those who being upon the register retain the same qualification and continue in the same place of abode; very slight evidence as respects these latter is under the circumstances abundantly sufficient to prove their right, and thus the difficulty is surmounted, the Act is complied with, and no injustice done to any one.

Now however by this new measure this cannot be done, and therefore have they been driven to insert a clause to meet the difficulty which they themselves have raised. They have chosen for some purpose best known to themselves (possibly because some people are not very popular in counties) to deprive the county voter of a right secured to him by the Reform Act, viz., the right of proving his claim to be upon the list, in the event of an overseer omitting him, and of having his name inserted in the register of voters accordingly. This manifest injustice to a party claiming the county franchise was first introduced into the Bill of last year; we took occasion then to protest against depriving a party of the only practical check upon the negligence or wilfulness of an overseer which the Reform Act gave him, and we do it again in the hope that it may meet the eye of some who may have power to preserve it to the county voters.

A man's name may be omitted from a list by accident or design, in neither case under this Bill, professedly introduced to cure existing defects in the present system of registration, has he the power to get it inserted in the register, and thus without any fault of his own, and with no redress, is he to be deprived of the franchise for above a twelvemonth. It requires no great stretch of imagination to see how this could be turned to account on the eve of an eventful time, nor how inadequate a remedy the deluded voter has in an action for penalties against a perhaps pennyless overseer. If the Reform Act, as respects the registration of voters, has any one merit, it is supereminently that one which secures to a party the certainty of having his name upon the register, provided only he has the right to the possession of the franchise, and has done all that the Act requires of him personally, as a condition precedent to his becoming a registered elector; let him but comply with these conditions, and neither the

VOL. XXI. NO. XLIV.

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wilfulness nor the negligence of any person entrusted with what may be called the ministerial part of the process, can do him any injury whatever. Now, however, it is to be otherwise, all county voters are henceforth to have their political rights dependent upon the honesty or the accuracy of officials, who may be their political opponents, and in the event of any foul play, the consequences of which may be most important, are to be recompensed with a law suit against a man of straw, the real delinquent being all the while in the back ground, provided with, and in all probability supplying, the means of further oppression.

This is not an imaginary case, such things have been attempted under the present system, when fortunately they have failed, owing, as we said before, to the fact that a voter is dependent upon himself alone for the security of his political rights: that such things will be attempted again, and with success, we verily believe, if the present measure be allowed to pass, and we earnestly call upon those who have the power to save, not to permit a Law to be enacted, which under the cover of being an amendment of the present system of registration, will deprive voters of the only check which they now possess against the fraud or the ignorance of those to whom the duty of making out the lists is entrusted.

The remainder of the Bill is, with a few exceptions, verbatim the same as the one brought forward last year; and we will conclude this brief notice by referring those of our readers to whom the subject may be new, to the remarks which we felt it our duty to make in a former Number upon that Bill. We are in conscience bound to add, that we cannot afford this measure the bald and scanty praise which we allowed its predecessor, of having introduced some amendments upon the system of Registration as provided by the Reform Act, (which praise, small as it was, we felt bound to qualify, by asserting and proving that its merits were abundantly counterbalanced by its defects:) on the contrary, it has so bungled the best part of the Bill of last year (we allude to that part which introduced important alterations into the mode of serving notices of objection), that it is very doubtful, as the clause now stands, whether service of the notice of objection

by post, in all cases, is not to be sufficient; such a service, by the Bill of 1838, was only to have been allowed in cases where the place of abode of the party objected to was not in the parish to which the list might relate: and any extension of the privilege, beyond cases of non-residence, appears to us equally unnecessary as it certainly is dangerous.

It had been our intention on the present occasion to have given a short sketch or analysis of a scheme of our own for a real improvement of the system of registration, whereby all rights and privileges hitherto enjoyed by the voter should be religiously preserved to him, at the same time that an efficient check should be imposed upon the numerous facilities, which at present unfortunately abound, as well for harassing the individual possessed of a bonâ fide qualification, as for imposing the man of straw upon the constituency. In this measure it would have been our care to have simplified the now complicated duties of making out the lists, and to have transferred them from the present obscure, often incompetent, and always irresponsible overseer, to an intelligent, competent and responsible public officer. All this, however, must be reserved for another opportunity. We have now performed our duty by drawing the attention of our readers to a Bill, which, if it passes, will be one of the greatest impositions of modern times, which will form a remedy infinitely more intolerable than the grievance it pretends to cure; but which, it is at least one consolation to know, will carry within it the seeds of its own certain and speedy dissolution. It continually happens that measures, of the admitted importance even which this is, pass through parliament, without attracting much, if any, attention to their details; but once let them become the law, the eyes not only of all whose rights or privileges are to be affected, but of those who will have to carry their provisions into effect, will be anxiously and speedily directed towards them; and it requires no conjuror to say what would be the result of such a scrutiny in the present in

stance.

But as we said before, we have done our duty, it now rests with others to do theirs: It is our firm conviction with this, as with the Bill of last year, that it never will be suffered to

pass in its present state, or, if it be pressed through under the dread of collision, or be sent up late in the session to the Lords, and thus be smuggled through in a lump with other measures, that the very first attempt to put it into operation, as a practical measure, will show the absolute necessity either of wholly repealing it, or of immediately passing another act to amend the Amendment Act.-We shall watch it.

Z.

DIGEST OF. CASES.

COMMON LAW.

[Comprising 7 Adolphus & Ellis, part 3; 1 Perry & Davison, (in continuation of Nevile & Perry,) part 1; 5 Bingham's New Cases, part 1; 6 Scott, part 2; 4 Meeson & Welsby, part 3; 7 Dowling's Practice Cases, part 1; and a selection from 8 Carrington & Payne, part 3; all Cases included in former Digests being omitted.]

AFFIDAVIT. See BAIL, 2, 4.

AMENDMENT.

(In criminal cases.) A woman charged with the murder of her husband was described as " A., the wife of J. O., late of the parish of S., in the county of W. labourer." The judge, at the trial, ordered this to be amended by striking out the word "wife," and inserting the word "widow."-Reg. v. Orchard, 8 C. & P. 565.

ANNUITY.

(Memorial,) Where a nominal consideration is expressed in an annuity deed to have been paid to a surety, it need not be stated in the memorial, under 53 G. 3, c. 141, s. 2. (6 T. R. 545.)—Few v. Backhouse, 1 P. & D. 34. ARBITRATION.

1. (Award, finality of—Action for costs of reference.) Where an action of debt, in which the defendant had pleaded the general issue and a set-off, was by consent referred to arbitration, "the costs of the reference and award to abide the event," and the arbitrator found that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover in the action, and had not any cause of action against the defendant; but said nothing as to the set-off: Held, that the award was final, and that the defendant was entitled to maintain an action for the costs of the reference and award. (2 C. & M. 722; 10 Bing. 508; 2 C. M. & R. 327.)—Duckworth v. Harrison, 4 M. & W. 432; 7 D. P. C. 71.

2. (Motion to set aside award, what is, and time for.) Where an arbitrator, to whom a cause was referred by order of nisi prius, directed that the verdict should be entered for the plaintiff for 254l.; and then set forth certain facts, raising a question for the opinion of the Court, and awarded that if upon such facts the Court should be of opinion that the verdict should be for 1257. only, then the damages should be reduced to that sum: Held, that a motion to enter the verdict for the latter sum upon the facts so stated by the arbitrator, was in effect a motion to set