flesh body wounds. It will scarcely be believed children, you see them now all before you. that, notwithstanding the flattering sentence The war before this, our Britlsh father, gave of the court, and the severity of his wounds, the hatchet to his red children when our old Captain Barclay was only promoted to post chiefs were alive. They are now all dead. In rank in 1824, or nearly eleven years after the that war our father was thrown on his back action. by the Americans, and our father took them by the hand without our knowledge, and we are afraid our father will do so again at this With the loss of the British fleet vanished all prospect of supplies Consequences of Per- either of men or prory's victory. visions, and consequently no hope remained that effectual resistance could be offered to the advance of the enemy, or to his occupation not only of the Michigan territory, but also the western portion of the peninsula. In fact Proctor was at once reduced to the necessity of abandoning all his positions beyond Lake Erie, and by this abandonment he ran the farther risk of being deserted by his Indian allies. Already had a vast number of boats been collected by the Americans, for the purpose of conveying the troops, who had assembled, in the neighbourhood of Forts Sandusky and Meigs, to the number of ten thousand men, across the lake, now that their success had left them undisputed masters in that quarter, when General Proctor found it essential to the safety of his troops to take immediate measures for a retreat. A council of war was held, and the Indian chiefs invited. At this council, General Proctor, after an exposition of the numercial strength of his force, of their position without provisions or other supplies, and the impracticability of procuring the actual necessaries for supporting life, proposed that, as it was utterly impossible to prevent the landing of the enemy in overwhelming force, the forts of Detroit and Amherstburg, together with the various public buildings, should be destroyed, and that the troops and Indians should retire on the centre division at Niagara. It is much to be deplored that this proposition was not acted upon, and that General Proctor suffered himself to be induced by Tecumseth's mingled reproaches and entreaties to change his purpose. Tecumseth's speech, which follows, is said to have been delivered with great energy, and to have produced the most startling effect on his brother Indians, who are described to have started up to a man, brandishing their tomahawks in a most menacing manner: time. 'Summer before last, when I came for ward with my red brethren and was ready to take up the hatchet in favour of our British father, we were told not to be in a hurrythat he had not yet determined to fight the Americans. "Listen! When war was declared, our father stood up and gave us the tomahawk, and told us he was now ready to strike the Americans-that he wanted our assistance; and he certainly would get us our lands back, which the Americans had taken from us. "Listen! You told us at the same time to bring forward our families to this place-we did so, and you promised to take care of them, and that they should want for nothing, while the men would go to fight the enemythat we were not to trouble ourselves with the enemy's garrisons-that we knew nothing about them, and that our father would attend to that part of the business. You also told your red children that you would take good care of your garrison here, which made our hearts feel glad. "Listen! When we last went to the Rapids, it is true we gave you little assistance. It is hard to fight people who live like groundhogs. "Father-Listen! Our fleet has gone out; we know they have fought; we have heard the great guns; but we know nothing of what has happened to our father with one arm. Our ships have gone one way and we are much astonished to see our father tying up everything and preparing to run away the other, without letting his red children know what his intentions are. You always told us to remain here and take care of our lands; it made our hearts glad to hear that was your wish. Our great father, the king, is the head, and you represent him. You always told us you would never draw your foot off British ground; but now, father, we see you "Father,―(he thundered,) listen to your are drawing back, and we are sorry to see our father doing so without seeing the enemy. We must compare our father's conduct to a fat animal, that carries its tail upon its back, but when afrighted, it drops it between its legs and runs off. "Listen Father!--The Americans have not yet defeated us by land; neither are we sure that they have done so by water; we there fore wish to remain here, and fight our enemy, should they make their appearance. If they deteat us we will then retreat with our father. "At the battle of the Rapids, last war, the Americans certainly defcated us; and when we retreated to our father's fort at that piace, the gates were shut against us. We were afraid that it would now be the case; but instead of that we now see our British father preparing to march out of his garrison. "Father! You have got the arms and ammunition which our great father sent for his red children. If you have any idea of going away, give them to us, and you may go in welcome, for us. Our lives are in the hands of the Great Spirit. We are determined to defend our lands, and if it is his will, we wish to leave our bones upon them." centre division, and there await the approach of the enemy, This course of action having been decided on, the troops were immediately set about destroying the fortifications, and various public buildings in Detroit and Amherstburg, and these places presented for some time a scene of cruel desolation. All stores that it was deemed impossible to move were committed The work of demolition having to the flames. been completed, and the baggage waggons and boats sent on in advance, the troops commenced their march; and never was a march set out on, under more dispiriting circum stances. The situation of the men was deplorable in the extreme; they had been for some time on short allowance; and even their pay had not been regularly received. Arrears were due, to some for six, and to others for nine months. A Canadian winter was fast ap proaching, and few of the troops had blankets; to all greatcoats were a luxury quite unknown. The same privations which they had experienced during the winter of 1812 were, therefore, likely to be doubly felt during the coming season. To all these real hardships was joined the painful certainty that the families of many of the militia were exposed to similar privations at home. The scene that ensued is described to have been of the most imposing character. Richardson's account says-"The Council room Under these circumstances, the troops comwas a large lofty building, the vaulted roof of menced their retreat towards the end of Sepwhich echoed back the wild yell of the Indi-tember, and proceeded up the Thames, a river ans, while the threatening attitude and diver- navigable for small craft, up which the boats sified costume of these latter formed a striking had already preceded them. On the 27th contrast with the calm demeanor and military garb of the officers grouped around the walls. The most prominent feature in the picture, however, was Tecumseth. Habited in a close leather dress, his athletic proportions were admirably delineated, while a large plume of white ostrich feathers, by which he was generally distinguished, overshadowing his brow, and contrasting with the darkness of his complexion, and the brilliancy of his black and piercing eye, gave a singularly wild and terrific expression to his features. It was evident that he could be terrible." After some opposition General Proctor prevailed on Tecumseth and his brother chiefs to assent to a second proposal, viz., to retire on the Moravian village, distant nearly half-way between Amherstburg and the outposts of the the American fleet, "composed of sixteen vessels of war and upwards of one hundred boats," received on board General Harrison's division, and landed it, on the afternoon of the same day, at a point three miles below Amherstburg, which post was reached just three days after it had been evacuated by the British. The two armies, numerically considered, stood thus-The British retreating force consisted of about eight hundred and thirty men, exclusive of five hundred Indians; the Americans mustered fully five thousand men. We have adopted James's statement of the American force, as he seems to have been at much trouble in arriving at something like the truth. "The number of American troops," says James, "with which General Harrison so sanguinely expected to overthrow General the American By following out this plan, James has arrived at the number which we have adopted above. The British movements were extremely slow, as they appear to have been encum bered with a very unnecessary amount of baggage, and, when they arrived at the Moravian village, the pursuing party was but a few leagues behind. This village, situated on a small plain, offered every facility for defence, being skirted on one side by a thick wood highly favorable to the operations of the Indians, and on the other by the Thames, while immediately in front, a deep ravine, covered with brushwood, and capable of being commanded by artillery, presented an obstacle peculiarly unfavorable to the passage of cavalry, of which a large portion of the advancing columns consisted. It is impossible to understand the motives which could have induced General Proctor to abandon his original plan of making a stand at this point, and withdrawing his troops into the heart of a wood. It could scarcely have been that he expected by this means to render the cavalry, of which reports averred the major portion of the pursuing force to consist, comparatively useless, as, had even General Proctor been ignorant of the material out of which the American cavalry was formed, the Indians were not in the same state of ignorance, and there can be very little doubt but that this very point was discussed at the meeting, when Tecumseth urged the impolicy of a retreat. backwoodsman rides better than any other people; a musket or rifle is no impediment, he being accustomed to carry them on horseback from his earliest youth. The Indians knew this as well as General Harrison, and it is not probable but that they put General Proctor in possession of the fact- —so acute an observer as Tecumseth was not likely to leave his commander in the dark on so important a point. The British regulars on the other hand were just as ill suited for this irregular kind of bush fighting, where their tactics and previous training would be useless, as their opponents were the reverse. Taking, then, all these points into consideration general Proctor's manœuvres are more and more difficult to be accounted for, especially when we remember that all his former operations had been marked by decision and clear-sightedness. Richardson who was present at the battle, says "on the 5th, at one o'clock in the afternoon, we were within two miles of the Moravian village, but in defiance of that repeated experince which should have taught us the hopelessness of combating a concealed enemy, the troops were ordered to defile into the heart of a wood, not very close it is true, yet through the interstices of which it was impossible for the view to extend itself to a distance of more than twenty paces, much less to discover objects bearing so close a resemblance to the bark and foliage of the trees and bushes, as the costume of the Americans; whereas on the contrary, the glaring red of the British troops formed a point, in relief, on which the eye could not fail to dwell." James does not seem to consider the position to have been unfavourable. He says "this position was considered an excellent one; as the enemy, however numerous his force could not turn the flank of the British, or present a more extended front than theirs," we are rather pleased to be able to bring forward even so slight a palliation as James' opinion, of that unlucky affair, we In General Harrison's despatch* he says, have not been able to find in any other in * From major-gen. Harrison to the American secretary at war. Head-quarters, Detroit, Oct. 9th, 1813. SIR,-In my letter from Sandwich of the 30th ultimo, I did myself the honor to inform you that I was preparing to pursue the enemy the follow ing day. From various causes, however, I was unable to put the troops in motion until the morning of the 22nd inst., and then to take with me only about 140 of the regular troops-Johnson's mounted regiment, and such of governor Selby's volunteers as were fit for a rapid march, stance, even the shadow of an excuse offered. understood." We are however anticipating, Christie says "this disaster to the British as we have not yet given an account of the arms, seems not to have been palliated by ba't o, if we may so call it. these precautions, and the presence of mind, which, even in defeat reflect lustre on a commander. The bridge and roads in the rear of the retreating army were left entire, while its progress was re'arded by a useless and cnmbrou load of baggage. Whether the omission sprang from an erroneous contempt of the enemy, or from disobedience of the orders of the commanding officer is not well the whole amounting to about 3500 men. To general M'Arthur, (with about 700 effectives) the protecting of this place and the sick was committed; general Cass's brigade, and the corps of lieutenant-col. Ball were left at Sandwich, with orders to follow me as soon as the men received their knapsacks and b'ankets, which had been lef. on an island in Lake Erie. The unavoidable delay at Sandwich was attended with no disadvantage to us. General Proctor had posted himselt at Dalson's, on the right side of the Thames, (or Trench) 56 miles from this place, which I was informed he intended to fortify, and wait to receive me. He must have believed, however, that I had no disposition to follow him, or that he had secured my continu ance here, by the reports that were circulated that the Indians would attack and destroy this place upon the advance of the army, as he neglected the breaking up the bridges until the night of the 3nd instant. On that night our ariny reached the river, which is 25 miles from Sandwich, and is one of four streams crossing our route, over all of which are bridges; and they being deep and muddy, are rendered unfordable for a considerable distance into the country. The bridge here was found entire; and in the morning I proceeded with Johnson's regiment to save, if possible, the others. At the second bridge, over a branch of the river Thames, we were fortunate enough to capture a lieutenant of dragoons and 11 privates, who had been sent by general Proctor to destroy them. From the prisoners, I learned that the third bridge was broken up, and that the enemy had no certain informa tion of our advance. The bridge having been imperfectly destroyed, was soon repaired, and the army encamped at Drake's Farm, four miles below Dalson's. The river Thames, along the banks of which our route lay, is a fine deep stream, navigable for vessels of a considerable burthen, after the passage of the bar at its mouth, over which there is six and a half feet of water. The baggage of the army was brought from Detroit in boats, protected by three gun-boats, which commodore Perry had furnished for the purpose, as well as to cover the passage of the army over the Thames, or the mouths of its tri butary streams; the bank being low and the country generally (prairies) as far as Dalson's, these vessels were well calculated for that purpose Above Dalson's, however, the character of the riv The Cisposition of the troops is a point disputed One author asserts that the line formed an obtise angle; Thompson, that the line was straight. Christie strange to say gives as Proctor's position, the identical one which we have been lamenting that he did not occupy. Richardson was present on the occasion, as he was taken prisoner on the field of battle; following him, therefore, wo er and adjacent country is considerably changed. The former, though still deep, is very narrow, and its banks high and woody. The commodore and myself, therefore, agreed upon the propriety of leaving the boats under the guard of 150 infantry; and I determined to trust to fortune and the bravery of my troops to effect the passage of the river. Below a place called Chatham, and four miles above Dalson's, is the third unfordable branch of the Thames; the bridge over its mouth had been taken up by the Indians, as well as that at M'Gregor's Mills, one mile above. Several hundred of the Indians remained to dispute our passage; and upon the arrival of the advanced guard, commenced a heavy fire from the opposite bank of the creek, as well as that of the river. Believing that the whole force of the enemy was there, I halted the army, formed in order of battle, and brought up our two 6-pounders to cover the party that were ordered to cover the bridge. A few shot from those pieces soon drove off the Indians, and enabled us in two hours to repair the bridge and cross the troops. Colonel Johnson's mounted regiment, being upon the right of the army, had seized the remains of the bridge at the mills under a heavy fire from the Indians. Our loss upon this occasion was two killed, and three or four wounded; that of the enemy was ascertained to be considerably greater. A house near the bridge, containing a very considerable number of muskets had been set on fire; but it was extinguished by our troops, and the arms saved. At the first farm above the bridge, we found one of the enemy's vessels on fire, loaded with arms, ordnance, and other valuable stores; and learned they were a few miles a-head of us, still on the right bank of the river. with a great body of Indians. At Bowles' Farm, four miles from the bridge, we halted for the night, found two other vessels and a large distillery filled with ordnance, and other valuable stores, to an immense amount, in flames; it was impossible to put out the fire; two 24pounders, with their carriages, were taken, and a large quantity of ball and shells of various sizes. The army was put in motion early on the morning of the 5th. I pushed on in advance with the mounted regiment, and requested governor Shelby to follow as expe litiously as pos sible with the infantry. The governor's zeal, and that of his men, enabled them to keep up with the cavalry, and by nine o'clock we were at Arnold's mills, having taken in the course of the may safely record that the British were seventy were either in the hospital or were drawn up in line, in a wood, not a very great on duty guarding the baggage. distance from the Moravian settlement, with the Indians on the right, and a six pounder on the left. The whole British force thus drawn up amounted to four hundred and seventy six. Originally it numbered about eight hundred and forty-but of these one hundred and seventy four had been just captured in the batteaux, and nearly one hundred and morning, two gun-boats and several batteaux, loaded with provisions and ammunition. A rapid bend of the river at Arnold's mills, affords the only fording to be met with for a considerable distance; but upon examination, it was found too deep for the infantry. Having, how ever, fortunately taken two or three boats, and some Indian canoes, on the spot, and obliging the horsemen to take a footman behind each. the whole were safely crossed by 12 o'elock. Eight miles from the crossing we passed a farm, where a part of the British troops had encamped the night before, under the command of colonel Warburton. The detachment with general Proctor was stationed near to, and fronting the Moravian town, four miles higher up. Being now certainly near the enemy, I directed the advance of Johnson's regiment to a celerate their march for the purpose of procuring intelligence. The officer commanding it, in a short time, sent to inform me, that his progress was stopped by the enemy, who were formed across our line of march. One of the enemy's waggoners being also taken prisoner, from the information received from him, and my own observation, assisted by some of my officers, I soon ascertained enough of their position and order of battle, to determine that which it was proper for me to adopt. The American force, even by their own admission, mustered twelve hundred cavalry, nineteen hundred and fifty infantry, and some one hundred and fifty Indians, thus, exclusive of officers, out numbering Proctor's force seven-fold. General Harrison drew up his forces in two iines, and commenced the attack by a simultaneous charge on both British and Indians, in both cases the first charge 500 men, and colonel Johnson's regiment of mounted infantry, making, in the whole an ag gregate something above 3000. No disposition of an army opposed to an Indian force can be safe, unless it is secured on the flanks and in the rear. I had therefore no difficulty in arranging the infantry conformably to my general order of battle. General Trotter's brigade of 500 men formed the front line, his right upon the road, and his left upon the swamp. General King's brigade as a second line, 150 yards in the rear of Trotter's; and Child's brigade, as a corps of reserve, in the rear of it. These three brigades formed the command of major-general Henry; the whole of general Desha's division, consisting of two brigades, were formed en potence upon the left of Trotter. Whilst I was engaged in forming the infantry, I had directed colonel Johnson's regiment, which was still in front, to form in two lines opposite to that of the enemy; and upon the advance of the infantry, to take ground to the left; and, orming upon that flank, to endeavour to turn the right of the Indians. A moments reflection, however, convinced me, that from the thickness of the wood, and swampiness of the ground, they would be unable to do any thing on horseback, and that there was no time to dismount them, I have the honour herewith to enclose you my and place their horses in security; I therefore general order of the 27th ult. prescribing the determined to oppose my left to the Indians, and order of march and of battle, when the whole of to break the British line, at once, by a charge the army should act together. But as the num- of the mounted infantry; the measure was not ber and description of the troops had been essen- sanctioned by any thing that I had seen or heard tially changed, since the issuing of the order, it of, but I was fully convinced that it would sucbecame necessary to make a corresponding alter-ceed. The American back-woodsmen ride better ation in their disposition. From the place where in the woods than any other people. A musket our army was last hal ed, to the Moravian town, or rifle is no impediment, they being accustomed a distance of about three miles and a half, the to carry them on horseback from their earliest road passes through a beech forest without any youth. I was persuaded, too, that the enemy clearing, and for the first two miles near to the would be quite unprepared for the shock, and river. At from 2 to 300 yards from the river, a that they could not resist it. Conformably to swamp extends parallel to it, throughout the this idea, I directed the regiment to be drawn whole distance. The intermediate ground is up in close column, with its right at the distance dry, and although the trees are tolerably thick, it of 50 yards from the road, (that it might be in is in many places clear of underbrush. Across some measure protected by the trees from the this strip of land, their left appuyed upon the artillery,) its left upon the swamp, and to charge river, supported by artillery placed in the wood, at full speed as soon as the enemy delivered their their right in the swamp, covered by the whole fire. The few regular troops, under their coloof their Indian force, the British troops were nel, (Paul,) occupied, in column of sections of drawn up. four, the small space between the road and the river, for the purpose of seizing the enemy's artillery: and some 10 or 12 friendly Indians were directed to move under the bank. The crotchet formed by the front line and The troops at my disposal consisted of about 120 regulars, of the 27th regiment, five brigades of Kentucky volunteer militia infantry, under his excellency governor Shelby, averaging less than |