As a specimen of the Lancashire dialect, we give Collier's excellent apologue of the tailor and the hedgehog; just premising that the sage light of the village there pourtrayed is meant as an

emblem of a reviewer.

A tealyer i' Crummil's time, war thrung* poo'ing turmets in his pingot, an' fund an urchon ith' had-lond reăn; he glender'd at 't lung, boh cou'd mey nowt on't. He whoav'd his whisket owr't, runs whōăm, an' tells his neighbours he thowt in his guts 'at he'd fund a thing 'at God newer mede eawt; for it had nother head nor tele, hond nor hough, midst nor eend. Loath to believe this, hoave a dozen on 'em wou'd geaw t' see if they cou'd'n mey shift to gawm it; boh it capt 'em aw; for they newer a won on 'em e'er saigh th' like afore. Then they'dn a keawnsil, an' th' eend on 't wur, 'at tey'dn fotch a lawm, fawse, owd felly, het an elder, 'at cou'd tell oytch thing, for they look'nt on him as th' hammel scoance, an' theawt he'r fuller o' leet than a glow-worm's tele. When they'dn towd him th' kese, he stroak'd his beard, sowghd an' order'd th' wheelbarrow wi' th' spon new trindle to be fotch't. "Twur done, an' they beawld'n him awey to th' urchon in a crack. He glōard at 't a good while, droyd his beard deawn, an' wawted it ow'r wi' his crutch. "Wheel me abeawt agen o' th' tother side," said he, " for it sturs-an' by that it su'd be whick." Then he dons his spectacles, steared at 't agen, an' sowghing said, "Breether, its summot; boh feather Adam nother did nor cou'd kerson it-wheel me whoam agen." '†

This resembles Anglian more than Northumbrian-but is sufficiently distinct from both. The shibboleth of the three dialects is house, which the Northumbrian pronounces hoose, the North Anglian hãoose-nearly like au in the Italian flauto-and the inhabitant of South Lancashire in a way quod literis dicere non est-but generally represented in print by heawse.

We know no better specimen of the genuine West of England dialect than Robert of Gloucester's Chronicle. The present Somersetshire and Devonshire are more barbarous and ungrammatical than the northern dialects-and their distinguishing peculiarities are well known.

We could extend our remarks on every branch of this copious subject to a much greater length, but the above may suffice speciminis gratia. We have perhaps already given our readers cause to twit us with the undev ayav of the Grecian sage, and to tell us that our lucubrations on the barbarisms of our provinces are about as acceptable to the public, as the Antiquary's dissertation on Quicken's-bog was to the Earl of Glenallan. However

* Pronounced thrunk. In this and the preceding specimens, we have occasionally adjusted the orthography to the English or Scottish standard, where the pronunciation does not materially differ.

+ View of the Lancashire Dialect, Introduction.

greatly,

greatly, therefore, we may long to prove that dreigh (tedious) is closely related to doxos, and that leemers, a north-country phrase for ripe nuts, profoundly referred by our glossarists to les múrs, is more nearly akin to leprosy, we shall for the present be silent about these and other matters of similar importance. As Fontenelle observes, a man whose hand is full of truths, will, if he is discreet, often content himself with opening his little finger.

ART. IV.-Paley's Natural Theology Illustrated. Part I. A Discourse of Natural Theology, showing the Nature of the Evidence and the Advantages of the Study. By Henry Lord Brougham, F.R.S., and Member of the National Institute of France. 12mo. pp. 296. London. 1835.

THE

HE importance of Natural Theology to our present happiness and our future hopes, with its intimate connexion with Divine revelation, invests it with a decided superiority to every other subject of scientific inquiry. Whence am I? Whence the system to which I belong? Am I the offspring of chance, or blind necessity? Or, am I the creature of an omnipotent and intelligent Power? If the latter alternative be true, have I been thrown into existence to be the sport of accident, neglected and forgotten by the Being who made me? Or, am I at all times under the guardianship of His parental and omniscient eye? And, when the brief period of my existence here is completed, what is then to be my future destiny? Am I to perish for ever, or is there something within me which will never die? These are questions which rouse our most eager curiosity. They interest the feelings of every human being, if exalted but a little above the animal in the common. They are questions in comparison with which all others. sink into utter insignificance.

To explain the nature of that evidence, on which the science of Natural Theology rests, and to illustrate the advantages with which the study of it is accompanied, are the two great objects of the Discourse before us.

Lord Brougham begins with observing, that all the objects of human knowledge are usually divided into two classes; first, those which we know by external and internal sense; and, second, those which we know by a process of reasoning. This classification he endeavours to prove to be incorrect; and he contends, that it is by a process of reason only, founded on those two other sources of information, that we attain the knowledge of external objects. In order to establish the truth of this position, he adduces light, air, and caloric, as clear and incontrovertible proofs. He says that we do

not

not see light, but only infer its existence by a process of reasoning; and to know its laws,' he observes, 'requires a still more complicated process of reasoning.' We know not,' he says, 'the existence of caloric, as a separate substance, but by reason and analogy; nor that of air, but by a similar process.' Thus writes the author. Now, be it observed, that it is not with the laws of light, of air, or of caloric-which it requires experience, observation, and reason, to ascertain that we, as opposing his theory, are at present concerned; but with the simple existence of external objects. We ask, then, how does reason aid us in acquiring a knowledge of that simple existence? We shall suppose, with Lord Brougham, that our sense of sight is affected. Does reason teach us the cause? Certainly not. The cause is learned by experience; and what is experience, but the repeated testimony of sense? But, says our author, ‘It is an inference of reason, that the affection of sense must have had a cause.' From what premises, we ask, does reason arrive at this conclusion? Will he reply, that it is a self-evident and incontrovertible truth, that every effect must have a cause? It is granted. But it is obvious, that the sensation must first be proved to be an effect, and then, but not before, by a necessity of relation, a cause will follow. But we shall suppose that he abandons the axiom, as carrying with it the appearance of a petitio principi, and that he urges, For every change there must be a cause.' How, we ask, has he learned this maxim? Can it be proved by argument? or will the author explain to us that process of reasoning by which we arrive at this position; for, be it observed, he does not speak of reason, as merely that source of knowledge which has been termed common sense, whence are derived all our primary truths, but that faculty by which, from things known, we arrive at the knowledge of things unknown.' Now we crave leave to repeat our question by what process of reasoning does Lord Brougham learn, that for every change there must be a cause? The truth of the maxim we do not dispute, but we desire to know the argument or the proof. If it be of an abstract nature, we are earnestly desirous to learn it; for we candidly confess that we have no conception of its possibility. If it be an appeal to experience, does not the experience to which the appeal is made, imply a belief in the existence of external objects? Can we have any notion of change as proceeding from some cause external to ourselves, without the belief of anything external? It is evident that the existence of external objects must be believed-before reason, or even common sense, can judge or determine.

Possibly it may be said that our senses furnish us with a knowledge of the qualities only, but with no notion of the substance of external objects, and that the latter is acquired by a process of reasoning.

reasoning. We ask, what is substance, as knowable by us, but an assemblage or group of qualities and properties? Abstract these, and where is the substance? Deprive matter of length, breadth, and thickness, and what is there left for us to perceive? An external object can be known to us by its qualities only; and of these our senses give us direct information. No process of

reasoning is required.

His lordship subjoins a note, in which he proceeds still farther advancing a doctrine truly paradoxical, and resting on nothing but a palpable fallacy. Having bravely denied that our senses are necessary to make us acquainted with an external world, he next maintains that, without their aid, we might possibly acquire a knowledge of numerical relations, and become expert arithmeticians and algebraists. He says, 'that the whole science of numbers could, by possibility, have been discovered by a person who had never in his life been out of a dark room, and whose limbs had been so confined that he had never even touched his own body, and had never heard a sound; for the primitive ideas of numbers might, by possibility, have suggested themselves to his mind, and been made the grounds of all further calculations.' He then triumphantly asks, What becomes now of all our knowledge depending on the senses?' We answer it is just where it was before the question was put. Is an argument having no better foundation than bare possibility to be received as conclusive evidence of a fact? We shall say nothing of the author's primitive ideas of numbers,' though we could say much on this subject; nor of his further calculations,' having heard nothing of his previous calculations; but we must take the liberty to ask, whence is the presumed suggestion of ideas to originate? It must have some cause. Secondly, how came it to escape the author's attention that hearing, seeing, and touching are not our only senses? Have we not also taste and smell? And did it not occur to him that, in the absence of the three first, we might acquire the notion of number by the aid of either of the two last? Whenever a part shall be equal to a whole, the author's reasoning will be legiti

mate.

'So,' he continues, 'of the existence of mind; and although undoubtedly the process of reasoning is here the shortest of all, and the least liable to deception, yet so connected are all the phenomena with those of body, that it requires a process of abstraction, alien from the ordinary habits of most men, to be persuaded that we have more undeniable evidence of its separate existence, than we even have of the separate existence of the body.'

It is not by any process of reasoning that we become acquainted

with ourselves, but by consciousness. It is thus we know that we exist, that we feel, that we perceive, that we imagine, that we remember, that we reason, that we will. To this knowledge the rational faculty contributes nothing. But Lord Brougham proceeds on the assumption that the mind is a distinct substance, and wholly dissimilar to the body. His argument, therefore, can be pertinently addressed to those only who yield their assent to his assumption ;-nor will even they generally admit what he affirms, that we have more undeniable evidence' of mind than of body as distinct substances, and that we attain a knowledge of the former by a shorter process of reasoning than that of the latter. Now, if his assumption were as demonstrably true as he represents, we should acknowledge that the means by which we arrive at the fact would furnish an apposite illustration of his doctrine of classification. But a controvertist trifles with his readers when he grounds his argument on the assumption of a theory which is denied by many, and doubted by more. We must observe, also, that it is always understood that the clearer the evidence in favour of any truth, and the shorter the argument from which it is concluded, the firmer is the conviction, and the more general is the belief. If, then, we have more undeniable' evidence of mind as a distinct existence than of body, and arrive at the knowledge of the former by a shorter process' than that by which we acquire a knowledge of the latter, we desire to know how the author can account for these two facts: 1st. That metaphysicians and physiologists, incomparably his superiors in all philosophical acquirements, have been so blind as not to perceive what, according to him, is a fact more evident than the existence of the body? 2nd. That all believe in our corporeal existence, and, as the author himself acknowledges, are compelled to believe it, and that many have no notion of an immaterial principle in man, and deny its existence? These two unquestionable facts are directly opposed to the author's two propositions. The truth is, he confounds the power of thinking, which we know immediately through consciousness, with the existence of mind as a separate substance, assuming that they are one and the same thing. Though we ourselves are firmly persuaded of the immateriality of the human soul, yet, knowing that this doctrine has many opponents, we should hardly venture to adduce it, on an occasion like this, even for the purpose of illustration-far less as the foundation of our argument in favour of theism.

That we arrive, then, as the author maintains, at the knowledge of an external world by a process of reasoning, we expressly deny; and the illustration or argument referring to the separate existence of mind will avail nothing with those who reject his assumption

of