John Dewey's Ethics: Democracy as ExperienceIndiana University Press, 2008 - 341 หน้า John Dewey, perhaps the most prolific figure in American philosophy and pragmatism, is roundly considered deficient with respect to ethics. Pappas (Texas A&M) addresses this misconception by demonstrating that ethics is the organizing center of Dewey's entire philosophical approach. This is a challenging thesis to argue for both dedicated pragmatists and philosophers of ethics from the analytic or Continental traditions. Pappas's argument moves in three steps: experience as method, moral theory and practice, and the normative standpoint of pragmatism. The claim to normativity is the most interesting and problematic. Pappas says that "the broadest characterization of Dewey's ideal is that he advocates living a moral life that is intelligent, aesthetic, and democratic." Imagination and conscientiousness are primary aspects of this emergent normativity, and Pappas also explores Dewey's notion of affections and virtues of character. Pappas is consistent in signaling the qualitative notion of faith present in Dewey's moral thought, although the content of this faith remains necessarily vague. This book handles Dewey's disparate texts and broad research adeptly, and focuses on the issues of experience and experiment in a holistic treatment of pragmatic ethics. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Lower-level undergraduates through faculty/researchers; general readers. General Readers; Lower-division Undergraduates; Upper-division Undergraduates; Graduate Students; Researchers/Faculty. Reviewed by R. Ward. |
เนื้อหา
Introduction | 1 |
One Experience as Method | 17 |
Two Moral Theory and Moral Practice | 43 |
Three The Normative Standpoint of Pragmatism | 71 |
Four Morality as Experience | 81 |
Five The What of Moral Experience | 88 |
Six The How of Moral Experience | 121 |
Dewey and the Great Divide in Ethics | 129 |
Preface | xi |
List of Abbreviations | xv |
Introduction | 1 |
One Experience as Method | 17 |
Two Moral Theory and Moral Practice | 43 |
Three The Normative Standpoint of Pragmatism | 71 |
Four Morality as Experience | 81 |
Five The What of Moral Experience | 88 |
Eight Present Activity and the Meaning of Moral Life | 146 |
The Need for a Recovery of Moral Philosophy | 156 |
Ten The Intelligent Aesthetic and Democratic Way of Life | 165 |
Eleven The Ideal Moral Self | 185 |
Twelve Democracy as the Ideal Moral Community | 217 |
Thirteen A Philosophical Justification of Democracy | 260 |
Conclusion | 300 |
Notes | 309 |
Bibliography | 327 |
Index | 335 |
back cover | 351 |
Contents | vii |
Six The How of Moral Experience | 121 |
Dewey and the Great Divide in Ethics | 129 |
Eight Present Activity and the Meaning of Moral Life | 146 |
The Need for a Recovery of Moral Philosophy | 156 |
Ten The Intelligent Aesthetic and Democratic Way of Life | 165 |
Eleven The Ideal Moral Self | 185 |
Twelve Democracy as the Ideal Moral Community | 217 |
Thirteen A Philosophical Justification of Democracy | 260 |
Conclusion | 300 |
Notes | 309 |
Bibliography | 327 |
335 | |
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