treaty-of establishing a system of general education-of revising the defective laws which regulate real property and commerceand of introducing a pure and competent administration of justice."

But the ordinance was strictly of a temporary character; and comes strictly within the meaning of a law for the peace, welfare and good government of the colony. When, therefore, his ex-Excellency proclaims: "the disposal of the political prisoners was, from the first, a matter foreign to any mission"—we reply-" you are only right by accident, and then you correct yourself." An objection made in the Quarterly Review, that the ordinance was illegal on account of the limited number of the council, is one which lawyers will instantly reject.

In Lord Durham's proclamation we find the following allusion to the Bermuda part of the ordinance.

"I was perfectly aware that my powers extended to landing the prisoners on the shores of Bermuda, but no further. I knew that they could not be forcibly detained in that island without the cooperation of the imperial legislature."

His lordship does not say whether he communicated this knowledge to Lord Melbourne. It follows that, in the affair of the Indemnity Bill (which was limited to the Bermuda part) Lord Brougham suggested, and the Conservative Peers did, what Lord Durham ought to have suggested and the ministry to have done; and that Lord Durham's resignation must have been exclusively owing, not to the Indemnity Bill which he must have expected, but to the disallowance of the ordinance, which was altogether the work of his friends and no necessary consequence of the Indemnity Bill.

In another part of the proclamation we find

"The ordinance has been disallowed, and the proclamation is confirmed. Her Majesty having been advised to refuse her assent to the exceptions, the amnesty exists without qualification. No impediment therefore exists to the return of the persons who had made the most distinct admission of their guilt, or who had been excluded by me from the province on account of the danger to which its tranquillity would be exposed by their presence."

On turning to the amnesty, we find that it contains an

exception for "such persons as are in that behalf named in the ordinance, and whose cases are thereby provided for." It strikes us that these expressions are descriptive merely, and that, though the ordinance has been disallowed, it may still be looked at for the purpose of ascertaining the names. At all events, Lord Durham's conduct in thus announcing, on the eve of a fresh outbreak, that they might return in safety, is without excuse.

H.

DIGEST OF CASES.

COMMON LAW.

[Comprising 6 Adolphus & Ellis, Part 5; 7 Adolphus & Ellis, Parts 1 and 2; 2 Nevile & Perry, Part 4; 3 Nevile & Perry, Part 4; 4 Bingham's New Cases, Part 4; 5 Scott, Parts 3, 4 and 5; 6 Scott, Part 1; 4 Meeson & Welsby, Part 2; 6 Dowling's Practice Cases, Parts 4 and 5;-all cases included in former Digests being omitted.]

ACTION ON THE CASE.

1. (Case or trespass-Action for injury to reversion.) A party who has demised a house without exception of mines, may sue in case for an injury occasioned to the house by a stranger in excavating coal; although it was not clear whether the injury resulted from excavation under the house, or under an adjoining house in the plaintiff's occupation. (Com. Dig. Grant, E. 3.)—Raine v. Alderson, 4 Bing. N. C. 702.

2. The case of Langridge v. Levy (2 M. & W. 519; 18 L. M. 375.) was affirmed on error, in the Court of Exchequer Chamber.-Levy v. Langridge, 4 M. & W. 337.

AFFIDAVIT OF DEBT.

1. Where the sum sworn to be due was less than that indorsed on the writ of capias, and a bail bond was given in the latter sum, the Court ordered that the bailbond should be cancelled, and that the defendant should enter a common appearance.-Cook v. Cooper, 2 N. & P. 607.

2. Where an affidavit of debt stated the defendant to be indebted to the plaintiff in 3041." for principal and interest," by virtue of an indenture whereby the defendant covenanted to pay 300l.: Held, that the amount of principal and interest was sufficiently distinguished.

It is not sufficient to state a sum to be due " upon and for the balance of accounts between the plaintiff and the defendant." (2 Chit. Rep. 15.)

In an action on a bill of exchange by indorsee v. indorser, the affidavit of debt must show the default of the acceptor; and a statement that the amount " is now due and unpaid " does not supply the omission of such allegation. (1 D. P. C. 122, 211, 445; 5 D. P. C. 62; 3 D. P. C. 731; 2 M. & W. 67.)

An affidavit of debt, which states two causes of action, one imperfectly and the other correctly, is not bad altogether, but the defendant may be held to bail for the latter part, if separate from and independent of the former. (1 Har. & Wol. VOL. XXI. NO. XLIII. M*

365, n. ; 3 M. & W. 76. Overruling Kirk v. Almond, 1 D. P. C. 318; Drake v. Harding, 4 D. P. C. 34.)~Jones v. Collins, 4 D. P. C. 526.

ALEHOUSE LICENCES. See QUO WARRANTO.

AMENDMENT.

(Under 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, s. 23.) Declaration in assumpsit was on an agreement to sell to the plaintiff, at 2s. per sack, the potatoes then growing on certain land of the defendant, and stated the contract to be that the defendant should deliver the potatoes within a reasonable time, to be paid for on delivery. Pleas, non assumpsit, and that the agreement had been rescinded by consent. The proof was of a contract made in June, to sell the potatoes at 2s. per sack, the plaintiff to have them at digging up time (October) and to find diggers. The judge at nisi prius having amended the declaration so as to make it conformable with the contract so proved, the Court refused a new trial, no affidavit being produced to show that the defendant had been prejudiced by the amendment.—Sainsbury v• Matthews, 4 M. & W. 343.

ARBITRATION.

A submission to arbitration contained a stipulation that the award, not the agreement, should be made a rule of Court: Held, that the Court had jurisdiction under the 9 & 10 W. 3, c. 15, and were authorized to make a rule of Court thereon. (3 East, 603.)- Ex parte Storey, 2 N. & P. 667.

And see COSTS, 6.

ARREST.

1. (Discharge from, on ground of privilege.) A defendant who is arrested while privileged eundo, &c. will be discharged as to that case only, and not also as to any detainers lodged against him, unless notice of the motion has been given to the parties concerned.-Sharplin v. Hunter, 6 D. P. C. 632.

So in the case of a discharge from arrest on the ground of an irregularity to which the sheriff is no party. (9 Bing. 566.)—Ex parte Cogg, 5 Scott, 715. 2. (Under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 3) The principle by which the judges will be guided in allowing an arrest under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 3, is to consider whether the defendant is about to leave the country for such a time that he is not likely to be forthcoming to satisfy the plaintiff's execution at the period when he will be entitled to it in the ordinary course of law proceedings. It was therefore held to be a sufficient ground for issuing the writ, that the defendant, an officer in the army, was about to join his regiment stationed abroad.-Larchin v. Willan, 4 M. & W. 351.

3. (Discharge from, under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 7.) Where a defendant was arrested on mesne process before the 1st of October, 1838, and gave a bail-bond, and after that day final judgment was signed against him, and a ca. sa. issued and lodged with the sheriff, in order to fix the bail; the Court refused to exonerate the bail, on an equitable construction of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 7.-Jackson v. Cooper, 4 M. & W. 353. [The Court of C. P. had previously, in a case of Bateman v. Dunn, extended the statute by an equitable construction, so as to relieve the bail, where the defendant was arrested and gave bail before the 1st of October, and continued out on bail on and after that day, no judgment having been signed.]

4. (Same) Where a defendant was arrested on mesne process before the 1st of October, 1838, and deposited a sum of money in lieu of bail and for costs, which

was paid into Court under the 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 71, s. 3: Held, that he was not entitled to have the money paid out to him after the 1st of October, on an equitable construction of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 7.--Harrison v. Dickenson, 4 M. & W. 355.

5. (Same.) Where a defendant was arrested on mesne process before the 1st of October, 1838, but escaped from custody, and after that day was retaken on an escape warrant Held, that he was not entitled to be discharged under either the first or the seventh section.-Nyas v. Milton, 4 M. & W. 359.

ATTACHMENT. See COSTS, 4, 10.

ATTORNEY.

1. (Bill, when taxable.) An attorney's bill of charges for business done in the Central Criminal Court is taxable by order of a judge of one of the superior Courts. Curling v. Sedger, 4 Bing. N. C. 743; 6 D. P. C. 759.

2. (Changing attorney.) Where an attorney has accepted a declaration, and has acted and been treated by the plaintiff as the attorney in the cause, another attorney cannot proceed with the action without a rule for changing the attorney, although the former attorney's name was not on the record.-May v. Pike, 4 M. & W. 197; 6 D. P. C. 667.

3. (Alteration of name on roll.) An attorney having obtained the royal licence to assume an additional name, the Court refused to alter the roll.-Ex parte Hayward, 5 Scott, 712.

4. (Articles, discharge of, where attorney has become insane.) Where an attorney to whom a clerk has been articled became insane during the clerkship, the Court allowed fresh articles entered into with another attorney to be enrolled.—Ex parte Darbell, 6 D. P. C. 505.

5. (Summary enforcement of undertaking by.) The Court will not summarily enforce an undertaking given by an attorney, who is also a solicitor, in a suit in Chancery. In re Garland, 6 D. P. C. 512.

6. Where a plaintiff was improperly delayed in his action, in consequence of the defendant's attorney not fulfilling his undertaking to enter an appearance in due time, the Court would not compel the attorney to give security for the debt and costs in the event of the plaintiff's obtaining a verdict.-Morris v. James, 6 D. P. C. 514.

7. (Admission-Notices.) Where the 15th of April, (which, by the 1 W. 4, c. 70, s. 6, is constituted the first day of Easter term,) fell on Easter Sunday, a delivery three days before the 18th of April, of the notices for the admission of an attorney, was held to be a sufficient compliance with the rule of H. T. 2 W. 4.—Ex parte Bayley, 6 D. P. C. 516.

8. (Admission—Answers of articled clerk under rule of E. T. 6 W. 4.) Where the delay on the part of an articled clerk in sending the answers required by Reg. Gen. E. T. 6 W. 4, has been caused by the unexpected absence of the attorney with whom the articles were served, the Court will allow them to be sent in nunc pro tunc.-- -Ex parte Lyons, 6 D. P. C. 517.

9. (Re-admission.) Where a person was admitted an attorney, but never took out his certificate, or practised, for a period of twenty-four years from the time of his VOL. XXI. NO. XLIII.

N