Wisdom :-"Even with the might and powerfulness of wisdom and knowledge, even then it is not possible to contend with destiny. Because, when predestination as to virtue, or as to the reverse, comes forth, the wise becomes wanting in duty, and the astute in evil becomes intelligent; the faint-hearted becomes braver, and the braver becomes faint-hearted; the diligent becomes lazy, and the lazy acts diligently. Just as is predestined as to the matter, the cause enters into it, and thrusts out everything else." 1

4

Nor is it only the popular mind that, when human volitions are concerned, interprets causation as compulsion. Even such philosophers as Hamilton and Mansel3 seemed quite unable to distinguish between determinism and fatalism. Professor Laurie likewise observes :-" Determinism is the term adopted of late years to veil fatalism and confound issues Freedom or fate, these are the sole alternatives." Surely, it is those who identify determinism with fatalism that "confound issues." And a similar confusion lurks behind the main argument which has been adduced in support of free-will. It is said that "I ought" implies "I can," and that men are not accountable for what they cannot avoid. This is perfectly true if by "cannot" is meant compulsion, and by "can freedom from compulsion. But it is certainly not true if "I can" is intended to mean that "I" am a first cause, not determined by anything else.

When a person's will is believed to be constrained by a power outside him, he can obviously not be held responsible for what he does under the influence of such constraint. We are responsible only for that which is due to our will. A licentious man who has grown up in a corrupt society is less blamable than an equally licentious man who has always lived under conditions favourable to virtue; and if we hear of a criminal that he was kidnapped as a child by a band of pickpockets and trained to their profession, we 3 Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, p. 329 sqq.

1 Dînâ-i Maînôg-i Khirad, xxiii. 3 sg+

Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 410 sqq.

4 Laurie, Ethica, pp. 307, 319.

no doubt look upon him with some indulgence. In these cases, however, it may be said that, though the person's conduct is largely due to the influence of external circumstances upon his will, this influence was not irresistible, that he might have saved himself with an effort of will, and that consequently he is not wholly irresponsible. But in the case of a restraining destiny no escape is possible; the compulsion is complete. Hence the logical outcome of radical fatalism is a denial of all moral imputability, and a repudiation of all moral judgment.1

Not so with determinism. Whilst fatalism presupposes the existence of a person who is constrained by an outward power, determinism regards the person himself as in every respect a product of causes. It does not assume any part of his will to have existed previous to his formation by these causes; his will is not constrained by them, it is made by them. When we say of a person that he is influenced by external circumstances or subdued by fate, we regard him as existing independently of that which influences or subdues him, we attribute to him an innate character which is acted upon from the outside. He would have been different if he had grown up under different conditions of life, or if fate had left him alone. But it would be absolutely meaningless to say that he would be different if the causes to which he owes his existence had been different; for instance, if he were the offspring of different parents. This shows that we distinguish between the original self of a person and the self which is partly innate and partly the product of external circumstances. His innate character belongs to his original

Of the inhabitants of NorthEastern Africa, Munzinger observes (Ostafrikanische Studien, p. 66) :— "Seien sie Christen, Heiden, oder Mohammedaner, schreiben sie Leben und Tod, Glück und Unglück, Tugend und Verbrechen der unmittelbaren Hand Gottes zu. Mit dieser blinder Nothwendigkeit entschuldigt sich der Missethäter, tröstet sich der Unglückliche." Cf. also Doughty, Arabia

Deserta, i. 155, on the Bedouins. However, men are not philosophers in the ordinary practice of life, hence the fatalist is generally as ready as anybody else to judge on his neighbour's conduct. According to various ancient writers, the power of destiny is limited so as not to exclude personal responsibility (see Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, i. 59 sq.).

self; and, strictly speaking, it is on the innate character only that the scrutinising moral judge, so far as possible, passes his judgment, carefully considering the degree of pressure to which it has been exposed both from the non-voluntary part of the individual himself and from the outside world. According to the fatalist, the innate character is compelled; hence personal responsibility is out of the question. According to the determinist, the innate character is caused; but this has nothing whatever to do with the question of responsibility. The moral emotions are no more concerned with the origin of the innate character than the æsthetic emotions are concerned with the origin of the beautiful object. In their capacity of retributive emotions, the moral emotions are essentially directed towards sensitive and volitional entities conceived, not as uncaused themselves, but only as causes of pleasure or pain.

1 That the proper subject of moral judgment is the innate character was emphasised by Schopenhauer in his prize-essays on Die Freiheit des Willens (Sämmtliche Werke, vii. 83 sqq.) and Die Grundlage der Moral (ibid. vii. 273 sqq.). The innate character, he says, that real core of the whole man, contains the germ of all his virtues and

vices. And though Schopenhauer be mistaken in his statement that a person's character always remains the same, it seems to me indisputable that the succeeding changes to which it may be subject are imputable to him only in so far as they are caused by his innate character.

CHAPTER XIV

PRELIMINARY REMARKS-HOMICIDE IN GENERAL

WE

We have discussed the general nature of those phenomena which have a tendency to evoke moral blame or moral praise. We have seen that moral judgments are passed on conduct and character, and we have seen why this is the case. It now remains for us to examine the particular modes of conduct which are subject to moral valuation, and to consider how these modes of conduct are judged of by different peoples and in different ages.

If carried out in every detail such an investigation could never come to an end. Among other things, it would have to take into account all customs existing among the various races of men, since every custom constitutes a moral rule. And the impossibility of any such undertaking becomes apparent when we consider the extent to which the conduct of man, and especially of savage man, is hampered by custom. Among the Wanika, for instance, "if a man dares to improve the style of his hut, to make a larger doorway than is customary; if he should wear a finer or different style of dress to that of his fellows, he is instantly fined." If, during the performance of a ceremony, the ancestors of an Australian native were in the habit of painting a white line across the forehead, their descendant must do the same.2 Dr. Nansen's statement with reference to the Greenlanders,

1 New, Life, Wanderings, Labours in Eastern Africa, p. 110.

and

2 Spencer and Gillen, Native Tribes of Central Australia, p. 11.

that their communities had originally customs and fixed rules for every possible circumstance, is essentially true of many, if not all, of the lower races.

It is necessary, then, that we should restrict ourselves to the more important modes of conduct with which the moral consciousness of mankind is concerned. These modes of conduct may be conveniently divided into six groups. The first group includes such acts, forbearances, and omissions as directly concern the interests of other men, their life or bodily integrity, their freedom, honour, property, and so forth. The second includes such acts, forbearances, and omissions as chiefly concern a man's own welfare, such as suicide, temperance, asceticism. The third The third group, which partly coincides with, but partly differs from, both the first and the second, refers to the sexual relations of men. The fourth includes their conduct towards the lower animals; the fifth, their conduct towards dead persons; the sixth, their conduct towards beings, real or imaginary, that they regard as supernatural. We shall examine each of these groups separately, in the above order. And, not being content with a mere description of facts, we shall try to discover the principle which lies at the bottom of the moral judgment in each particular case.

It is commonly maintained that the most sacred duty which we owe our fellow-creatures is to respect their lives. I venture to believe that this holds good not only among civilised nations, but among the lower races as well; and that, if a savage recognises that he has any moral obligations at all to his neighbours, he considers the taking of their lives to be a greater wrong than any other kind of injury inflicted upon them.

Among various uncivilised peoples, however, human life is said to be held very cheap.

The Australian Dieyerie, we are told, would for a mere trifle kill their dearest friend. In Fiji there is an "utter disregard of

1 Nansen, Eskimo Life, p. 104.

2 Gason, Manners and Customs of

the Dieyerie Tribe,' in Woods, Native Tribes of South Australia, p. 258.