he is united in all but marriage to Christiane Vulpins-and eighteen years later actually makes up his mind, and marries her outright-the story of the huddled-up nuptial ceremony, during the hurry and riot of French invasion, being a favourite jest with those who love any jest in general for the sake of a laugh, and this one in particular for the sake of a laugh at Goethe. Alas, these eighteen years are no theme for laughter, nor is their sequel a jest. At the first, Christiane was a fresh, young, bright-looking girl, with "golden-brown locks, laughing eyes, ruddy cheeks, kiss-provoking lips, small and gracefully rounded figure"-endowed, too, with quick "mother-wit, a lively spirit, a loving heart, and great aptitude for domestic duties." Goethe certainly appears to have been completely fascinated by her: "there are few poems in any language which approach the passionate gratitude of those in which he recals the happiness she gave him." Before he married her, however, Christiane had put an end to her beauty, whatever that may have originally been, by habits of intoxication, which had been the ruin of her father. Mr. Lewes throws no light-except conjectural and psychological-on the cause of the delay in this marriage ceremony; but he corrects the error which dates it "during the cannonade" of the battle of Jena, the actual date being the 19th of October, five days after that battle.

Not even with this very mature wedding terminates the list of the elderly bridegroom's tendresses. In 1809 he is perilously captivated by a school-girl, Minna Herzlieb, an adopted child in the family of Frommann, the Jena bookseller, and the original of Ottilie in the "Elective Affinities." And in 1825 (nine years after his wife's death), Goethe, aged seventy-six, meets at Marienbad with a Fräulein von Lewezon, for whom he conceives a vehement passion, and whom he is only withheld from marrying by the remonstrances of friends, "and perhaps the fear of ridicule." All these love-phases go to prove a too close resemblance between Goethe himself and his own Wilhelm Meister, who, as Mr. Lewes describes him, passes (with a sad lack of persistency in his emotions) from love of the passionate Mariana to an inclination for the coquettish Philina; from Philina to the Countess, whom he immediately forgets for the Amazon; and when about to marry Theresa, he relinquishes her as soon as he is accepted, and offers himself to Natalie. Like hero, like author. And what though "souls feminine" unite "as one man" to cry shame on Goethe's choppings and changings?

That was wrong, perhaps but then
Such things be-and will, again.
Women cannot judge for men.*

But they can judge of men, or at any rate they do; and of Goethe, sharply enough. Nor in his case does their mercy rejoice against judgment, but is as good as ordered out of court.

"Bertha in the Lane."

THE DOCK WARRANTS. A TALE OF THE TIMES. BY DUD-
LEY COSTELLO

LAWRENCE'S LIFE OF FIELDING

THE PRIVATE THEATRICALS AT CHESHANT

139

154

. 161

. 165

. 171

186

BY-WAYS OF HISTORY. WILMER'S DE HOMINE REPLE-
GIANDO"

NEW-BOOK NOTES BY MONKSHOOD. MACAULAY'S HISTORY

199

. 204

PRINTED BY CHARLES WHITING, BEAUFORT HOUSE, STRAND.

NOTICE TO CORRESPONDENTS.

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Rejected articles cannot be returned.

THE QUESTION OF THE DAY.

A WAR of exceeding severity, marked by the most energetic perseverance on the one hand, and an equally stubborn resistance on the other, by immense losses from sickness and exposure, as well as from the usual casualties in the field, appears at length about to be terminated by a compromise.

The propositions emanating from Austria, which have to a certain extent been adopted by the Allied Powers, are well calculated to meet the exigencies of those who hold that to arrive at a peaceful solution of the question nothing must be done to humiliate Russia. In the propositions submitted to that power by Count Esterhazy it can be truly said, that although certain special conditions were held in reserve, little appears on the surface that could in any way militate against the most sensitive nationality;-nothing, indeed, when we consider the system of aggression so long and so successfully carried on against neighbouring petty states, and which it became the duty of the great contracting powers to repel as far as possible.

The complete abolition of the Russian protectorate over the Danubian Principalities will indeed be a great point, and the reorganisation of those states will do more towards insuring permanent peace than even the occupation of the Crimea; but there is nothing in such a concession that militates either against the honour, or against the true interests of the Russian Empire.

The freedom of the Danube is essentially a European question. No power but Russia, who has never hesitated to put her foot upon the neck of any other neighbouring state, would have ventured upon so selfish and unprincipled an act as to close up the mouth of the main artery of Central Europe. Russia can lose nothing, she can only gain in the opinion of the civilised world by ceding such an invidious position. But for the Allies to make all the strong places and territories occupied by their armies a matter of exchange for a rectification of the frontier on the Danube, is, in reality, to cast all that has been done by France, England, Sardinia, and Turkey into the scale for the benefit of Austria.

That the Black Sea should be open to merchant vessels and closed to war navies presents nothing that could possibly be objectionable to any of the belligerent powers. But that no naval or military arsenals shall be created of maintained there, appeared to many a stumbling-block to all pacific arrangements. Would so ambitious and especially warlike and aggressive a power as Russia give up the holding of all naval or military arsenals on the Black Sea? How would France like to disarm on the coast of

VOL. XXXIX.

I

the Mediterranean, or England in the Channel, at the bidding of a hostile power? But if the proposition is viewed as it has been accepted, purely and simply, it will be found to comprise only arsenals in the Black Sea, and that it does not therefore include the great naval and military arsenals on the Bug, on the Dnieper, in the Sea of Azof, or in the Straits of Kertch: such do not come within the category of the proposed interdiction. Again, there is no mention of forts or fortresses, and it is therefore to be presumed that Yeni-Kalah, Kaffa, Kinburn, Otchakof, Odessa, Akerman, Anapa, Phanagoria, &c., &c., are to remain as they were. There is not even any provision against the permanence of the fortifications of Sebastopol; it is only stipulated that it shall not be a naval or military arsenal. The fortress of Chotym is also to remain in the hands of Russia, who will always threaten from it the mouths of the Danube and the Principalities. The proposition might then be readily accepted by Russia, as in no way infringing upon her honour. She remains, in reference to the points involved in that guarantee, just as she stood before the war, with the exception of the nominal abandonment of Sebastopol as a naval and military arsenal.

The preservation of the immunities of the Christian subjects of the Porte-the propositions say " Rayah subjects," but Rayah, like the Indian Ryot, is a term expressive of a race too despised to be held worthy of being subjects-implies nothing that can be possibly injurious either to the interests or the honour of the Russian Czar. On the contrary, if Russia could only for a moment sink her ambition, love of conquest, and aspirations of aggrandisement into a real desire for the welfare of the Christians of the East, she would feel that she could not do better than associate herself with Austria, France, Great Britain, and the Sublime Porte, in assuring to these persecuted races their religious and political rights.

But there still remained a paragraph which might mean little or nothing, or might, on the contrary, be made to comprise stipulations that would be fatal to the happy conclusion of the negotiations. It was to the effect that the belligerent powers reserved to themselves the right of producing in a European interest special conditions over and above the four guarantees. It is evident that till these special conditions were known it was impossible to form a correct idea of the chances there would be for a favourable termination of the peace negotiations.

It is no doubt highly gratifying to find that all the principal obstacles to peace have disappeared, and that Russia has so far given way to the general and pronounced wish of all Europe as to accept the propositions made to her purely and simply; but it still remains to be seen if they comprise, accepted in such a sense, all that the Allies feel they have a right to ask for in indemnification of the vast sacrifices made by them in the interests of