in some souls, as capacities in all. But if there be one who could master them (all-we do not say yet whether there is-then we feel sure that he could lay down such a law.

(b) Let us look at the matter in another way.

At different times in the world's history men have put forward ethical systems, which were avowedly intended to supply these two things-the standard and the motive of Duty. And they have supplied it in more or less degree. It would take us too long to look at these systems separately, but we may look at them in classes, with special reference to those which are in vogue in our day. They have been very conveniently classified under three heads, according as they made our own happiness, or that of mankind generally, or some kind of intuition the ultimate standard of appeal. I am sorry to say that I am not sufficiently well acquainted with Indian philosophy to say how far they are represented there: but you will no doubt recognise the general types as cropping up again and again, in one form or other, in your own country as elsewhere. The systems, such as Epicureanism in the ancient world, and Hedonism in the modern, which make the happiness of the individual the ultimate test, have something to be said for them. For it is undoubtedly true that all moral action must ultimately tend to our own happiness-nay if the word happiness be largely interpreted it does so now-to a "sort of happiness which often brings so much pain with it, that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we should choose above everything else." Therefore it is not unfair to say, that if a man can take a sufficiently large view of that wherein his true happiness consists, it will furnish him with a true test of morality. This system has the advantage of being strong in its motive power, but it has seldom produced in the long run a very high type of character.

And seeing this defect men have said that happiness is indeed the test, but it must be the happiness of the many. "The greatest happiness of the greatest number "—is the famous formula by which it has been expressed in our day; and this too expresses a great truth, that moral action must necessarily be communicative: it cannot stop with itself. This system has in our time received two wonderful developments which I must just briefly notice-Cosmic and Positive Religion. You see they claim to be Religions, and thus binding on

all kinds of men, and not merely philosophic systems for the learned. And they do so not unjustly, if Religion be what I have defined it,— some form of believing love; for these two systems, resting on belief in the great destiny of the human race, are careful to reinforce their inherent persuasiveness by all the strength of motives which can come within their grasp. Herbert Spencer, the great advocate of Cosmic Religion grounds his system on that principle of evolution which has proved so powerful a factor in science. He says that religions too are in process of development; but meanwhile he will not ignore the value of the imperfect religions which he sees: he says, it is false to assume that without them, “adequate guidance for conduct in life private and public could be had;" or that "a moral code, rationally elaborated by men as they now are, would be duly operative upon them."* Here you see that he gives us two important elements of truth: one, that every religion must be greater than its adherents in those who profess it, it can only be imperfectly seen: it leaves something yet to be developed in practice. And secondly, even though this be so, that imperfectly realized religion may still be a vital power among men.

When I look at Positivism I see that it puts forward a truth which comes still nearer my heart: for it boldly proclaims itself the Religion of Humanity, and demands the full and frank recognition of all that men have done in times past as one of the chief motives to exertion in the present: that is to say it gives a personal affection as a ruling motive of morals. Its chief advocates you know in England have been John Stuart Mill, and-not less powerful because less systematicthe great novel writer who is lately dead, and whose works I have constantly had occasion to quote in these lectures, George Eliot. These philoshopers have pointed us to the great principle that (to use the words of the latter) "the impulse to help our fellows should be as immediate and irresistible as that which I feel to grasp something when I am falling.”

And lastly the systems of Intuitionism, which make the moral Law be witnessed by the voice of conscience within us, whencesoever that conscience comes, state a truth which few would be found seriously to deny. There are within us intuitive perceptions of good, however we may account for their being there..

* Study of Sociology. p. 303.

Now I am not pretending to sound the truth and falsehood of these systems; even if I were competent to attempt it, it would be an impertinence to do so in this short lecture. I am not concerned with what they deny; I have only tried to discover the main principle which each affirms. I have called them up as witnesses to existing human needs. There are these needs-there must be, else these systems or religions could never have heen embraced as they have been by large masses of men. Taken separately they witness to the existence of the separate needs: but taken together they witness to needs of the whole human race, which none of them singly can supply. If it be true that all these needs exist separately, some of which are supplied by Positivism, and some by Cosmic Religion, and some by Intuitionism, while there may be many others yet latent which have never been met by any human system at all; then I say there is― not indeed a proof, but-a hope, a presumption, an expectation that there is somewhere, we know not where, a truth, supreme and eternal, which shall meet all this great need.

And now, as before, having reached this conclusion independently, I shall ask whether Christ as a moral Teacher, does recognise all these needs, and provide for them in His system. He provides for whatever is true in Hedonism by the fact that a state of happiness—a kind of happiness now, and a perfect happiness hereafter-must necessarily be the portion of all His faithful followers: "Godliness is profitable for all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come." He recognises the truth of utilitarianism: for it is not indeed the primary, but the next after the primary law of His kingdom "to love thy neighbour as thyself." He admits a progressive element such as would satisfy the truth contained in Cosmic religion; for it said that in him "are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge:" so that there is something in his teaching, though its main lines are for ever fixed, which each one of his followers, each nation as it accepts his leadership, may evolve for itself. He admits the personal element more fully even than Positivism can do, for the strongest of all immediate motives for His followers is to be the tender, ever-present, personal love of Himself: "If ye love Me, keep My commandments." Even more naturally do those Ethical systems which rest on Intuition ally themselves with His: "I will put My laws into their hearts, and in their minds will I write them." And lastly He does claim for his

system that it shall not be a philosophy for the study only, but a Religion for the world: in it "there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female:" especially "to the poor the Gospel is preached." He does claim that it shall satisfy all deep and righteous human needs, not repressing any, not ignoring any; rather expanding them to the utmost while it satisfies them. "Whosoever" He says metaphorically, "drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst: but the water that I shall give him will be in him a fountain of water springing up into everlasting life."

But mark this; in His system all these different motives are ranged and ordered under one supreme motive. which is not identical with them, but is identical with the moral law: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."

(c) But now, lastly, I do not admit for one moment the assumption that external conduct is the only sphere with which morality has t deal. When it is said that men may act rightly from different motives, it is forgotten that the essence of a moral act lies in its motive; motives are the very subject matter with which morality has to do. It could only be a miserable morality which was satisfied that men did not commit murder, or theft, or adultery; or even with their making munificent gifts and forming philanthropic schemes: a deeper morality teaches us to ask why they do so, and though we cannot often practically get an answer to that question, still we withhold our admiration from any apparently noble act when there is evidence to shew that it was prompted by ambition or selfseeking. No, for our own guidance at any rate we cannot grasp too firmly the fact that moral evil begins in the thoughts and in the desires, long hefore it issues in act, nay, even though it never does so issue. So away with this shallow sophism that “he can't be wrong whose life is in the right." Whose life can be in the right, if it happen to be governed by motives other than the true ones -a thing with which "modes of faith" have something to do? So the motive cannot be distinct from, must be included under, the moral law.

Thus when men come to us, as men often do, in the name of tolerance, and say: Be content; be not so eager about your own particular system of morality or form of religion; others have theirs, and it may be equally good: perhaps it is as true as yours-shall we not be bold

to answer; Is it nothing to you then, O my brother, that somewhere amidst us or around us or within us or above us, there sits the changeless Image of eternal truth, unmoved by human clamour undismayed by human indifference, and yet stretching out a tender hand to those who at all costs will reach up to her and find her. No scepticism is so sad as that which has ceased to believe in her very existence.

And now, my friends, what is the result of to-night's enquiry? This: that there is a unity of the moral law, and one which contains in itself the supreme motive for obeying it. Man's imperious need of a Religion witnesses to the existence of a Truth, one and the same for all mankind. We have questioned our human reason, we have questioned the facts of life, we have questioned ethical systems, and though they none of them give this answer, they all point to it. One or other of them can be satisfied with less than this: this alone can satisfy all. And with the elevation of this truth, that idle fallacy falls to the ground, which tells us moral truth is merely relative. We have established this at any rate, that our enquiry after the truth need not be stopped on the very threshold by the deep philosophic doubt, whether indeed there be any truth to enquire after.

I myself have felt the irksomeness and the burden of going about to establish this result by a laborious induction. I have felt it, and I wonder that you too have had patience to listen to me.

"Why labour at the dull mechanic oar,

When the fresh breeze is blowing,

And the strong current flowing

Right onward to the Eternal Shore?"

Why all this cumbrous accumulation of proof for that which our own consciences have long told us must be so? Are there not within you memories and affections and strong yearnings which tell you that there must be somewhere a truth which, while it enlarges all these deepest needs of the soul, shall satisfy all. Out of life's fitful fever-its greatness and its littleness, its progress and its retrogression, its triumphant evil, its defeated good, its noble impulses, its half fulfilled promises, its wasted opportunities-out of the inexplicable mystery of your own heart, ever reaching upwards yet ever falling back-out of your own quenchless hopes and enthusiasms, now fixed upon something truly noble, now fastening themselves on things utterly con