THE

ANGLO-AMERICAN MAGAZINE.

VOL. IV. TORONTO: MARCH, 1854.-No. 3.

HISTORY OF THE WAR BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DURING THE YEARS 1812, 1813, AND 1814.

CHAPTER XV.

The regulars and militia, who had escaped Betreat of Proctor and captivity or destruction place of rendezvous on the unfortunate 5th of October, retreated, as may be easily imagined, in the greatest confusion, to Ancaster, a small village some ten miles from the head of Lake Ontario, and, on the 17th of the same month, they rendezvoused at that place, a their numbers, inclusive of seventeen officers, amounting to two hundred and fifty-six. During this retreat, which was effected through an almost unbroken wilderness, the troops suffered the greatest privations and misery, and their appearance as they straggled into the village, was by no means calculated to lessen the feeling of apprehension, which the rumour of the defeat at Moravian town had spread amongst the defenceless inhabitants, To these unfortunates, pillaged houses and their little homesteads destroyed, could not but appear inevitable, and the infection of the panic spread far and wide.

to the manifold difficulties by which he was surrounded.

Proctor's situation at Malden, writes Armstrong, made necessary on his part, a prompt retreat to Vincent, unencumbered with baggage; or a vigorous defence of the post committed to his custody. By adopting the former, he would have saved seven hundred veteran soldiers and a train of artillery, for the future service of his sovereign; by adopting the latter, he would have retained the whole of his Indian allies, (three thousand combatants) giving time for the militia of the interior to come to his aid; had the full advantage of his fortress and its munitions, and chance, at least, of eventual success, with a certainty of keeping inviolate his own selfrespect, and the confidence of his followers. Taking a middle course between these extremes, he lost the advantage that would have resulted from either. His retreat began too late-was much encumbered with women, children, and baggage, and at no time urged with sufficient vigour, or protected with sufficient care. Bridges and roads, ferries and boats, were left behind him, neither destroyed nor obstructed; and when, at last, he was overtaken and obliged to fight, he gave to his veterans a formation, which enabled a corps of four hundred mounted infantry, armed General Armstrong in his observations on with rifles, hatchets, and butcher knives, to Proctor's retreat and sub win the battle "in a single minute." ConArmstrong's observations on Proctor's de- sequent defeat, seems to duct like this deserved all the opprobrium have been unaware of and punishment it received, and justly led to that officer's situation previous to the com- General Harrison's conclusion, that "his mencement of his retreat, and uninformed as antagonist had lost his senses."

of the body of mounted riflemen (not infantry) and the whole number of Harrison's army, we therefore only direct the reader's attention to the passage as another proof how prone Americans are to misrepresent.

It is not often that we have occasion to commend an American com Remarks on Harrison's mander for modesty; we

letter as to numbers.

must not omit, therefore, on the present occasion to point out an instance of it as occurring in Harrison's despatch. He admits that

It is plain, we again assert, from these remarks that Armstrong could not have been aware of Proctor's real situaton, and we shall proceed to urge in detail our objections to his conclusions. First as to the prompt retreat to General Vincent, unencumbered with baggage. We have no defence to make of Proctor on this count, too many of our cotemporaries have expressed themselves strongly, in reprobation of the ill-judged manner in which the retreat was conducted, to permit us to urge aught in vindication. One fact, how-"the number of our troops was certainly ever, is remarkable, Veritas the earliest writer greater than that of the enemy." This is on the subject, one by no means sparing in something even for an American General, but condemnation, and who might have been the pains he takes to do away with the imsupposed to be thoroughly acquainted with pression, that numbers had aught to do with the pros and cons of the affair, is silent on the fate of the day, is also noteworthy. Acthe point, confining his remarks to a stricture cordingly, he adds, in the next paragraph, on the severity of Sir George Prevost's gene-" but when it is recollected that they had choral order. This is significant and leads us to sen a position, that effectually secured their pause ere we adopt too readily all that has flank, which it was impossible for us to turn been said in condemnation of Proctor. and that we could not present to them a line more extended than their own, it will not be considered arrogant for me to claim for my troops the palm of superior bravery." Can anything be more absurd than this last paragraph? Here were over three thousand Americans opposed to something like four hundred and seventy British, and yet the American General, instead of honestly confessing that by dint of superior numbers he overcame his opponents, descends to the meanness of twaddling about the superior position chosen by Proctor, and claims on that account superior Proctor was, we think, to blame for the bravery for his men. We should scarcely deposition of his forces at the Moravian town, have noticed this passage in Harrison's desbut even this is, as we have shown, a mere patch had we not found that he thereby gained matter of opinion, as the observations, quoted his object, to throw dust in the eyes of his in our last chapter, show. We must not compatriots. That this was effected is to be allow one passage in Armstrong to pass un- discovered in the fact that every town throughnoticed-it is when he speaks of the forma-out the Union was illuminated, and every tion which enabled four hundred mounted church rung out a merry peel on the occasion. infantry armed with rifles, hatchets, and All this to be sure might have been a political butcher knives, to win the battle in a single measure, or, as General Wilkinson calls it, “a minute. military deception," but still it is difficult to Had we not already shown the overwhelm-imagine that any sober-minded American, in ing numbers of Harrison's army, the reader would be led to suppose that a corps of four hundred men, armed hastily with any weapons and horses they could collect, had routed in one minute seven hundred British veterans. We need scarcely go into this subject, as we have both shown the constitution and habits

Secondly,-As to the vigorous defence of the post committed to his custody. We have already shown the difficulties by which Proctor was surrounded, and that it was impossible for him to find provisions for his troops as well as for the Indians and their families. Gen. Armstrong lost sight, too, of the fact that "the post" had been to a great degree dismantled of its guns, which had been required to arm Barclay's fleet, and had accordingly been appropriated for that purpose, and captured with that fleet.

possession of the truth, could or would have seen reason to exult in the circumstance of three thousand five hundred of his countrymen overcoming some four hundred and seventy British and some Indians.

Harrison's end was nevertheless gained, and one of the members for South Carolina, a Mr.