avoid a known concomitant of a beneficial act. But there are instances, though much less frequent, in which moral praise is bestowed on a person for not-willing to avoid a known concomitant which is itself beneficial. Thus it may on certain conditions be magnanimous of a person not to refrain from doing a thing, though he knows that his deed will benefit somebody who has injured him, and towards whom the average man in similar circumstances would display resentment. All these various elements into which the subjects of moral judgments may be resolved, are included in the term "conduct." By a man's conduct in a certain case is understood a volition, or the absence of a volition in him -which is often, but not always or necessarily, expressed in an act, forbearance, or omission-viewed with reference to all such circumstances as may influence its moral character. In order to form an accurate idea of these circumstances, it is necessary to consider not only the case itself, but the man's character, if by character is understood a person's will regarded as a continuous entity. The sub ject of a moral judgment is, strictly speaking, a person's will conceived as the cause either of volitions or of the absence of volitions; and, since a man's will or character is a continuity, it is necessary that any judgment passed upon him in a particular case, should take notice of his will as a whole, his character. We impute a person's acts to him only in so far as we regard them as a result or manifestation of his character, as directly or indirectly due to his will. Hume observes:-" Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil. . . . The person is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded 1 Cf. Alexander, op. cit. p. 49: "Character is simply that of which individual pieces of conduct are the manifestation." To the word "character" has also been given a broader meaning. According to John Grote (Treatise on the Moral Ideals, p. 442), a person's character "is his habitual way of thinking, feeling, and acting.” 1 from nothing in him, that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment or vengeance." There is thus an intimate connection between character and conduct as subjects of moral valuation. When judging of a man's conduct in a special instance, we judge of his character, and when judging of his character, we judge of his conduct in general. It will perhaps be remarked that moral judgments are passed not only on conduct and character, but on emotions\ and opinions; for instance, that resentment in many cases is deemed wrong, and love of an enemy is deemed praiseworthy, and that no punishment has been thought too severe for heretics and unbelievers. But even in such instances the object of blame or praise is really the will. The person who feels resentment is censured because his will has not given a check to that emotion, or because the hostile attitude of mind has led up to a definite volition. Very frequently the irascible impulse in resentment or the friendly impulse in kindly emotion develops into a volition. to inflict an injury or to bestow a benefit on its object; and the words resentment and love themselves are often used to denote, not mere emotions, but states of mind characterised by genuine volitions. An emotion, or the absence of an emotion, may also, when viewed as a symptom, give rise to, and be the apparent subject of, a moral judgment. We are apt to blame a person whose feelings are not affected by the news of a misfortune which has befallen his friend, because we regard this as a sign of an uncharitable character. We may be mistaken, of course. The same person might have been the first to try to prevent the misfortune if it had been in his power; but we judge from average cases. As for opinions and beliefs, it may be said that they involve responsibility in so far as they are supposed to Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, viii. 2 (Philosophical Works, iv. 8o). Cf. Idem, Treatise of Human Nature, iii. 2 (ibid. ii. 191). See also Schopenhauer, Die beiden depend on the will. Generally it is not so much the opinion itself but rather the expression, or the outward consequence, of it that calls forth moral indignation; and in any case the blame, strictly speaking, refers either to such acts, or to the cause of the opinion within the will. That a certain belief, or "unbelief," is never as such a proper object of censure is recognised both by Catholic and Protestant theology. Thomas Aquinas points out that the sin of unbelief consists in "contrary opposition to the faith, whereby one stands out against the hearing of the faith, or even despises faith," and that, though such unbelief itself is in the intellect, the cause of it is in the will. And he adds that in those who have heard nothing of the faith, unbelief has not the character of a sin, "but rather of a penalty, inasmuch as such ignorance of divine things is a consequence of the sin of our first parent."1 Dr. Wardlaw likewise observes :-" The Bible condemns no man for not knowing what he never heard of, or for not believing what he could not know. . . . Ignorance is criminal only when it arises from wilful inattention, or from aversion of heart to truth. Unbelief involves guilt, when it is the effect and manifestation of the same aversion-of a want of will to that which is right and good."2 To shut one's eyes to truth may be a heinous wrong, but nobody is blameable for seeing nothing with his eyes shut. After these preliminary remarks, which refer to the scrutinising and enlightened moral consciousness, we shall proceed to discuss in detail, and from an evolutionary point of view, the various elements of which the subjects of moral judgments consist. 1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, ii.-ii. 10. I sq. 2 Wardlaw, Sermons on Man's Accountableness for his Belief, &c. p. 38. CHAPTER IX THE WILL AS THE SUBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL EVENTS HOWEVER obvious it may be to the reflecting moral consciousness that the only proper object of moral blame and praise is the will, it would be a hasty conclusion to assume that moral judgments always and necessarily relate to the will. There are numerous facts which tend to show that such judgments are largely influenced by external events involved in, or resulting from, the conduct of men. Some peoples are said to make no distinction between intentional and accidental injuries. Most statements to this effect refer to revenge or compensation. 1 Von Martius states that, among the Arawaks, "the bloodrevenge is so blind and is practised so extensively, that many times an accidental death leads to the destruction of whole families, both the family of him who killed and of the family of the victim"; and, according to Mr. Im Thurn, the smallest injury done by one Guiana Indian to another, even if unintentional, must be atoned by the suffering of a similar injury.2 Adair, in his work on the North American Indians, says that they pursued the law of retaliation with such a fixed eagerness, that formerly if a little boy shooting birds in the high and thick cornfields unfortunately chanced slightly to wound another with his childish arrow, "the young vindictive fox was excited by custom to watch his ways with the utmost earnestness, till the wound was returned in as equal a manner 1 von Martius, Beiträge zur Ethnographie Amerika's, i. 693 sq. 2 Im Thurn, Among the Indians of Guiana, p. 214. 4 as could be expected."1 Among the Ondonga in South Africa, the Nissan Islanders in the Bismarck Archipelago, and certain Marshall Islanders, the custom of blood-revenge makes no distinction between wilful and accidental homicide. Among the Kasias "destruction of human life, whether by accident or design, in open war or secret, is always the cause of feud among the relations of the parties." 5 It seems that the blood-revenge of the early Greeks was equally indiscriminate. As for the blood-feuds of the ancient Teutons, Wilda maintains that, even in prehistoric times, it was hardly conformable to good custom to kill the involuntary manslayer; but there is every reason to believe that custom made no protest against it. According to the myth of Balder, accident was no excuse for shedding blood. Loke gives to Hödur the mistletoe twig, and asks him to do like the rest of the gods, and show Balder honour, by shooting at him with the twig. Hödur throws the mistletoe at Balder, and kills him, not knowing its power. According to our notions, blind Hödur is perfectly innocent of his brother's death; yet the avenger, Vali, by the usual Germanic vow, neither washes nor combs his hair till he has killed Hödur. It is also instructive to note that the narrator of this story finds himself called upon to explain, and, in a manner, to excuse the Asas for not punishing Hödur at once, the place where they were assembled being a sacred place.s We find survivals of a similar view in laws of a comparatively recent date. The earliest of the Norman customals. declares quite plainly that the man who kills his lord by misadventure must die. And, according to a passage in Leges Henrici I., in case A by mischance falls from a tree upon B and kills him, then, if B's kinsman must needs have vengeance, he may climb a tree and fall upon A.10 This provision has been justly represented as a curious instance of a growing appreciation of moral differences, which has not dared to abolish, but has tried to circumvent the ancient rule.11 1 Adair, History of the American Indians, p. 150. 2 Rautanen, in Steinmetz, Rechtsverhältnisse, p. 341. 3 Sorge, ibid. p. 418. 4 Kohler, in Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss. xiv. 443. See also Idem, Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz, p. 188. 5 Fisher, in Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal, ix. 835. 6 Rohde, Psyche, pp. 237, 238, 242. 11 7 Wilda, Strafrecht der Germanen, p. 174. 8 Snorri Sturluson, Gylfaginning,' 50, in Edda, p. 59. Cf. Brunner, Forschungen zur Geschichte des deutschen und französischen Rechtes, p. 489. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law before the Time of Edward I. ii. 482. 10 Leges Henrici I. xc. 7. 11 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii. |
