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Title VI is an integral part of the far-reaching Civil Rights Act of 1964. No doubt, when this legislation was being debated, Congress was not directly concerned with the legality of "reverse discrimination" or "affirmative action" programs. Its attention was focused on the problem at hand, "the glaring. discrimination against Negroes which exists throughout our Nation." 10 and, with respect to Title VI, the federal funding of segregated facilities." The genesis of the legislation, however, did not limit the breadth of the solution adopted. Just as Congress responded to the problem of employment discrimination by enacting a provision that protects all races, see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 279,12 so too its answer to the problem of federal funding of segregated facilities stands as a broad prohibition against the exclusion of any individual from a federally funded program "on the ground of race." In the words of the House Report, Title VI stands for "the general principle that no person ... be excluded from participation . . . on the ground of race, color or national origin under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." H. R. Rep. No. 914, Part I, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 25 (1963) (emphasis added). This same broad view of Title VI and § 601 was echoed throughout the congressional debate and was stressed by every one of the major spokesmen for the Act."

13

10 H. R. Rep. No. 914, Part I, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1963).

11 It is apparent from the legislative history that, the immediate object of Title VI was to prevent federal funding of segregated facilities. See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 1521 (remarks of Rep. Celler); id., at 6544 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).

12 In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail, the Court held that "Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against . . . white petitioners... upon the same standards as would be applicable were they Negroes... " 427 U. S., at 280. Quoting from our earlier decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 431; the Court reaffirmed the principle that the statute "prohibit[s] '[d]iscriminatory preference for any [racial] group, minority or majority." 427 U. S., at 279 (emphasis in original).

13 See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 1520 (remarks of Rep. Celler); id., at 5864

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA REGENTS v. BAKKE

7

Petitioner contends, however, that exclusion of applicants on the basis of race does not violate Title VI if the exclusion carries with it no racial stigma. No such qualification or limitation of § 601's categorical prohibition of "exclusion" is justified by the statute or its history. The language of the entire section is perfectly clear; the words that follow "excluded from" do not modify or qualify the explicit outlawing of any exclusion on the stated grounds.

The legislative history reinforces this reading. The only suggestion that § 601 would allow exclusion of nonminority applicants came from opponents of the legislation and then only by way of a discussion of the meaning of the word "discrimination." 14 The opponents feared that the term "discrimination" would be read as mandating racial quotas and "racially balanced" colleges and universities, and they pressed for a specific definition of the term in order to avoid this possibility.15 In response, the proponents of the legislation gave repeated assurances that the Act would be "colorblind"

(remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6561 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); id., at 7055 (remarks of Sen. Pastore) (Representative Celler and Senator Humphrey were the House and Senate floor managers for the entire Civil Rights Act, and Senators Kuchel and Pastore were the minority and majority Senate floor managers for Title VI.)

14 Representative Abernethy's comments were typical:

"Title VI has been aptly described as the most harsh and unprecedented proposal contained in the bill. . . . It is aimed toward eliminating discrimination in federally assisted programs. It contains no guideposts and no yardsticks as to what might constitute discrimination in carrying out federally aided programs and projects. . . . Presumably the college would have to have a 'racially balanced' staff from the dean's office to the cafeteria. . . . The effect of this title, if enacted into law, will interject race as a factor in every decision involving the selection of an individual. The concept of 'racial imbalance' would hover like a black cloud over every transaction. . . ." 110 Cong. Rec. 1619. See also, e. g., id., at 5611-5613 (remarks of Sen Ervin); id., at 9083 (remarks of Sen. Gore).

15 E. g., id., at 5863, 5874 (remarks of Sen. Eastland).

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in its application.10 Senator Humphrey, the Senate floor manager for the Act, expressed this position as follows:

"[T]he word 'discrimination' has been used in many a court case. What it really means in the bill is a distinction in treatment given to different individuals because of their different race, religion or national origin..

...

"The answer to this question [what was meant by 'discrimination'] is that if race is not a factor, we do not have to worry about discrimination because of race. . . . The Internal Revenue Code does not provide that colored people do not have to pay taxes, or that they can pay their taxes 6 months later than everybody else." 110 Cong. Rec. 5864.

"[I]f we started to treat Americans as Americans, not as fat ones, short ones, tall ones, brown ones, green ones, yellow ones or white ones, but as Americans. If we did that we would not need to worry about discrimination." 110 Cong. Rec. 5866.

In giving answers such as these, it seems clear that the proponents of Title VI assumed that the Constitution itself required a colorblind standard on the part of government,"

16 See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 8346 (remarks of Sen. Proxmire) ("[t]axes are collected from whites and Negroes, and they should be expended without discrimination"); id., at 7055 (remarks of Sen. Pastore) ("[Title VI] will guarantee that the money collected by colorblind tax collectors will be distributed by Federal and State administrators who are equally colorblind"); and id., at 6543 (remarks of Sen. Hunphrey) (“[s]imple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes,, or results in racial discrimination") (quoting from President Kennedy's Message to Congress, June 19, 1963).

17 See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 5253 (remarks of Sen. Hunphrey); and id., at 7102 (remarks of Sen. Javits). The parallel between the prohibitions of Title VI and those of the Constitution was clearest with respect to the

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA REGENTS v. BAKKE 9

but that does not mean that the legislation only codifies an existing constitutional prohibition. The statutory prohibition against discrimination in federally funded projects contained in § 601 is more than a simple paraphrasing of what the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment would require. The Act's proponents plainly considered Title VI consistent with their view of the Constitution and they sought to provide an effective weapon to implement that view.18 As a distillation of what the supporters of the Act believed the Constitution demanded of State and Federal Governments, § 601 has independent force, with language and emphasis in addition to that found in the Constitution.19

immediate goal of the Act-an end to federal funding of "separate but equal" facilities.

18 "As in Monroe [v. Pape], we have no occasion here to 'reach the constitutional question whether Congress has the power to make municipalities liable for acts of its officers that violate the civil rights of individuals.' 365 U. S., at 191. For in interpreting the statute it is not our task to consider whether Congress was mistaken in 1871 in its view of the limits of its power over municipalities; rather, we must construe the statute in light of the impressions under which Congress did in fact act, see Ries v. Lynskey, 425 F. 2d, at 175." Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 709.

19 Both Title VI and Title VII express Congress' belief that, in the long struggle to eliminate social prejudice and the effects of prejudice, the principle of individual equality, without regard to race or religion, was one on which there could be a "meeting of the minds" among all races and a common national purpose. See City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Power & Water v. Manhart, 46 U. S. L. W. 4347, 4349 ("the basic policy of the statute [Title VII] requires that we focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes"). This same principle of individual fairness is embodied in Title VI.

"The basic fairness of Title VI is so clear that I find it difficult to understand why it should create any opposition. . .

"Private prejudices, to be sure, cannot be eliminated overnight. However, there is one area where no room at all exists for private prejudices. That is the area of governmental conduct. As the first Mr. Justice Harlan

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As with other provisions of the Civil Rights Act, Congress' expression of its policy to end racial discrimination may independently proscribe conduct that the Constitution does not.20 However, we need not decide the congruence or lack of congruence of the controlling statute and the Constitution since the meaning of the Title VI ban on exclusion is crystal clear: Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from participation in a federally funded program.

In short, nothing in the legislative history justifies the conclusion that the broad language of § 601 should not be given its natural meaning. We are dealing with a distinct statutory prohibition, enacted at a particular time with par

said in his prophetic dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559:

"Our Constitution is colorblind.

"So I say to Senators-must be our government.

"Title VI closes the gap between our purposes as a democracy and our prejudices as individuals. The cuts of prejudice need healing. The costs of prejudice need understanding. We cannot have hostility between two great parts of our people without tragic loss in our human values. . . . "Title VI offers a place for the meeting of our minds as to Federal money." 110 Cong. Rec. 7063-7064 (remarks of Sen. Pastore). Of course one of the reasons marshalled in support of the conclusion that Title VI was "non-controversial" was that its prohibition was already reflected in the law. See id. (remarks of Sen. Pell and Sen. Pastore).

20 For example, private employers now under duties imposed by Title VII were wholly free from the restraints imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which are directed only to governmental action.

In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563, the Government's brief stressed that "the applicability of Title VI does not depend upon the outcome of the equal protection analysis [T]he statute independently proscribes the conduct challenged by petitioners and provides a discrete basis for injunctive relief." Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 15. The Court, in turn, rested its decision on Title VI. MR. JUSTICE POWELL takes pains to distinguish Lau from the case at hand because the Lau decision "rested solely on the statute." Ante, at 33. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 238-239; Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 588 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).