The Control Effort What type of community response is most effective once disorder erupts is clearly a critically important question. Chapter 12, "Control of Disorder, and the Public Safety Supplement to this report consider this question at length. We consider in this section the variety of control responses, official and unofficial, which were utilized in the 24 surveyed disorders, including: Use or threatened use of local official Use or threatened use of supplemental Negotiations between officials and On-the-street persuasion by "counter- Disorders are sometimes discussed as if they consisted of a succession of confrontations and with drawals by two cohesive groups, the police or other control force on one side and a riotous mob on the other. Often it is assumed that there was no effort within the Negro community to attempt to reduce the violence. Sometimes the only remedy prescribed is mobilization of the largest possible police or control force, as early as possible. We found none of these views to be accurate. We found that: A variety of different control forces employed a variety of tactics, often at the same time, and often in a confused situation; Substantial non-force control efforts, such as negotiations and on-the-street persuasion by "counter-rioters," were usually being made, often simultaneously with forcible control efforts; counter-rioter activity often was carried on by Negro residents of the disturbance area, sometimes with and often without official recognition; No single tactic appeared in all situations Local Official Force In 20 of the 24 disorders, the primary effort to restore order at the beginning of violence was made 1 entirely by local police. In ten cases no additional outside force was called for after the initial response. In only a few cases was the initial control force faced 2 The police approach to the initial outbreak of disorder in the surveyed cities was generally cautious. Three types of response were employed. One was dispersal (clearing the area, either by arrests 4 or by scattering crowds), used in ten cases. Another was reconnaissance (observing and evaluating develop 5 ments), used in eight cases. In half of these instances, they soon withdrew from the disturbance area, generally because they believed they were unable to cope with the 6 disorder. The third was containment (preventing movement in or out of a cordoned or barricaded area), used in six cases. 7 No uniform result from utilization of any of the three control approaches is apparent. In at least half of the 24 cases it can reasonably be said that the approach taken by the police did not prevent the 8 continuation of violence. To the extent that their effectiveness is measurable, the conclusion appears to 9 hold for subsequent police control responses as well. The various tactical responses we have described are not mutually exclusive, and in many instances combinations were employed. The most common were attempts at dispersal in the disturbance area and a simultaneous cordon or barricade at the routes lead ing from the disturbance area to the central commercial area of the city, either to contain the disturbance or to prevent persons outside the area from entering it, In 11 disorders a curfew was imposed at some time, either as the major dispersal technique or in combina tion with other techniques. 10a In only four disorders was tear gas used at any 11 point as a dispersal technique. Only Newark and New Haven used a combination of all three means of control, cordon, curfew and tear gas. 12 Supplemental Official Force The addition of outside force from other jurisdictions was also not invariably successful. In nine disturbances--involving a wide variation in the intensity of violence--additional control forces were brought in after there had been serious violence which local police had been unable to handle alone. 13 In every case further violence occurred, often more than once and often of equal or greater intensity than 14 before. The result was the same where extra forces were mobilized prior to serious violence. In four cities 15 where this was done, violence nonetheless occurred, 16 in most cases more than once, and often of equal or 17 greater intensity than in the original outbreak. In the remaining group of seven cities no outside 18 control forces were called, because the level and duration of violence were lower. Outbreaks in these cities nevertheless followed the same random pattern 19 as in the cities which did use outside forces. Negotiation In 21 of the 24 disturbances surveyed, discussion or negotiation occurred during the disturbance. These took the form of relatively formal meetings between |