Corruption and the Global EconomyInstitute for International Economics, 1997 - 244 หน้า The recently-adopted OECD convention outlawing bribery of foreign public officials is welcome evidence of how much progress has been made in the battle against corruption. The financial crisis in East Asia is an indication of how much remains to be done. Corruption is by no means a new issue but it has only recently emerged as a global issue. With the end of the Cold War, the pace and breadth of the trends toward democratization and international economic integration accelerated and expanded globally. Yet corruption could slow or even reverse these trends, potentially threatening economic development and political stability in some countries. As the global implications of corruption have grown, so has the impetus for international action to combat it. In addition to efforts in the OECD, the Organization of American States, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations General Assembly, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have both begun to emphasize corruption as an impediment to economic development. This book includes a chapter by the Chairman of the OECD Working Group on Bribery discussing the evolution of the OECD convention and what is needed to make it effective. Other chapters address the causes and consequences of corruption, including the impact on investment and growth and the role of multinational corporations in discouraging bribery. The final chapter summarizes and also discusses some of the other anticorruption initiatives that either have been or should be adopted by governments, multilateral development banks, and other international organizations. |
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หน้า 42
... , considerable evidence suggests that much investment in the developing world has little or no productive impact ( Pritchett 1996 ) . the government . This kind of behavior will be difficult 42 CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY.
... , considerable evidence suggests that much investment in the developing world has little or no productive impact ( Pritchett 1996 ) . the government . This kind of behavior will be difficult 42 CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY.
หน้า 87
... productive work does , the allocation of talent will be worse : talented and highly educated in- dividuals will be more likely to engage in rent seeking than in productive work , with adverse consequences for their country's growth rate ...
... productive work does , the allocation of talent will be worse : talented and highly educated in- dividuals will be more likely to engage in rent seeking than in productive work , with adverse consequences for their country's growth rate ...
หน้า 149
... productive . Attitudes are polarized , and it becomes impossible to de- velop consensus behind proposals for reforms , as happened when the United Nations tried to deal with corruption in the late 1970s and early 1980s . The second ...
... productive . Attitudes are polarized , and it becomes impossible to de- velop consensus behind proposals for reforms , as happened when the United Nations tried to deal with corruption in the late 1970s and early 1980s . The second ...
เนื้อหา
The Globalization of Corruption | 7 |
The Political Economy of Corruption | 31 |
Public Officials Private Interests and Sustainable | 61 |
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action agencies American antibribery anticorruption Barro benefits bidding bribery of foreign bribes bureaucrats chapter civil codes combatting corruption companies composition of government consequences of corruption contracts corporate Corrupt Practices corruption index costs criminal deductibility of bribes democracy democratic developing countries economic growth effects of corruption efforts elites enforcement ernment example export FCPA firms Fred Bergsten Freedom House funds global government expenditure government officials government procurement groups illegal illicit implement incentives increase institutions International Monetary Fund investment ISBN paper issue Johnston Klitgaard Mark Pieth Mauro ment Moisés Naím money laundering OECD opportunities Organization pay bribes payments payoffs percent potential problem programs projects public officials Rafael Di Tella recommendation reforms regulations rent-seeking Risk role Rose-Ackerman rules ruption scandals strategies tax deductibility tion trade transactions transnational bribery Transparency International Uganda United World Bank World Trade Organization