the Peninsula,' begun by General Foy, but which, unhappily, that distinguished French officer did not live to bring to a conclusion. General Foy says

The bishops were rich, but commendable for the use which they made of their riches. The people were accustomed to reverence them, and they deserved it, both by their virtues and by their instructions. The monarchy being dissolved, the bishops are the natural heads of the people.'-Foy, vol. ii. p. 275.

Farther on in his book, describing the part taken by individuals. of eminence when the people rose to maintain the independence of their country, the General tells us, at St. Ander, the bishop, a person whose manners recalled the simplicity and strictness of evangelical times, placed himself at the head of the popular movement. Again, speaking of the Bishop of Orense, he saysthis prelate, the honour of the Spanish clergy by his doctrine, and exemplary by his virtues, did not fear, at the age of sixtythree years, and before the insurrection of his countrymen had broken out, to address the words of truth (in a written protest, forcible both in point of argument and of eloquence) to the ears of an all-powerful prince' [Napoleon]. And having once more occasion to allude afterwards to the same Bishop of St. Ander, General Foy adds, he was rich, like all the bishops of Spain; but he allotted only 300 dollars a-year to his own use ;a man holy, severe to himself, and reverenced by all.'

We have thought it to be but an act of fairness thus early to place in juxtaposition the opinions of the English and the French military historians of the Peninsular war respecting the Spanish clergy. In the contrast which exists between these opinions, we shall leave our readers to form their own judgment on the subject. With respect to the unfavourable character given to the Spanish nation in general by Colonel Napier, we shall not refer to those testimonials of an opposite kind with which history would largely supply us, but we shall enable our readers to compare on this head also the account of an eminent and recent French observer with that of our British author; we allude to the celebrated military surgeon, Baron Larrey, who was for some time in Spain with the French army. After describing the personal appearance of the Castillians, he says—

The Spaniards in general, but especially the Castillians, possess much quickness of parts and soundness of understanding; and they have great aptness for the study of arts and sciences. They have a high idea of their origin, and think themselves of a race superior to that of other nations. But these sentiments contribute to inspire them all with a spirit of national attachment to their country, and excite them to courage and to perseverance in the sacrifices

required

required in her cause. In fine, when this nation shall have been freed from institutions and customs which have supported superstition and fanaticism, and repressed its good qualities, it will become one of the first in the world.'- Larrey, vol. iii. p. 240.

We were in hopes, on first looking over the opening chapter of Colonel Napier's book, that we might have been able to pass on without making any particular remarks upon it, knowing how large a task we had before us, and seeing that it did not enter into the war. On perusing it a second time, however, we deemed it indispensable to direct the attention of our readers to some passages in it which appear to afford an index to the peculiar views and opinions of this historian. It is a rule of criticism laid down by Pope, that a work should be read

With the same spirit that its author writ.'

Pope does not mean, of course, that the reader is wholly to identify himself with the spirit of his author, for that would put an end to criticism altogether, but only that he is to inform himself, as accurately as he can, under what particular impressions, and with what bias, the author composed his work, in order to be enabled by that means to make suitable allowances in judging of it. The chapter before us will afford considerable assistance, we think, in applying the critic's rule, and the very first fact assumed in it will go far, probably, towards deciding the reader's opinion as to the accuracy of our author's assertions, and the justice and impartiality of his views. Colonel Napier tells us, that

up to the peace of Tilsit the wars of France were essentially defensive.'-vol. i. P. 1.

Such an assertion from a devoted partisan of France, during the violent contests which grew out of the revolution in that country, might have been natural, notwithstanding that each succeeding year, almost, was marked by some fresh accession to the French territory gained by fraud or violence-notwithstanding, for example, the subversion of the independence of the Swiss cantons, the seizure of Malta, and the unprovoked invasion of Egypt. But that an historian writing twenty years after the close of the contest, and claiming credit for impartiality, should advance such a doctrine, is truly astonishing. France varied, indeed, the mode of extending her dominion; but before, as after the peace of Tilsit, she was making, continually, fresh accessions to her power. Whilst democracy was in the ascendant at Paris, pretended republics were created; and, subsequently, when Buonaparte had seized upon the government, and republicanism went out of fashion, a similar process was adopted in the formation of kingdoms and principalities, especial care being always taken, in both cases, that these new and pretendedly independent states should be the

subservient

subservient vassals of France, and should be ready, whenever called upon, to become active instruments in furthering the extension, and in confirming the solidity of her domination. If a system of policy such as that is to be called essentially defensice,' the most grasping spirit of conquest will never find any difficulty to cloak itself under similar specious disguises. We trust, however, that there will be found few Englishmen to be either their dupes or their apologists.

The bloody contest that wasted the Continent so many years, was not a struggle for pre-eminence between ambitious powers-not a dispute for some accession of territory, nor for the political ascendency of one or other nation, but a deadly conflict, to determine whether aristocracy or democracy should predominate, whether equality or privilege should henceforth be the principle of European governments.'-vol. i. p. 1.

The particular spirit in which our author contemplates the great drama alluded to, and the effect which it has in narrowing his views of things, show themselves here with a broad and strong light. What-no ambition, no thirst of conquest, no desire for political ascendency in all the bloody contests which followed the French Revolution! no motive of action in any of those parties or individuals who successively wielded power in France but disinterested love of equality; and nothing but an opposite motive in any of their opponents! History will be simplified certainly, and much abridged, by this summary mode of dealing with events and their causes, but little evidence will be afforded of penetration on the part of the historian, and little useful instruction will be conveyed to the reader.

The French Revolution, intrinsically too feeble to sustain the physical and moral force pressing it down, was fast sinking, when the wonderful genius of Napoleon, baffling all reasonable calculation, raised and fixed it on the basis of victory, the only one capable of supporting the crude production.

Once a

sovereign, his vigorous character, his pursuits, his talents, and the critical nature of the times, inevitably rendered him a despotic one;' yet while he sacrificed political liberty, which, to the great bulk of mankind, has never been more than a pleasing sound, he cherished with the utmost care equality, a sensible good that produces increasing satisfaction as it descends in the scale of society.'—vol. i. p. 2. We fear to hazard any lengthened commentary upon this passage, lest it should turn out perhaps to be owing to the obtuseness of our own intellects that we do not understand it. We venture to observe, however, that we cannot think it baffled all reasonable

Napoleon is here represented as inevitably despotic'-but a few pages further on (page 9) we are told, that he was rather peremptory than despotic': a nice distinction.

calculation,'

calculation,' that anarchy and war should end in placing a successful military leader at the head of the state. These same causes led to such a result in ancient Rome, and had a similar issue in England in more modern times; why then should it baffle all reasonable calculation' that they would lead to the same consequences in France? In such cases the new sovereign will always be despotic in proportion as his hold of power is precarious, and the acknowledgment of his right to it is partial. He may be a courtier to the multitude, and he may affect clemency, and even desire to practise it, in the beginning, but his pretorian bands are his true constituents, and arbitrary rule must become the maxim of his government. How all this is reconcileable with cherishing equality with the utmost care,' and how that equality was cherished-producing increasing satisfaction as it descends in the scale of society,' by a man who made himself an emperor; his brothers and brothers-in-law, kings; and his generals, ministers, and courtiers, dukes and princes, whilst from the general mass of his subjects the conscription drew forth, annually, thousands of victims to be sacrificed to his ambition;-perhaps the Duke of Dalmatia may have explained to Colonel Napier, but we must humbly confess that we have been ourselves unable to discover.

Colonel Napier now approaches the Peninsula, taking care to slide in something apologetic for Buonaparte's line of conduct there, founded on the necessity of enforcing everywhere his 'continental system' against English commerce, and of fixing the policy of the Spanish government, which he is represented to have mistrusted, in consequence of a proclamation issued by the Prince of the Peace previously to the battle of Jena, and hastily recalled when the result of that conflict was known.

This state of affairs drew the French emperor's attention towards the Peninsula; and a chain of remarkable circumstances which fixed it there, induced him to remove the reigning family, and place his brother Joseph on the throne of Spain. In an evil hour for his own greatness, and the happiness of others, he commenced this project. Founded in violence and executed in fraud, it spread desolation through the fairest portions of the Peninsula, was calamitous to France, destructive to himself; and the conflict between his hardy veterans and the vindictive race he insulted, assumed a character of unmitigated ferocity, disgraceful to human nature; for the Spaniards did not fail to defend their just cause with hereditary cruelty, while the French army struck a terrible balance of barbarous actions.'-vol. i. p. 5.

Why does Colonel Napier stigmatize the Spaniards as a vindictive race-why does he cast upon them the reproach of hereditary cruelty? Is it because they have defended their native

soil and their national independence, in every age, with indomitable courage and with unrivalled constancy? and is it because, in the present instance, they maintained their just cause' against a project founded in violence and executed with fraud'?

He proceeds to calculate the amount of the array which was brought against them.

The extent and population of the French empire, including the kingdom of Italy, the confederation of the Rhine, the Swiss Cantons, the Duchy of Warsaw, and the dependent States of Holland and Naples, enabled Bonaparte, through the medium of the conscription, to array an army, in number nearly equal to the great host that followed the Persian of old against Greece; like that multitude, also, his troops were gathered from many nations, but they were trained to a Roman discipline, and ruled by a Carthaginian genius.'-vol. i. p. 5. Was it then magnanimity in the Greeks to meet the mighty hosts of eastern monarchs at Marathon, at Thermopylæ, and at Salamis ; but only vindictiveness' and 'hereditary cruelty' which stimulated the Spanish people, though without a government, without an army, deprived by artifice of the strongholds of their country, to defy the violence, the fraud, and the power of a European despot, nurtured in camps, endowed with a Carthaginian genius,' and leading into the field armies inured to Roman discipline,' and in number nearly equal to the Persian multitude? In truth, the Spaniards acted precisely like the Greeks of old-they stopped not to calculate, as wary politicians, or timid commanders, the odds that were against them; the fame of their ancestors, and the fate of their posterity, stood before their kindled imaginations, and the fear of death vanished from their thoughts.

By the way, some of our readers may perhaps suppose that the word Punic would have been more suitable than the word Carthaginian in this place; but they would greatly mistake Colonel Napier's meaning. His intention is to suggest a parallel of Napoleon and Hannibal; but we cannot admit the parallelism. The lines, it is true, never meet, but it will be found, upon examination, that they diverge more and more, the farther they are produced. In Buonaparte we see a man whose distinguished abilities, favoured by extraordinary events, raised him to the possession of the greatest power which has ever been wielded by a single individual. But we see him, the blinded votary of selfish ambition, effecting in the space of fourteen years the destruction of that power, by his intemperate use of it-yet retaining existence, to sink into the condition of a peevish caviller with a petty governor, about the merest trifles-clinging to the shadow of his former greatness when the substance was gone-and displaying, of all the talents attributed to him in the days of his prosperity, that alone