5

PRESENT ASPECT OF AFFAIRS IN RELATION TO THE WAR.

COLONEL ST. ANGE argues in the Journal des Débats that it would have been nothing short of madness on the part of the Allies to attack the forts north of Sebastopol, either by the mouth of the Balbek or by escalading the heights in front of Mackenzie's Farm. Efforts, according to the French apologist of existing tactics, were made to turn the position. Strong reconnoissances were pushed on from Baidar to try the possibility of turning the Mackenzie lines by the upper valley of the Balbek, but it was soon seen that in advancing by this route the army would have had to carry a series of strong positions (the nature and character of which, including as they do Mangup-Kaleh and Tcherkess Kirman, we have previously described), one behind the other; and in order to turn the second line it would have been necessary to penetrate into the mountains as far as the sources of the Katcha, an eccentric and difficult movement, and of doubtful success.

If, then, according to the admission of the military apologist of Marshal Pelissier's strategy, it was equally dangerous and difficult to attack the Russian position in front or to attempt to turn it, the Russian boast, that their position was as good after the fall of Sebastopol as before, proves to be sound. The Allies, even after the fall of Sebastopol, are still placed in a cul de sac, from which there is no emancipation save by sea. They are fairly hemmed in and beleaguered in the Heracleontic Chersonesus, without even the power to avail themselves navally of the harbour of Sebastopol. Those who are fighting on the defensive will always have the choice of position. It is difficult to imagine that the Russians could not have been driven from their strong position on the Mackenzie heights just as they were at Alma. Wherever they are to be combated they will select an entrenched position of natural strength in which to resist the assault. Their present position will be just as formidable in spring as it was this autumn; while the army is likely to lose more men by exposure, privations, and sickness during a long winter's bivouac than in one battle, however severe.

If it was impossible to attack the Russian position or to turn it, it will naturally be asked, why not leave the place altogether and land at Eupatoria, Kertch, or any other available point, and recommence a campaign upon different principles? The answer to that question involves the gist of Marshal Pelissier's strategy? It was impossible to move away all the impedimenta of a long siege in time. The true reason, we are told by the French apologist, of the marshal's resolve not to force his way by the Balbek or Katcha, was not so much the strength of the

enemy's works, but the danger of extending or dividing the army in any such operations, during which the Russian general might have crossed the valley of the Tchernaya, cutting through the allied centre, and exposing that portion of the force which still kept the heights above Sebastopol to an unequal contest. Marshal Pelissier declined to move, in short, until he could do so with his whole army-that is, till the plateau of the Chersonese was cleared of its artillery and stores, till Kamiesch was fortified, and the captured town itself left in such a state as to afford no advantage by its reoccupation. Sir George Brown predicted that the capture of Sebastopol would set 90,000 allied soldiers free. It has kept upwards of 100,000 encumbered and beleaguered around it, and we cannot for the life of us see how their position will be improved next spring. Whether by that time they will be sufficiently clear of encumbrances to march into the interior and turn the Russian position, remains to be seen. Meantime, the allied army is, as it has been justly expressed, crystallised in the Crimea. The number of those bearing great names, not to mention hecatombs of unknown, who have already perished there, have made of the place a terrible, but lasting reputation. Between sickness and the progress of an obscure and unsatisfactory kind of warfare -of a description such as has never before existed-men who have earned proud names in the Peninsula, in the Punjaub, at the Cape, or in Canada, have gone there to die or be slain, without the possibility of doing anything worthy of themselves or of the renown they carried with them. Personal genius and personal qualities have alike found an inglorious tomb in the Heracleontic Chersonesus. Our own solid infantry, our heavy cavalry, our perfect artillery, the dashing Zouave, the scientific French engineer, the active Piedmontese, the trained bands of Egypt, and the rough Turkish troops, have furnished a variety of instruments rarely to be obtained in modern armies. We have ourselves added to the variety by the formation of German and Swiss legions and a Turkish contingent. There are also army-work corps, transport corps, "navvies," and every conceivable supplementary service by land or by sea. Yet, with all these auxiliaries, it has been found impossible to harass the main body of the enemy, to capture Kaffa or Arabat, to succour Kars, or even interrupt the communication between Perekop or Chongar and the Russian camp!

Nothing in the history of the war is more annoying than the jealousy said to exist between the Queen's officers and the gallant and experienced officers trained in India and those in command of irregular troops. To this jealousy is attributed the fact of Beatson's "Ottoman Irregular Horse," which have cost some 250,000l., being sent away to Schumla-in fact, virtually disbanded. To the same jealousy is attributed the strange conduct pursued towards General Vivian and his Turkish Contingent, bandied about from one place to another, and at last tolerated, rather

than upheld, in a remote, exposed, and forageless station in the Crimea. To the same feeling many are prone, with too much probability in their favour, to attribute the neglect experienced by the brave General Williams and his coadjutors at the hands of the ambassador and the military authorities. After remedying the disasters of last year by fortifying, with the assistance of Colonel Lake, the two Armenian capitals-Erzeroum and Kars; after, with less than a handful of British officers, driving back the Russians during a sanguinary assault upon the latter city, he and his devoted companions in arms were left to surrender from sheer starvation, because no real and sincere interest was felt in their success, and nothing was done in earnest to assist them during the long summer that has passed. The existence of such a feeling is a disgrace to the profession of arms, which has always claimed preeminence in honour. The world will give credit to skill and bravery, no matter in what service it is found; and the man who, to thwart an opponent, or to uphold a custom, impedes the efficiency of our forces, is unworthy of office or esteem.

Omar Pasha was no sooner released from the extraordinary incubus that seems to trammel all independent spirit of enterprise in the Crimea than he set an example of successful operations, which it is much to be wished was more frequently seen at headquarters. Without any basis of operations, except that he held the coast at no considerable distance, he pushed his way through forests, over mountains and rivers, till he found a Russian army strongly entrenched at a pass of the river Ingour. These he drove before him with great slaughter and little loss, and he has since followed his first victory by a second, which it is to be hoped will carry him triumphantly into the capital of Imeritia.

It has been argued that Omar Pasha ought to have carried relief in a less indirect manner to the besieged of Kars; but there were only two roads to enable him to do so-one by Trebizond, the other by Batum! The first of these is so mountainous and bad that the troops could not have got even to Erzeroum before the snow had rendered it impassable. But supposing they had got to Erzeroum, they could no more than Selim Pasha have forced the formidable passes of the Soghanli Tagh, which are held by the Russians, and present the most remarkable natural difficulties, rendered almost insuperable when held by an intelligent enemy. As to the road from Batum to Kars, the difficulties of the country are very great indeed, the mountain-paths being impracticable to artillery. Added to this, there are two fortified towns on the way-Artvin and Ardahan; and these the Russians took care to garrison before they laid siege to Kars. Omar Pasha has, it is also said, no transport corps or resources for such an expedition; be this as it may, it is obvious that he could not have relieved Kars by way of Erzeroum this season, and that by way of Batum he would have met with greater obstacles in two fortified towns to

besiege and capture than were presented by the entrenched positions of the Russians on the tributaries to the Phasis. Steps for the relief of Kars ought to have been taken long ago, when Armenia was still bathed in a summer sun, and the Russians had not entrenched themselves in the passes of the Soghanli Tagh.

The position of the Turks in Imeritia, especially if, as there are some distant grounds of hope, Omar Pasha can obtain possession of Kutais before Mouravieff's corps can come to its relief, is such as to render the tenure of Kars by the Russians of no strategic importance whatsoever. In Imeritia the Turks are almost in immediate contact with the Circassians; they are advancing to the heart of the Transcaucasian provinces and their capital Tiflis by the line pursued from time immemorial-that of the Phasis, with the mountains and their friendly host to back them; and the Russians will not be able to maintain outlying positions in Armenia while threatened in the very centre of their Asiatic possessions.

Rumours of peace have come this month to gladden the hearts of many. The origin and real import of these rumours are somewhat difficult to make out. It seems certain, however, that propositions from Vienna, which were partially admitted by France, but demurred to in England, have ultimately been adopted by the Three Powers, and that Count Valentine Esterhazy has borne them to St. Petersburg. Some wary politicians insinuate that Russia took the initiative, others as boldly assert that Russia will listen to no propositions whatever so long as an enemy remains in arms on its territory. The question as to what Austria will do in case of any such an exhibition of Muscovite bearishness is involved in the same obscurity. It is said that she will recal her ambassador from St. Petersburg, and politely furnish Prince Gortschakoff with his passports: there is a wide difference between such a demonstration and actual war. The reasons assigned for Austria not declaring war with Russia are, that Russia would instantly attack her on all her vulnerable and unprotected points. The state of the Austrian frontier is too tempting to an invader not to inspire apprehension, and if she took the initiative it would leave her without succour from the German States, who are bound by treaty to defend her only in the event of attack. Neither could she hope for assistance from her allies, France and England, as the present is not a most convenient period to send a French force sufficiently great to afford efficient service. Austria, then, would have to face the Russians single-handed, who might easily march on her unfortified capital and take it. We put no faith in these representations. We do not believe that the Russians, after losing 300,000 men, are so strong on the Austrian frontier as is imagined. As to an effective force, it could always be raised in Austria itself, if the "sinews of war" were supplied from without, and that is probably what Austria is looking to.

France could also send by the existing railways a powerful auxiliary army at any time of the year into Austria.

As to the part played by Germany in the same contingency, it cannot be too strongly impressed upon those temporising states that their interests are really more concerned than those of England and France, and as much so as Austria. Let us suppose for a moment that peace were concluded on the most advantageous conditions; that Russia should pay the expenses of the war, and abandon the Crimea; and that that peninsula should be restored to the Sultan, who is alone able to keep it;-suppose that, to strengthen the line of the Pruth, the Danubian Provinces, united under the rule of a single hospodar, should remain subject to the Porte, without its authority being weakened by any sort of protectorate, and that fortified places and good Turkish garrisons should again defend that frontier -suppose all this, and the Ottoman Empire once more placed in a position of safety from its formidable neighbour. Would the danger to Europe be less? The Russians would only change their direction. For, if the events which have taken place for the last two years have exhibited to us Turkey as stronger and more capable of resistance than was supposed, they have also proved the excessive weakness of Germany, and of most of the secondary states.

Meantime, if the position of the Allies in the Crimea is much improved beyond what it was last winter-although all that has been done in the Chersonesus, at Eupatoria, or at Kertch, is not equal to what the world had a right to expect-if the surrender of Kars has come to counterbalance the victorious advance of Omar Pasha in Imeritia, the position of Russia is becoming almost deplorable. Experience has shown that in as far as her troops are concerned, any European soldiers might face with assurance of success an equal force of the Czar. It is estimated that more than 300,000 Russians have fallen since the Pruth was passed. The recruiting for fresh levies becomes every day more difficult. The nobles are discontented and disloyal. The serfs begin sullenly to mutter that they were not created to be food for powder in a cause in which they have not the most remote interest. Even religion, appealed to for want of reason or cause, ceases to inspire them with enthusiasm enough to do away with the necessity for chains and handcuffs. The finances of the empire are wasted; the revenues of the Church and the savings of the State are nearly gone; national banks, as at Odessa, are breaking up; manufactures have ceased for want of material; agriculture and mining are at an end, and commerce is only carried on by the surreptitious aid of neutral ports or railways. Russia may well put forward Austria to pave the way for deliberations!