distinguished himself by volunteering, after he had been gassed, to carry important messages through heavy barrages to the support companies, and refusing first aid until his company was relieved. For this courageous act he later received a hero's medal.

The next morning, November 11, at five o'clock the attack was renewed on the east side of the Moselle. The advancing troops were met by strong enemy artillery, machine-gun, and infantry fire. Acording to General Barnum's report, "Troops on the right had reached the outskirts of Brouxières by 7:30 a. m. Troops on the left had advanced a short distance, but had been forced to retire to the woods." The artillery was destroying the wire entanglements about Brouxières preparatory to farther advance when at 10:45 the order was received to cease firing on account of the signing of the armistice. During the two days' fighting the troops on the east bank of the Moselle advanced a total of 32 kilometers. The attack was executed over a difficult terrain. The Bois Frehaut is a wood about 1,500 meters square, and the Bois Voivrotte to the east is a wood about 600 meters square. Both of these woods were a mass of heavy German wire. Their edges were protected by heavy bands of wire and chevaux-defrise.

The attack on the west of the Moselle was less aggressive, but was marked by alternate forward dashes and precipitous taking to the woods.

At 9:30 the French on the left had not succeeded in capturing Preny, and the general advance was halted. At 10:30 an attack of the 367th Infantry, 184th Brigade, was repulsed and reinforcements had to be sent forward. Later in the day, in an attack on Pagny, the French 56th Infantry became hopelessly enmeshed in the enemy's wire entanglements and were being slaughtered by the German machine guns. Two machine-gun units from the 367th Infantry and 350th Battalion respectively were sent to the rescue, and succeeded in silencing the German batteries and covering the withdrawal of the French infantry. The rescuing units held their position until relieved by reinforcements from the 56th.

The 367th regiment on the west bank of the Moselle made practically no advance. General Bullard seemed to think that it lacked the fighting spirit. However, it certainly had more difficult ground to cover. "In the area west of the Moselle," says Major General Martin, "the ground in front of the position slopes to the north into a basin with little or no cover. On the west Preny heights rise

precipitously out of the plain and the town and citadel dominate the entire basin up to Preny and beyond."

The achievements of the 92nd Division on this front consisted in a gain of 31⁄2 kilometers on the east bank of the Moselle.

"A total of six prisoners was captured; three in the Bois Frehaut and three in the Bois Voivrotte.

"The following material was captured: 1,000 (approximately) grenades, all types; 5,000 (approximately) rounds ammunition; 25 (approximately) boxes M. G. ammunition, in belts; 50 (approximately) rifles and bayonets; 10 (approximately) pairs field glasses; 4 (approximately) machine guns; 6 carrier pigeons; I signal lamp and battery; 2 Verey pistols; 3 carbide lamps; 100 helmets. Many overcoats, boots, canteens, belts, and other articles of equipment were left by the fleeing enemy."

General Pershing, in an address to the officers and soldiers of the 92nd Division, January, 1919, said:

"I want you officers and soldiers of the 92nd Division to know that the 92nd Division stands second to none in the record you have made since you arrived in France. I am proud of the part you have played in the great conflict which ended on the 11th of November, yet you have only done what the American people expected you to do and you have measured up to every expectation of the Commanderin-Chief. I realize that you did not get into the game as early as some of the other units, but since you took over your first sector you have acquitted yourselves with credit, and I believe that if the armistice had not become effective on the 11th day of November, the 92nd would have still further distinguished itself."

Official Report, quoted by Scott, op. cit., p. 162.

CHAPTER 33

WORTH OF THE NEGRO TROOPS

Summary of the Services of the Colored Units-Recipients of the Croix de Guerre -Citations for Distinguished Service-General Bullard's Criticisms of the 92nd Division-General Estimate of The Negro As a Soldier-Enlivening Effect of Negro Regimental Bands in the Camps-Introduction of the French People to Jazz Music

N regard to the value of the Negro troops in the World War it

any

have an effective army in the degree that the fighting force is made up of harmonious elements. Any difference in racial elements or cultural background is sure to interfere with the efficiency of the army as a whole. Among the ancient Greeks and Romans only freemen were allowed to enlist for military service. The Carthaginian, Hannibal, though one of the world's greatest generals, suffered defeat chiefly because of the heterogeneous elements he was obliged to draft into his army; and William the Conqueror nearly lost the battle of Hastings because, at a critical moment, a division of Alpines, which he had drafted from Brittany, broke ranks and fled.

No respectable military man would hesitate to say that our fighting force in the World War would have worked more smoothly and effectively if it had been all white.

The race problem can no more be eliminated from military affairs. than from civil affairs. From the drafting to the mustering out, the presence of the Negro in our army was a source of manifold and perpetual discord, dissipating the time and energies of the War Department and the commanding generals in efforts to preserve discipline among the soldiers.

The white demagogues and fanatics are as busy and full of mischief in an army as out of it. They preach the doctrine that there should be no race prejudice, and they harp upon any military or social privilege enjoyed by a white soldier that is not equally enjoyed by the Negro. They expect white men to serve willingly under Negro officers, sleep and eat with them in the same barracks and dance with

the same ladies at the Moulin Rouge. Such social intermingling of the races does not exist in any of the American states, and cannot be made to exist in an American army.

Race prejudice is a hard fact, and military commanders, of whatever attitude towards the Negro problem, have to deal with the fact, which they find it difficult to harmonize with military efficiency. The 372nd Negro regiment was so wrought up over the question of social equality that it was next to useless as a fighting unit until the crisis of the war was passed and the regimental officers were reorganized.

The French soldiers and civilians were of necessity very hospitable to all foreign Allied troops fighting on their soil, and were even very tolerant of behavior on the part of foreign troops which would call for police interference among their own citizens. A certain class. of our Negro soldiers mistook this hospitability for license, and presumed that the French people, unlike the white Americans, had no racial prejudices. They found a welcome among a certain class of French women, but when they began to assume attitudes of familiarity with women of another type, they met with resentment and in some instances, overcame this by committing rape. In reference to this matter General Bullard says:

"It is commonly believed among Americans that French people have no objections to Negroes, but this I quickly found was an error. . . . While there were very few French people in the region occupied by this division, they were not happy to have the Negroes among them. The Negro is a more sensual man than the white man, and at the same time he is far more offensive to white women than a white man is. The little acts of familiarity that would pass unnoticed in a white man, become with white women the cause of complaint against the Negro. This special Negro division was already charged with fifteen cases of rape.

"For these reasons immediately after the armistice I recommended in effect that this division be sent home first of all American troops, that they be sent home in all honor, but above all, that they be sent quick. The answer came that Marshal Foch would not, pending peace, approve the transfer of any division back to the United States. In answer I told the American headquarters to say to Marshal Foch that no man could be responsible for the acts of these Negroes toward French women, and that he had better send this division home at once. This brought the order, and the 92nd was, I believe, the very first division to be sent home. I was told that the division

was received at home with great glorification. I was perfectly willing that it should be; the American Army abroad was relieved. My own sense of relief can be understood when I say that while a part of the division was waiting for its railroad trains to move it to its port of embarkation, among other things, one French women complained that she was ravished by five 92nd Division soldiers." 1

A Negro of the 371st Regiment was convicted of attempted rape upon a French girl and sentenced to prison for twenty years. (From data furnished by Col. Chas. E. Greenough, letter of June 19, 1926.)

These crimes, of course, reflect great discredit on the Negro soldiers, but the fault is not so much with them as with the white demagogues and fanatics in the army who led the Negro to believe that race prejudice is a matter of Southern inculcation, and that white and colored men and white and colored women ought to commingle freely without reference to a mere matter of pigmentation of the skin.

We, of course, ought not to overlook the fact that only a small fraction of the Negro troops were involved in these crimes. The majority of the men of the 92nd, as of the other divisions, behaved remarkably well.

Now, as to the fighting efficiency of the Negro troops, prior to the World War the Negro had entered only two branches and four organizations of the United States Army, to wit: the 9th and 10th Cavalry and the 24th and 25th Infantry, whereas during the World War the Negro figured to some extent in every branch of the service, including field artillery, coast artillery, engineer corps, signal corps, hospital and ambulance corps, veterinary corps, labor battalions, auto repairers, etc. The one service which the Negro did not enter was that of the aviation corps.

The 92nd Division, made up entirely of Negroes except for the officers of higher command, has come in for the greatest amount of criticism on account of its weakness in aggressive warfare, its small achievements, and its general inefficiency. General Bullard, having successfully commanded a small unit of colored troops in the SpanishAmerican War, doubted the wisdom of utilizing a large mass of Negroes in a single division. Perhaps the Negro's nervousness and susceptibility to stampede is heightened by the contagion of masssuggestion.

The general inefficiency of the Negro division was undoubtedly 'Quoted from General Bullard's Personalities and Reminiscences of the War, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1925, by courtesy of the author and the publishers.