited by Madisonian checks and balances designed to keep him in semi-permanent tension with Congress. Hence Nixon is better understood not as a uniquely evil man, which he certainly ...
... President, the President's freedom to govern is inhibited by Madisonian checks and balances designed to keep him in semi-permanent tension with Congress. Hence Nixon is better understood not as a uniquely evil man, which he certainly ...
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... President Trujillo, the `benefactor' of the Dominican Republic (1930±61), took over the country's only shoe factory there was no secret about the ensuing decree forbidding anyone in the capital from going barefoot. . . . Likewise President ...
... President Trujillo, the `benefactor' of the Dominican Republic (1930±61), took over the country's only shoe factory there was no secret about the ensuing decree forbidding anyone in the capital from going barefoot. . . . Likewise President ...
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... President Anastasio Somoza Debayle pocketed much of the aid, helping swell his personal fortune to some $400 to $500 million by the time of his overthrow by the Sandinistas in 1979 (Merrill 1993). In parts of sub-Saharan Africa ...
... President Anastasio Somoza Debayle pocketed much of the aid, helping swell his personal fortune to some $400 to $500 million by the time of his overthrow by the Sandinistas in 1979 (Merrill 1993). In parts of sub-Saharan Africa ...
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... President Soeharto in Indonesia help explain the support his regime continued to receive from the rural poor in particular. During his thirty-two-year rule poverty declined, rice yields doubled, per capita calorie intakes increased by ...
... President Soeharto in Indonesia help explain the support his regime continued to receive from the rural poor in particular. During his thirty-two-year rule poverty declined, rice yields doubled, per capita calorie intakes increased by ...
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... President Soeharto had acquired such a huge sum for himself and his family that he was offered an amnesty if he returned $25 billion held mainly in overseas accounts. In South Korea, on his retirement President Chun Doo Hwan (1980±1988) ...
... President Soeharto had acquired such a huge sum for himself and his family that he was offered an amnesty if he returned $25 billion held mainly in overseas accounts. In South Korea, on his retirement President Chun Doo Hwan (1980±1988) ...
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