ÀҾ˹éÒ˹ѧÊ×Í
PDF
ePub

"I. That as a primary remedy for the evils set forth, a paid constabulary force should be trained, appointed, and organised on the principles of management recognised by the Legislature in the appointment of the new Metropolitan Police Force.

"II. That for this purpose on application in writing under the hands and seals of a majority of the justices assembled at any quarter sessions of the peace for the county, setting forth the insecurity of person and property, and the want of paid constables, the Commissioners of Police shall, with the approbation of the Secretary of State for the Home Department, appoint a sufficient number of constables and such officers as may, upon such examination as the said Commissioners shall make or direct, be by them deemed adequate for the due protection of life or property within the county.

"III. That the force shall be paid one-fourth from the Consolidated Fund and three-fourths from the county-rates, as a part of the general expenses of the whole county.

"IV. That the constables so appointed shall report their proceedings to the magistrates of the quarter and petty sessions where they are stationed.

"V. That the superintendents shall be liable to be dismissed upon the representation of the magistrates in quarter sessions; that the serjeants and constables shall be liable to be dismissed upon the representation of the magistrates in petty sessions.

" VI. That the superintendents shall be subject to dismissal upon the representation of the justices of the peace in quarter sessions, and that the serjeants and constables shall be subject to dismissal upon the representation of the justices of the peace in petty sessions.

"VII. That the commissioners shall frame rules and regulations for the general management of the police, which rules shall, on the approbation of the Secretary of State, be binding.

"The principles (they add) embodied in our recommendations being based on extensive experience, we feel confident that however they may for a time be impeded by adverse interests, these interests, and the prejudices begot by them, will yield before the light of future experience, which will lead to the

ultimate adoption of measures on the principles of those we propose. If one uniform and trained force be efficiently directed to the prevention or repression of crime, we cannot doubt of success."

The state of opinion may be collected from the following extract.

"Of the answers we have received from the magistrates of 435 petty sessional divisions, 123 recommend the appointment of an improved rural police; in 13 divisions the magistrates recommend the appointment of such a force to act under their own exclusive control; in 77 divisions the appointment of a patrol, or additional constables, is recommended; in 16 divisions the magistrates recommend that better remuneration be given to the present constables; in 37 divisions the magistrates answer that they consider some further security necessary; in 47 divisions the magistrates express no opinion; and in 122 divisions an opinion is expressed that no alteration is required."

It thus seems probable that the demand for policemen will keep pace with the supply, but if any counties should eventually hold out, it will be the bounden duty of the legislature to interfere, unless indeed it should be deemed advisable to preserve thieves as well as game, or revive the ancient institution of sanctuaries. We also hope that, though the execution may be piecemeal, the same plan will be uniformly pursued, without the least regard to the popular cry against centralization, now constantly in the mouths of persons who seem utterly incapable of distinguishing the occasions on which it does harm from those on which it does good. Whereever uniformity, consistency and progressiveness are desirable, wherever the clashing of jurisdictions or the influence of local prejudices and partialities is to be avoided, there the principle of centralization will be found productive of the happiest effects. For example, the uniformity of English jurisprudence as compared with that of other countries, and the high opinion hitherto entertained of our judges, are attributable to the centralized administration of justice; and the centralized administration of the poor laws affords an instance of the manner in which a comprehensive system of manage

ment may be advantageously framed and put in action through the medium of a board permanently fixed in the metropolis. As regards progressiveness-when there is no common centre, one district will often be found immeasurably a-head of another in all matters of internal arrangement: when there is a common centre, the first and inevitable consequence is that the best modes, plans or expedients at work in any part of the country are immediately extended to the whole.

On the other hand, it is far from our intention to deny that the benefits of centralization may occasionally be more than counterbalanced by the political evils resulting from it. For example, in countries like Prussia and Austria, it furnishes too many means of oppression or corruption to the crown; and in a country like France, it gives a baneful degree of influence to the government for the time being and the metropolis. But with a parliament such as ours, there is surely nothing to be apprehended from prerogative; nor perhaps could despotism itself well inflict a worse evil on the people at large than a constant sense of insecurity; whilst under the existing constitution of society, there seems little chance either of London swamping the provinces, or of government functionaries overtopping or undermining the landed and manufacturing aristocracy. A prefect or subprefect is a great person amongst our continental neighbours, because, thanks to the equal partibility of inheritances, there are few resident gentry to compete with him; and this in fact renders a good constitutional government utterly impracticable in France, where there is now no class strong enough to act as a breakwater between the lower classes and the crown. But can it be contended that any constitutional principle or beneficial local influence in England will be impaired by the appointment of one paid constable to every 2000 inhabitants, by a board independent of the ministry and responsible to parliament for its acts?

H.

ART. III.-OF CONTRACTS OPERATING IN RESTRAINT OF

TRADE.

THE exercise of a lawful avocation, as a means of subsistence, is recognized by the common law both as a duty and a right. The former simply requires an individual to exert his talents in some way useful to the public for the support of the commonwealth and the maintenance of himself and his family, but it leaves him at liberty to select in what particular way, and to what particular section of society he will apply them. The right of an individual, therefore, being subordinate only to the rights of the community, extends to every avocation not in itself unlawful, and generally to every locality within the realm.

Hence it is that monopolies have ever been denounced both by the civil and the common law. "There are," says Lord Coke, "three inseparable incidents to every monopoly against the commonwealth:-1. That the price of the same commodity will be raised, for he who has the sole selling of any commodity may and will make the price as he pleases. 2. That after the monopoly granted, the commodity is not so good and merchantable as it was before, for the patentee having the sole trade regards only his private benefit and not the commonwealth. 3. It tends to the impoverishment of divers artificers and others who before, by the labour of their hands in their art and trade had maintained themselves and their families, who will now of necessity be constrained to live in idleness and beggary."1 That case decided that a grant from the crown of the sole privilege of importing and making playing cards was void, though it was strongly urged that cards were not articles of necessary use, but " mere things of vanity and the occasion of loss of time," and many other evils, and therefore it belonged to the crown to take order for the convenient and moderate use of them. So it was previously held of a patent granted to an individual for the sole importation and sale of sweet wine, and he was severely punished for procuring it; and in the early part of the reign of Elizabeth, a patent granted by Philip and Mary to the Corporation of 1 Case of Monopolies, 11 Co. 84.

23 Ins. 181.

Southampton, by which all wines of a certain quality brought from foreign parts into England, whether by an alien or a liege-man, were to be landed at that port, was declared by all the judges to be void.1

It is obvious that general restrictions upon trade, namely, such as prohibit persons from exercising any known lawful avocation, are contrary to the policy of the law. We have a few instances of such restraint imposed by the legislature. The statute 37 Edw. III. c. 5, prohibited merchants from using more than one sort of merchandize; and c. 6, of the same year, enacted, “that the artificers and people of mystery hold themselves every one to his mystery, and that none use other mystery than that which he has chosen." But by the Parliament of the succeeding year it was declared, that "all people should be as free as they were at any time before the said ordinance." The statute of Elizabeth 5, c. 4, which prohibited a person from setting up a trade before he had served an apprenticeship of seven years to it, aimed rather at the regulation and improvement than the restriction of it. Yet its provisions were cramped from time to time by judicial construction,3 and at length were repealed by statute 54 Geo. III. c. 96. On the other hand, the common law freedom of trade is guaranteed by the Magna Charta, and established by several succeeding statutes, but notwithstanding these, it was frequently infringed upon by charters and patents from the crown, which were upheld by the Star-Chamber in opposition to the Courts of law, until the statute 21 Jas. I. c. 3, subjected them to the rules of the common law, and declared all such grants, &c., with a few exceptions, authorized by public policy, contrary to law and void.

4

Where, however, the restriction is confined to a particular place, the objection above noticed does not apply. There is not that proximate tendency to monopoly in these partial restraints which belongs to those of the other class, and which causes them to be regarded as prejudicial to the interests of the community.5 A monopoly is the grant of the sole buying, 2 38 Edw. III. c. 2; see 11 Co. 54.

13 Ins. 181.

3 See Ray. 514, 1179; Burr. 91; Str. 1066.

49 Edw. III. c. 1 and 2; 25 Edw. III. c. 2; 27 Edw. III. c. 11; 2 Rich. II. c. 1; 11 Rich. II. c. 7, et alia.

5 See per Parker, C. J., in Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181.

« ¡è͹˹éÒ´Óà¹Ô¹¡ÒõèÍ
 »