serious charges and one professor is condemned under the same charges, although no difference was made, during the trial, in respect either to accusations or evidence. At the final hearing, when the Secretary was absent, it was agreed by the counsel on both sides and by the Board of Visitors that the arguments and evidence which had been presented in the case of Professor Smyth should be accepted in the remaining cases, and the President also said publicly that a stenographic report of the statements then to be made would be submitted to the Secretary, and that by agreement of all parties the hearing could proceed in his absence. Five months later, when action was to be taken, the Secretary refrained from voting on those cases, offering as a reason his absence when brief statements were made by four of the accused, which statements he had an opportunity of reading a few days after the hearing. All concerned, the accused, the complainants, legal advisers, and the other members of the Board, were perfectly satisfied to have the Secretary make up his judgment on a reading of the addresses which did not reach him through the physical organs of hearing. Similar instances of so delicate a sense of propriety as the Secretary exhibited have never come to our knowledge. We remember that the Secretary was also absent from the room more than once, and several minutes at a time, while the case of Professor Smyth was in progress. How did his scrupulous honor allow him to vote for the removal of a gentleman some portions of whose defense he did not hear with his own ears? Can it be doubted that he desired to procure the removal of Professor Smyth alone, and that he determined to single him out for condemnation, making the action more emphatic by declining to vote in the succeeding cases? The discrimination was made by means of a technicality more microscopic than judges in the secular courts are accustomed to resort to. But, at all events, the effect of the action is that a tribunal has put itself upon record as reaching conflicting decisions on cases identically the same. Such a discrimination will fail to command the respect of an intelligent public. In the general estimation, if one is removed all should be removed, and if four are acquitted all should be acquitted. And all, we emphatically declare, will stand together, in complete theological agreement and in unbroken coöperation, whatever the decision may be in the case which goes up for review and adjudication.

Another characteristic of the official result is the insufficiency of the grounds upon which the removal of Professor Smyth was voted. Not only was no evidence submitted which could prove the three charges mentioned, but ample evidence to the contrary was introduced. There was absolutely no proof of the charge that the accused professors held that the Bible is "fallible and untrustworthy, even in some of its religious teachings." On the contrary, the evidence showed that the Bible is exalted as "the only perfect rule of faith and practice." The criticisms made in the writings of the editors were only against certain inadequate theories of the inspiration of the Bible. The charge that man has no

capacity or power to repent without knowledge of God in Christ can be sustained only by separating parts of sentences from their connection. It was conclusively shown on the trial, as indicated in the earlier reply, that the passages cited can be made antagonistic to the Creed only by being first misunderstood. The charge "that there is, and will be, probation after death for all men who do not decisively reject Christ during the earthly life" was not supported in that unqualified form by any evidence or arguments. It was held only as a reasonable inference that certain classes of persons may have opportunity to know God in Christ after death. Neither was any conclusive evidence presented that such an hypothesis is excluded by the Creed. Furthermore, the official result declares that Egbert C. Smyth, as such professor, maintains and inculcates beliefs inconsistent with and repugnant to the Creed. But no shred of evidence was introduced to show that in his professional capacity he had so taught. He did not avail himself, on the trial, of the distinction between his teachings and his published writings, but the decision, considered as official and legal, goes beyond the evidence in affirming that, as a professor, he has taught contrary to the Creed of the Seminary.

Another characteristic of the official result, taken in connection with the official procedure, is that there has been an apparently arbitrary and excessive use of the constitutional powers of the Board. It is true that the limitations of their power are yet to be judicially determined, and we do not, therefore, argue the point here. But the vote to remove a professor, who is also President of the Faculty, without recognizing the existence of the Board of Trustees, the responsible body of administration, seems like an arbitrary and discourteous proceeding. So far as any notice or action on the part of the Visitors was concerned, the Trustees would have been in complete ignorance that a trial was in progress and a professor under examination until the official announcement of his removal was made to them. It was so evidently the intention of the founders that the two boards should act in conjunction, especially in reference to important matters affecting the institution, that it seems like an excessive use of power under some literal construction of words to vote for the removal of a professor without, at least, informing the Trustees that proceedings were pending. This arbitrary action is aggravated into a breach of courtesy when it appears that before the public trial the Trustees, although they had been ignored at every point, requested the Visitors to admit them by committee or otherwise to the hearing, but were denied so reasonable a request. The Trustees in their recent report say: "We further regret that when proceedings had been initiated before the Visitors, all efforts of this Board to secure a standing at the hearing failed. We felt that as a Board of Trustees especially charged with the administration of the Seminary, we should have been recognized as a party in a trial which involved the best interests of the institution intrusted to our care." Official Boards are usually more punctilious than individuals in expressions of regard and courtesy. In this case

the Board of Visitors, whose duties usually, and it may prove always, are merely appellate, showed less regard for the ordinary proprieties than is expected in the direct relations of individuals. We also consider it an unjustifiable use of power to withhold the decision more than five months after the trial of the case was concluded. On any supposition, the interests of all concerned required an earlier announcement. For, if appeal should be taken, it would then be known that the Seminary would go on as usual until a final result should be reached, and the evils of uncertainty would be avoided. And if a vote for removal was expected to take effect, it was eminently unfair to inform the Trustees of a vacancy so late that it would be impossible to arrange for the work of another year in the few weeks of summer vacation. Our judgment of the official action and result is, then, that the singling out of one for condemnation, while four under the same charges are exonerated, is a worse than meaningless discrimination and for an utterly inadequate reason, that the charges against Professor Smyth are not sustained by the evidence, and that the course of procedure, especially in relation to the Trustees and to the delay of the decision, has been discourteous and arbitrary.

The case now goes to another tribunal, and we inquire next concerning the larger issues involved as these legal and theological questions are submitted to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. Evidently the appeal is taken without the least moral disadvantage on the part of those who take it. An unreasonable discrimination, affecting the rights and reputation of an individual, has been made upon the basis of a trivial technicality. The powers of a corporate board of trust have been invaded and its approved agent condemned by a literal and extreme interpretation of the statutory rights of an associated and less numerous Board. Unfair discrimination and adverse decisions have thus been rendered by resort to a technicality, which, after all, may prove invalid. No objection therefore can be made against submitting these and other technical questions as well as important legal principles to the highest judicial tribunal of the commonwealth. If the decision of the Visitors had carried any moral or theological weight, it is by no means certain that an appeal would have been taken by the professor or professors condemned. If any principle of interpretation had been laid down which would command respect, and under which all the accused professors had been voted against by all the members of the Board, there would have been little or no disposition to obtain a reversal on merely legal and technical grounds. But, as it is, the result not only carries no moral force against the professors and their opinions, but furnishes a decided moral advantage as the case goes up for adjudication. Nothing is decided theologically by the self-contradictory action of one individual; and an injustice has been attempted which gives a moral importance to the appeal above even its legal and theological character. It is also a moral advantage that twelve of the thirteen members of the Board of Trustees, after a careful examination of the charges, evidence,

and arguments, sign an exhaustive report completely vindicating the accused professors, and for reasons which are clearly stated. This result certainly has more value theologically and morally than the decision of two men who give no reasons, indicate no principle by which they are guided, and are opposed by the President of their own Board, whose opinion was absolutely necessary to give any theological value to the decision. We do not mean that because these cases have hinged on a technicality, we therefore are content to have them reversed on technicalities. There are now issues in equity to be raised and determined. There is also the grave question as to the powers and limitations of an associated board of trust. It should be settled once for all whether or not the founders intended to clothe with arbitrary and supreme powers three men who were appointed Visitors some years after the Seminary was in full operation, and so cautiously that the experiment was to be tried seven years before the Board should become permanent. And if there proves to be some doubt as to the intention of the founders, it should be determined whether or not the existence of a corporate board with such powers as have now been claimed is consonant with the genius of our institutions and laws. We mean that the case goes up to the secular court with an immense moral presumption in favor of the accused, and that, if there are legal principles which have been disregarded, or which possess a higher authority, there need be no hesitation in using them at their greatest advantage. And should an adverse decision be rendered by which the Visitors are established in the authority they claim, it certainly should be known, in order that self-respecting men may emancipate themselves from the control of so despotic a tribunal. It may be said that if all the professors had been acquitted the Visitors would have been praised without stint as righteous judges. That would depend on the reasons, if any, which might have been given. An acquittal of all without explanations would have indicated nothing more than the failure of an attack on the Seminary, and while we should have been gratified at the issue, we should not have been disposed to extol the men who had allowed so much needless annoyBut however that might be, the four who have been fully acquitted are not at all disposed to commend judges who would condemn another no more guilty and no less guilty than themselves. And we are certain that a decision to remove all would have commanded much more respect than the inconsistent result which was at last reached and announced.

ance.

The effect on the immediate administration of the Seminary can be stated in a few words. All the professors remain, and the work of the Seminary goes on as usual next September. The four professors who are acquitted remain in undisturbed and unquestioned possession. Professor Smyth continues in his present position, as the appeal to be taken in his case will vacate the judgment under which he has been removed. No one thinks of resigning. If a decision like that against Professor Smyth had been rendered in the other cases, a decision affirming no principles of interpretation, giving no reasons, and upon the basis of

charges unsupported by the evidence, appeal would have been taken, and pending the result the Seminary would have gone on as at present. Much more, as the Secretary has saved four of the accused professors the trouble of appealing, and as, by a positive vote of the Board the charges against them are dismissed, they have every reason to remain in office, and thus, so far as in them lies, to save the Seminary to its intended uses. An acquittal from charges to which they have pleaded not guilty is not an occasion for resignation of office. The Seminary is now established in the interests of genuine theological progress, for even the Visitors have decided not to remove four out of five professors who advocate the principles of a progressive orthodoxy, and with whose views they are perfectly familiar.

We should be glad to believe that no considerations have entered into the prolonged trial of the last year, except regard for a correct theology in the teaching of Andover Seminary. But the actual result taken in connection with some incidents of the trial almost compel the conclusion that the whole movement was nothing more nor less than a personal attack on the beloved President of the Seminary. Doubtless, some who have been drawn into active opposition were influenced by the fear of opinions which they thought dangerous, and were as desirous of the condemnation of all as of one. But, nevertheless, the indications are almost unmistakable that the opposition was aimed and guided towards the very end which has been secured. It is matter of record that the most strennous efforts were made by the counsel to prevent so much as a hearing on any cases except the first. Counsel for the complainants stated several times that they had been summoned to argue the case of Professor Smyth, and were not prepared to consider the cases of the other respondents. At that time all the accused professors and their counsel were apprehensive that only one case would be taken from the docket, and brought before the Visitors for decision. Only by persistent efforts was the opportunity gained to make the brief statements by the remaining professors which were finally introduced. As all the cases were at length submitted it was believed that the decision would necessarily be the same for all. When the result was announced, and it was found that Professor Smyth only was condemned, it was almost impossible not to associate the excuse by which that discrimination was explained with the efforts made during the trial to isolate his case from the others. The effect of such discrimination is not to disintegrate but to consolidate the accused professors and the entire Faculty. Whatever theological significance the procedure may have seemed to have, it is now apparent that its force was concentrated on one who is deserving only of support and affection. It is impossible that such attacks with such weapons should have any disastrous result except upon their contrivers and abettors.

There will be general disappointment that nothing has been gained or established relative to the administration of trusts under the conditions