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No words can convey an idea of the extent to which the feud between the Karabagh Afghans and their Hazara neighbours had been pushed. Neither age nor sex had been spared; children had been butchered, women foully dishonoured, and the graves of the dead every where desecrated. It seems hope less to expect that the two tribes can ever again exist as heretofore in neighbourly juxtaposition one to another. The only satisfaction was that the most careful inquiry made on on the spot elicited the fact that the Karabagh massacres could in no way, however remote, be ascribed to the presence of the British in Afghanistan. Nearer Ghazni the bitterly hostile feeling that existed between Afghan and Hazara, took its rise, no doubt, in the refusal of the latter to join in the war against the British, and the fighting engendered thereby was certainly embittered by the course of events in Karabagh. But the Karabagh massacres were mainly and primarily due to an attack made by the Hazara Malik of the CharDasteh tribe upon a defenceless village which had been purchased had been purchased from him by a Kharoti Afghan several years before. The Afghans had lived for years at peace with their Hazara neighbours. Faiz Mahomed, the Hazara chief, thinking, however, that the disturbed state of affairs at Kabul afforded him a good opportunity of recovering gratis the property he had sold, planned an attack upon the Afghan village, and in the dead of night killed every man and child in it, distributing the women among his own followers. It cannot be wondered at that the thirst for vengeance on the part of the Afghans was deep, and not easily appeased; and the atrocities since committed by them upon the general body of Hazaras, without reference to their tribes, has of course intensified the deadly enmity between the two sections.

Of all the districts traversed by the army, since quitting Kandahar, none appeared so fertile as Karabagh, which is a very extensive

valley, bounded on the east and west by lofty mountains, with a neverfailing supply of excellent water, and a most fertile soil. The traveller rides for miles through prosperouslooking villages and forts, all within a stone's throw of one another, and all surrounded by rich cultivation intersected by running streams. Forts and villages, however, were alike deserted, and a nearer inspection proved that the great majority of them had been fired and gutted, and nothing but the outward walls remained.

The army arrived in Karabagh on the 16th April, and halted there one day, as a rest was much needed by men and animals, and it was necessary to recruit the supplies. One Hindu merchant alone had remained in the district, and had collected a large quantity of grain and flour, for which he received liberal payment. The army could, however, have obtained ample supplies here for days by its own agency, had it not been for our so-called allies, the Hazaras. The pitching of our tents was, however, the signal for these men to come down in thousands from the mountains. They looted supplies that would have otherwise come to us, and day and night the horizon was aflame with the blaze of the villages which they had set on fire.' Their chiefs seemed to have no power over them, and their own answer to remonstrances was that as they had already suffered much, and were certain to suffer still worse, at the hands of the Afghans, they were bound to inflict all the injury possible upon their enemies while the opportunity offered. On the arrival of the English in Karabagh one of our foraging parties found 400 Hazaras squatting, fully armed, round a fort in which twenty-five Afghans had shut themselves up. These latter had

1 On the return march of Sir F. Roberts's force to Kandahar in August of the same year the condition of affairs was entirely reversed. It was then the Afghans who were in the ascendant in Karabagh, and the Hazaras were everywhere deserting their villages and property, and fleeing for their lives.

intended to bolt on our approach with the rest of their compatriots, but had been surrounded by the Hazaras before they could get away, and when our party arrived they were found looking uncomfortably over the walls of their village at what must have seemed to them very like certain death. The Hazaras were quietly waiting until the gates should be opened to bring out provisions for us, when they intended to rush in and indulge themselves with a general massacre. It was with great difficulty that they were induced to retire and forego their bloodshed and booty, and indeed they did not budge until the Political Officer arrived and intimated to them very plainly that it would go hard with them if they attempted to attack the besieged Afghans. They then retired slowly and reluctantly, and their intended victims escaped during the night. By dawn the Hazaras had returned and burned the fort. On another occasion our advanced cavalry scouts surprised in a village two Afghan women who had come back to search for a child lost in the general exodus of the previous day. The Hazaras swore that these were women of their own tribe, intending doubtless to cut their throats; and it was piteous to see the terror of these poor creatures when they were taken before the Political Officer to have their fate decided. They were soon made happy, however, and being placed on a couple of donkeys were taken to our advanced picquets, and told to make the best of their way to the enemy's outlying picquets, clearly visible at about two miles distance; the excellent time which they and the donkeys mutually made across the intervening distance was refreshing to witness. This was the day before the action at Ahmed Khel.

It was at this place, Mushaki, on the 18th April, that the enemy first came into contact with our outlying picquets. For days previous we had been regularly informed by spies of their movements. Cavalry reconnaissances had observed large bodies

of horse and foot moving parallel with our line of advance but clinging to the hilly ground to the east, and the hillsides had every night been illuminated by their camp-fires. But on this day they came further down into the plain, evidently intending to make for Ghazni; and Sir Donald Stewart, who must have been certain of meeting them, did not apparently think it necessary on that day to drive them out of the village which they occupied at a considerable distance from the camp. At Mushaki our troops were still some thirty-two miles from Ghazni, and the intention had been to make three marches into the citythe first stage being fixed at Ahmed Khel. Shortly, however, before the advanced cavalry reached the intended camping-ground on the morning of the 19th, the enemy showed themselves in great force on some low hills on the left of the road two miles beyond; and Sir Donald Stewart at once determined to give them battle. The appearance of the foe as the English troops advanced to the attack was very picturesque. They were drawn up in the form of a huge parallelogram on the upper slopes of the hills; white and red standards fluttered at intervals along the line; drums were beating; mullahs were seen preaching and exhorting them in their midst; whilst inside the line, and in front of the black and serried mass of human beings, horsemen galloped to and fro, brandishing their swords, and making the air resound to the shouts with which they invoked the blessing of the Almighty.

The action of Ahmed Khel was commenced by Major de Grey Warter's troop of Horse Artillery at nine o'clock precisely; and from that time until 10 A. M., when the "cease firing" sounded all along the line, the roar of the guns and the rattle of the infantry fire never ceased for a moment. The attacking line of the English force was formed, and advanced in the following On the extreme rightH. A., and a Troop 19+

order. A-B R.

Bengal Lancers; G-4 R. A. with wing of 19th Punjaub Native Infantry as escort; on their left Lieutenant-General's personal escort of one Company 2-60th, one Company 25th P. N. I.; then 59th Regiment, 2nd Sikhs, 3rd Goorkhas; Cavalry Brigade half a mile to right rear, but as the action developed, the 2nd Punjaub Cavalry moved up to the right of the attacking line, and the 19th Bengal Lancers to the left.

At 8 A.M., when it was evident that a battle was impending, an express was sent to bring up half the available troops of General Barter's Brigade, which, by the fortune of war, had been only that day relegated to the duty of forming the rear guard, after having been in the front nearly the whole march from Kandahar. The 1st P. C. arrived from the rear in time to do excellent service on our right flank, and the 60th Rifles, who came up at a tremendous pace, were also able to form up on the right of the advanced line of infantry before the cease firing sounded, though they took little or no part in the action.

Our attacking line had hardly been formed when it was seen that so far from contemplating retreat the enemy were moving very slowly down the slope to our rencontre. Their advance was at first so gradual that their next movement took every one by surprise. Suddenly, with a tremendous shout, beating of tom-toms, brandishing of swords, and waving of standards, more than 3,000 Ghazis, horse and foot, detached themselves from the main body and came down the hill right into the thin line of British troops with a fury and determination that nothing could surpass. Met as they were by the full fire of our guns and infantry, they never turned or wavered for an instant, and before one could draw one's breath the more advanced among them were among the troops and fighting hand to hand; while others, better mounted, who had outstripped the rest, had succeeded in getting round both flanks of our line and were bearing down on Sir Donald

Stewart and the head-quarter staff who occupied a low hillock in rear of the advanced line, and close to the reserves. Some of the Ghazis were actually killed within twenty yards of the general commanding, and they were at one time so close that Sir Donald Stewart himself and the headquarter staff had to draw their swords in self-defence.

The momentary partial success which the Ghazis thus achieved can only be accounted for by the fact that their attack was made with such rapidity and such reckless and desperate courage that it fairly took our troops by surprise. They had hardly finished deploying, many of them omitted to fix bayonets, and there was for a few seconds a tendency among some of them to waver and form into small groups. This, however, passed away as instantaneously as it arose, and during the rest of the action the men's steadiness left nothing to be desired. The disregard for life which the Ghazis exhibited may be judged of by the fact that they charged up to within thirty yards of Major de Grey Warter's guns, then firing case and reversed shrapnell, and thus compelled him to retire his guns 100 or 150 yards, when he again came into action, the practice of his guns during the whole engagement being specially good

Of the rest of the action little remains to be said. The enemy never ceased to advance in groups, firing their muskets, waving their swords and lances, and endeavouring to get up to our line. By this time, however, our men had settled down to their work, and their fire was such that nothing human could stand against it, not even the fierce fanaticism of our foes. Little by little the advancing groups became less numerous and less frequent, and at ten o'clock precisely the last of them were to be seen retiring over the hill and streaming by thousands in the far distance over the plain beyond. Had it not been that our enormous baggage-train had locked up a large

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number of our cavalry, the enemy's losses in that direction must have been very severe, but as it was we could only spare comparatively few men to pursue our retreating foes.

As might have been expected, many extraordinary escapes are recorded among our officers and men. One subaltern of the 1st P. C. had his horse's tail clean cut off by a blow which was aimed at his own head by a mounted Ghazi; Captain Broome, of the 2nd P. C., had his charger's head cut nearly off; Captain Abbott, of the 19th B. L., had his revolver and case severed from his belt by a sword-cut which missed his body altogether: and the list of hair-breadth escapes might be multiplied ad infinitum.

The 19th Bengal Lancers suffered the most during the first Ghazi charge, for the enemy got amongst them while they were only on the trot, and the fighting consequently was very severe. In this regiment alone there were more than forty wounded, including Lieutenant Young, who was picked up with eleven wounds. When he was first brought in his case was considered hopeless; but a naturally good constitution, and the splendid air in these latitudes, enabled him to make a wonderful recovery. His horse, as the Ghazis were charging, was struck with a spent bullet, and bolted with him right into the middle of the enemy, by whom he was dreadfully cut about. Another officer severely wounded was Captain Corbett, R.A., who had both bones of his right arm broken by a pistol bullet. Our total list of casualties were 17 killed and 153 wounded.

After the action our men were much irritated at seeing several of their number shot or cut down by wounded Ghazis, whom they had gone to assist, and who attacked them as soon as they came within reach, fiercely refusing all quarter for themselves. The English who had fallen were buried on the field by the Rev. Mr. Warneford and the Rev. W. Allen, the English and Roman Catholic chaplains, before the troops moved on,

the graves being so arranged as to render their discovery by the enemy very unlikely. The native soldiery carried their dead into camp, and either burnt or buried them the same evening.

Brigadiers General Hughes and Palliser were the brigadiers commanding during the action, under Sir Donald Stewart; Brigadier-General Barter being with the rear brigade in protection of the baggage.

The troops now marched across the field of battle on to their camp at Nani, eighteen miles distant from their starting point, and they did not arrive till 2.30 A.M. The weather during the whole day had been abominable. A fierce wind swept the plain, and raised vast clouds of dust. It was often impossible to see two yards in front, a circumstance which told in the enemy's favour, for in many instances it concealed their attacking bodies, and the fire from our troops was necessarily less accurate than it would otherwise have been. As it was we counted over 1,200 dead bodies on the field, and an equal number of wounded must certainly have been carried off. This estimate does not include those who fell before the fire from the guns of Major Tillard's heavy battery, which came into action from the summit of a hill some distance in the rear of the advanced line, and opened fire with most extraordinary precision at 3,000 yards, pitching their shells into large bodies of the enemy who had assembled on our left flank. These, however, were too far off to enable us to estimate accurately the number their killed and wounded.

Those who fought against us on this occasion were principally Tarakkis, Tokhis, Andaris, and Sulimán Khel Ghilzais. Their leaders were, Sher Jan -whose brother was killed by us at Shahjui last year, and who had sworn to revenge his death; Mahomed Aslam Khan, and Eusof Khan, the tutor of Sirdar Moosa Khan, who was forced by Mushki Alum to join the fight in which his brother and four favourite slaves were killed. No one joined the gathering from Ghazni, as the

inhabitants deemed it more prudent to await the result of the battle. It is certain however that they were prepared to rise against us, but the defeat the enemy sustained was so crushing as to render all thoughts of opposition utterly hopeless, and the next morning we received messages in camp to say that the fort and all within it were at the disposal of the English General.1

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The following three days were devoted by the enemy to burying their dead, the number of the slain having struck terror into the heart of the country. Afghan combatants generally prolong their engagements for days, with a singularly small percentage of casualties, so that this novel experience of the losses inflicted by us was as startling as it was disagreeable. It may be noticed here that among the enemy were twelve female Ghazis who had taken the oath of religious companionship, and were admitted to the privileges of their male panions on the understanding that they should follow the latter into action and bring them water battle, &c., &c. One of these wretched creatures was found dead, shattered by a shell. After the battle all the prisoners were handed over to the Political Officer for disposal. wounded had their wounds dressed in hospital, and, together with the unwounded, were eventually made over to the Sirdar Mahomed Alum Khan, at Ghazni, with directions that he should release them as soon as we had left. The same course was pursued with the prisoners taken on the 23rd at the subsequent action of Orzoo.

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On the 20th the division marched to within five miles of Ghazni, encamping within sight of the city on the plain to the south. The same afternoon a body of our cavalry, under Major Lance and accompanied by Captain Gaselee, Assistant Quarter

1 Sir F. Roberts's force, in its march to Kandahar, passed over the field of Ahmed Khel, which was found covered with graves, and with a rude monument erected to "martyrs who had been slain there for the sake of God and the prophet."

Master-General, rode into the town to reconnoitre, and reported it to be in an almost ruined state and incapable of making any defence. The inhabitants professed themselves friendly, and no armed men were visible. Next day the whole force marched in and encamped on the Kabul side of the city, on nearly the same ground as that occupied by General Keane previous to the assault on Ghazni in the previous Afghan

war.

Ghazni is a place (for it cannot be rightly termed a city) which, whatever its former claims may have been, is now of little or no importance. Its walls are of mud, and are already practicable in many places; while the citadel has no fortifications of its own, and is commanded from several points outside the walls. The houses are a conglomeration of two-storied mud dwellings arranged without any There is no regard to symmetry. bazaar worthy of the name, and no building that ranks above its fellows -the whole place is filthy, squalid, and mean. Notwithstanding the state of the fortifications, however, Ghazni would be still a difficult place to attack were it held by a determined enemy. The town is surrounded on every side by a mass of gardens with high mud walls, and covering a considerable extent of country. Were these to be well defended, they could not be taken without a severe loss of life on the attacking side. The only objects of interest at Ghazni are the two minars, one hundred yards apart, which tradition declares mark the spot where Mahmoud Shah formerly held his Durbars; and the famed Kabul Gate where Sir Henry Durand, then a lieutenant in the Engineers, covered himself with glory. In olden times Ghazni extended from the Sher-dána Pass on the north to the Karabagh district on the south, a distance of forty odd miles, in one unbroken mass of streets and buildings, and it is said that these minars were erected to aid ambassadors and pilgrims from foreign lands in finding the residence

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