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THE

NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CXIII.

OCTOBER, 1870.

ARTICLE I.-PRESIDENT FAIRCHILD'S MORAL

PHILOSOPHY.

Moral Philosophy; or, the Science of Obligation. By JAMES H. FAIRCHILD, President of Oberlin College.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY is a branch of science upon which many books have already been written, and still there is room for improvement. No two writers are entirely agreed except in the more prominent principles of the science; yet they agree much more nearly in ideas than in forms of statement. In prosecuting this most important branch of study, one which occupies no secondary place, we need a text book which shall be an improvement on those hitherto in use; and one that shall, if possible, harmonize the differing views of Philosophers.

This book professes to be especially adapted to the use of pupils in schools and colleges. As such we hail its appearance

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with great satisfaction. It certainly is an improvement upon most text books heretofore used. The author has adapted it very well to its end,-in size, arrangement, and matter. He tells us he wished to make a small book, but we cannot help regretting that he did not give some extended explanations and illustrations on several important subjects, even at the risk of enlarging the book. We think that this might have been done without any enlargement, by condensing some portions of less importance and by leaving out repetitions of the same or similar ideas. We are much pleased with the catch words placed in the margin of each page, designating the leading ideas treated of. On the whole the arrangement and manner of treating the subjects are such as will assist instructors in imparting, and pupils in acquiring a knowledge of the truths developed.

The principles of psychology and of moral philosophy which the author adopts and makes the foundation of his reasoning, are mainly correct; indeed we think that scarcely any erroneous principles can be found among them. This is saying considerable of any writer on moral philosophy. We do not think, however, that these true principles are as clearly stated and as fully and correctly carried out as they should be. While we are aware that it is much easier to find defects than to correct them, we shall proceed to point out as clearly as we can, what we regard as defects or failures in the development of these true principles of the science,—not all that might be stated, but only the more important ones.

The psychological principles stated in this book are very few-hardly sufficient we think to give a full and solid foundation on which to rear the science of moral philosophy. What the moral faculties are, and how known, we think should have been a little more fully illustrated. Conscience, the great

moral faculty of the soul, is in no sense treated psychologically. The authority of its acts, as well as its operations and limitations, are very fully and ably discussed; but we think its existence and our knowledge of it should have been carefully considered, as the great distinctive faculty of moral agency.

The three-fold division of the faculties of the soul into "intellect, sensibility, and free will," which are clearly the same as

the faculties of knowing, feeling, and willing, is adopted very correctly by the author as the true division. The faculty of free-will is described as the "power of choosing or refusing," that is, of choosing any given object or its opposite. The possession of this faculty he affirms "is implied in the very idea of obligation," and "is an essential attribute of personality."

The faculty of feeling is described as "the suceptibility to pleasure or pain," good or evil. This idea of good or evil, revealed in the sensibility, is declared to be "the necessary antecedent of that of obligation." Here the author states very clearly two of the necessary conditions of obligation, viz. freewill or freedom, and a "good" in the sensibility. If he had added to these "a good as an end," that is, a good seen or known by the moral agent to be within his power to choose, he would have given all of these conditions.

The author makes happiness the true good. On page 25th, he says, "well-being, satisfaction, happiness then is the true good-the summum bonum, not merely in the sense of the highest good, but of the final, ultimate, absolute good, that in which all other goods terminate and find their value." "Relative good on the other hand is good, that is valued for its uses." Again he says, "the term happiness is used in this treatise, not in the low, restricted sense given it by some writers, but as comprehensive of all satisfaction, blessedness, wellbeing, from the lowest forms of animal pleasure to the highest joys which dwell in the bosom of God." "In this sense, it is absolute good and the only absolute good." Here we have happiness the good, the only good that is absolute, and all other things good only as uses: as tending to promote happiness. The opposite of happiness is misery, pain, or suffering. The only absolute evil and all other things are evil only as tending to produce misery or to destroy happiness. This should have been added as a first truth.

These are all simple ideas, primary, fundamental, and universal. They might and we think ought to have been laid down as axioms in morals in the very commencement of our author's work. They are axioms which form the necessary

basis of any moral reasoning, and through which every one cognizes his own being as moral and responsible.

Now with these moral axioms, evidently regarded as such by our author, where is obligation found? and how does it originate? The author answers this question fully, thus, "In the presence or thought of this good (absolute good) obligation is perceived. The intelligence sees the good to be an object of value, and with that perception arises the idea of obligation." With this clear statement of the origin of the idea, it is marvellous that in his opening chapter the author should have affirmed that "obligation, the theme of ethical philosophy admits of no definition, except by a synonym. The idea is a simple one incapable of analysis." Can that be a simple idea which originates from several other ideas as antecedent and necessary conditions as the author affirms the idea of obligation does? Such a concept admits of a definition. It cannot, with any reason, be disposed of by the mere synonyms, ought, duty, right, and the like words, which equally demand explanation. The idea of obligation is, indeed, a universal idea, though not simple. Had the author put his own ideas concerning it as expressed in various forms and places, into a full definition, it would have stood thus: Moral obligation is the binding force or influence of the highest good, seen and known by the moral being at the time to be within his power to choose. Here are all the conditions of obligation, viz. a free agent, a person, a good to be chosen, seen to be the highest good, and within his power to choose as an end. When these conditions exist in the mind conjointly, obligation, as Dr. Hopkins says, is necessarily affirmed. On these conditions existing for the first time the feeling of obligation is produced in the sensibility and the idea is originated-makes its first appearance and is cognized by the moral being. What then is it that originates the feeling of obligation, first brings it into the field of every one's consciousness? Only one answer can reasonably be given to this question, which is the answer given by this author. He says, "In the presence of this good is obligation perceived, and the idea of obligation arises." It is the good, the absolute good, blessedness, happiness, that which is valuable in itself in some mode presented, that always gives the idea;

and if it gives or originates the idea, it certainly imposes the obligation. This is the thing that influences-binds with its own inherent force to the required choice. It is usually, perhaps always, some specific good in the first instance-some good, embodied in some distinct object-which originates the idea and imposes obligation,-i. e.: specific obligation.

We shall reach the same result if we proceed to examine the origin of the generic obligation. This is an obligation to choose the good, happiness, or well-being distinct from any particular object, being, or action in which the good may be found. Our author describes this generic good in the following language. "Well-being, satisfaction, happiness is good independently of any desire which may fasten upon it, and of any relation whatever." This is good in the generic sense. Happiness, blessedness, or well-being, stands thus on its own independent merits of inherent value; deriving none of its value from any thing beside. But when our author describes it as a good, independent of any desire or relation, he evidently means any specific desire or any specific relation. He certainly does not mean to deny that it stands related to the moral being or any and every moral being as an object to be chosen, and chosen for itself; for he repeatedly affirms this: nor does he mean to stultify himself by declaring that it awakens no movement in the sensibility, nor tends to do so; but that happiness or well-being is a good. This is the generic good which our author tells us the intelligence sees to be an object of value.

Now as this good is generic, so must the obligation also be generic. He describes the obligation to be "The duty to respect it, to treat it as good, to will it to all sentient beings, to stand ready to promote it." Here is a state of mind that is purely generic. Not a specific volition fastening upon any specific good, or object of good, which passes out of the mind as soon as it is formed; but a generic state of mind-a “ willing to all sentient beings" "not to any one in particular." "It is a standing ready to promote the good as occasion or opportunity arises," the choice of a good which is always present and one which never can be absent. Thus the mind is placed upon the watch tower with a will ready to act with energy, looking out for the coming of this generic good in some specific form. It

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