The frequent references made in the present work, on my own authority, to customs and ideas prevalent among the natives of Morocco, require a word of explanation. Seeing the close connection between moral opinions and magic and religious beliefs, I thought it might be useful for me to acquire first-hand knowledge of the folk-lore of some non-European people, and for various reasons I chose Morocco as my field of research. During the four years I spent there, largely among its country population, I have not only collected anthropological data, but tried to make myself familiar with the native way of thinking ; and I venture to believe that this has helped me to understand various customs occurring at a stage of civilisation different from our


before long to publish the detailed results of my studies in a special monograph on the popular religion and magics of the Moors.

For these researches I have derived much material support from the University of Helsingfors. I am also indebted to the Russian Minister at Tangier, M. B. de Bacheracht, for his kindness in helping me on several occasions when I was dependent on the Sultan's Government. All the time I have had the valuable assistance of my Moorish friend Shereef Abd-es-Salâm el-Baķkali, to whom credit


is due for the kind reception I invariably received from peasants and mountaineers, not generally noted for friendliness towards Europeans.

I beg to express my best thanks to Mr. Stephen Gwynn for revising the first thirteen chapters, and to Mr. H. C. Minchin for revising the remaining portion of the book. To their suggestions I am indebted for the improvement of many phrases and expressions. I have likewise to thank my friend Mr. Alex. F. Shand for kindly reading the proofs of the earlier chapters and giving me the benefit of his opinion.

Throughout the work the reader will easily find how much I owe to British science and thought-a debt whieh is greater than I can ever express.


January, 1906.



The origin of the present investigation, p. 1.-Its subject-matter, p. I sq.--Its

practical usefulness, p. 2 sq.

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The strong tendency to discrimination which characterises resentment not

wholly lost even behind the veil of common responsibility, p. 35 sq.-

Revenge among the lower animals, p. 37 sq.- Violation of the " self-
feeling” a common incentive to resentment, p. 38 sq.-- But the reaction of

the wounded “self-feeling” not necessarily, in the first place, concerned

with the infliction of pain, p. 39 sq.-Revenge only a link in a chain of

emotional phenomena for which “non-moral resentment” may be used as a

common name, p. 40.—The origin of these phenomena, pp. 40-42.-Moral

indignation closely connected with anger, p. 42 sq.-Moral indignation, like

non-moral resentment, a reactionary attitude of mind directed towards the

cause of inflicted pain, though the reaction sometimes turns against innocent

persons, pp. 43-48.-In their administration of justice gods still more

indiscriminate than men, pp. 48-51.--Reasons for this, p. 51 sq.--Sin looked

upon in the light of a contagious matter, charged with injurious energy,

pp. 52-57.—The curse looked upon as a baneful substance injuring or

destroying anybody to whom it cleaves, p. 57 sq.-The tendency of curses

to spread, pp. 58-60.-Their tendency to contaminate those who derive

their origin from the infected individual, p. 60 59:-The vicarious suffering

involved in sin-transference not to be confounded with vicarious expiatory

sacrifice, p. 61.--Why scapegoats are sometimes killed, pp. 61-64.- Why

sacrificial victims are sometimes used as scapegoats, p. 64 sq.–Vicarious

expiatory sacrifices, pp. 65-67.--The victim accepted as a substitute on the

principle of social solidarity, p. 67 sq.-Expiatory sacrifices offered as

ransons, p. 68 sq.- Protests of the moral consciousness against the infliction

of penal suffering upon the guiltless, pp. 70-72.

Whilst, in the course of mental evolution, the true direction of the hostile reaction

involved in moral disapproval has become more apparent, its aggressive

character has become more disguised, p. 73. – Kindness to enemies not a

rule in early ethics, p. 73 sq.-At the higher stages of moral development

retaliation condemned and forgiveness of enemies laid down as a duty,

pp. 74-77.—The rule of retaliation and the rule of forgiveness not radically

opposed to each other, p. 77 sq.-Why enlightened and sympathetic minds

disapprove of resentment and retaliation springing from personal motives,

p. 78 sq.-The aggressive character of moral disapproval has also become

more disguised by the different way in which the aggressiveness displays

itself, p. 79.--Retributive punishment condemned, and the end of punishinent

considered to be either to deter from crime, or to reform the criminal, or to

repress crime by eliminating or secluding him, pp. 79-81.-Objections to these

theories, p. 82 59:-Facts which, to some extent, fill up the gap between the

theory of retribution and the utilitarian theories of punishment, pp. 84-91. -

The aggressive element in moral disapproval has undergone a change which

tends to conceal its true nature by narrowing the channel in which it

discharges itself, deliberate and discriminating resentment being apt to turn

against the will rather than against the willer, p. 91 99.--Yet it is the

instinctive desire to inflict counter-pain that gives to moral indignation its

most important characteristic, p. 92 sq.- Retributive kindly emotion a

friendly attitude of mind towards a cause of pleasure, p. 93 sq.- Retributive

kindly emotion among the lower animals, p. 94. — Its intrinsic object,

p. 94 sq.—The want of discrimination which is sometimes found in retributive

kindliness, p. 95. -— Moral approval a kind of retributive kindly emotion,

ibid.-Moral approval sometimes bestows its favours upon undeserving

individuals for the merits of others, pp. 95-97.- Explanation of this,

p. 97 sq.-. Protests against the notion of vicarious merit, p. 98 sq.

on account of an injury inflicted, or a benefit conferred, upon another person

with whose pain, or pleasure, we sympathise, and in whose welfare we take a

kindly interest, p. 108.-Sympathetic feelings based on association, p. 109

sq.--Only when aided by the altruistic sentiment sympathy induces us to take

a kindly interest in the feelings of our neighbours, and tends to produce

disinterested retributive emotions, p. 110 sq.-Sympathetic resentment to be

found in all animal species which possess altruistic sentiments, p. 111 sq.—

Sympathetic resentment among savages, p. 113 sq.-Sympathetic resentment

may not only be a reaction against sympathetic pain, but may be directly

produced by the cognition of the signs of anger (punishment, language, &c.),

pp. 114-116. -Disinterested antipathies, p. 116 sq.-Sympathy springing

from an altruistic sentiment may also produce disinterested kindly emotion,

p. 117.-Disinterested likings, ibid.-Why disinterestedness, apparent im-

partiality, and the flavour of generality have become characteristics by

which so-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive

emotions, p. 117 sq.-Custom not only a public habit, but a rule of conduct,

p. 118.-Custom conceived of as a moral rule, p. 118 sq.-In early society

customs the only moral rules ever thought of, p. 119. — The characteristics of

moral indignation to be sought for in its connection with custom, p. 120.-

Custom characterised by generality, disinterestedness, and apparent im-

partiality, p. 120 sq.—Public indignation lies at the bottom of custom as a

moral rule, p. 121 sq.-As public indignation is the prototype of moral dis-

approval, so public approval is the prototype of moral approval, p. 122.-

Moral disapproval and approval have not always remained inseparably con-

nected with the feelings of any special society, p. 122 sq.-Yet they remain

to the last public emotions—if not in reality, then as an ideal, p. 123. —

Refutation of the opinion that the original form of the moral consciousness

has been the individual's own conscience, p. 123 sq.--The antiquity of moral

resentment, p. 124. — The supposition that remorse is unknown among the

lower races contradicted by facts, p. 124 sq.-Criticism of Lord Avebury's

statement that modern savages seem to be almost entirely wanting in

moral feeling, pp. 125-129. — The antiquity of moral approval, p. 129 sq.

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