Corruption and the Global EconomyInstitute for International Economics, 1997 - 244 ˹éÒ The recently-adopted OECD convention outlawing bribery of foreign public officials is welcome evidence of how much progress has been made in the battle against corruption. The financial crisis in East Asia is an indication of how much remains to be done. Corruption is by no means a new issue but it has only recently emerged as a global issue. With the end of the Cold War, the pace and breadth of the trends toward democratization and international economic integration accelerated and expanded globally. Yet corruption could slow or even reverse these trends, potentially threatening economic development and political stability in some countries. As the global implications of corruption have grown, so has the impetus for international action to combat it. In addition to efforts in the OECD, the Organization of American States, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations General Assembly, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have both begun to emphasize corruption as an impediment to economic development. This book includes a chapter by the Chairman of the OECD Working Group on Bribery discussing the evolution of the OECD convention and what is needed to make it effective. Other chapters address the causes and consequences of corruption, including the impact on investment and growth and the role of multinational corporations in discouraging bribery. The final chapter summarizes and also discusses some of the other anticorruption initiatives that either have been or should be adopted by governments, multilateral development banks, and other international organizations. |
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˹éÒ 41
... costs mean that there is less information available than in a legal market . This may help explain why bribes in many countries are reported as stylized percentages of the value of transactions or as fixed fees — 10 percent of the value ...
... costs mean that there is less information available than in a legal market . This may help explain why bribes in many countries are reported as stylized percentages of the value of transactions or as fixed fees — 10 percent of the value ...
˹éÒ 50
... costs and benefits will depend upon the context . Most cannot stand alone . For example , increases in civil service pay and benefits would be pointless unless credible monitoring systems are in place to detect wrongdoing . Furthermore ...
... costs and benefits will depend upon the context . Most cannot stand alone . For example , increases in civil service pay and benefits would be pointless unless credible monitoring systems are in place to detect wrongdoing . Furthermore ...
˹éÒ 63
... cost of lost political choices and inferior public services . Many people pay the costs of corruption again and again . Actual calculations of who gets what are admittedly complex and un- reliable . Much corruption never comes to light ...
... cost of lost political choices and inferior public services . Many people pay the costs of corruption again and again . Actual calculations of who gets what are admittedly complex and un- reliable . Much corruption never comes to light ...
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The Globalization of Corruption | 7 |
The Political Economy of Corruption | 31 |
Public Officials Private Interests and Sustainable | 61 |
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action agencies American antibribery anticorruption Barro benefits bidding bribery of foreign bribes bureaucrats chapter civil codes combatting corruption companies composition of government consequences of corruption contracts corporate Corrupt Practices corruption index costs criminal deductibility of bribes democracy democratic developing countries economic growth effects of corruption efforts elites enforcement ernment example export FCPA firms Fred Bergsten Freedom House funds global government expenditure government officials government procurement groups illegal illicit implement incentives increase industrial institutions International Monetary Fund investment ISBN paper issue Johnston Klitgaard Mark Pieth Mauro ment Moisés Naím money laundering OECD opportunities Organization pay bribes payments payoffs percent Political Corruption potential problem programs projects public officials Rafael Di Tella recommendation reforms regulations rent-seeking Risk role Rose-Ackerman rules ruption scandals strategies tax deductibility tion trade transactions transnational bribery Transparency International Uganda United World Bank