profit you to do so," constitutes the fundamental motive of Deuteronomy, as appears from phrases like these: "That it may go well with thee," "That thy days may be prolonged.' Speaking of the modern Egyptians, Lane observes that "from their own profession it appears that they are as much excited to the giving of alms by the expectation of enjoying corresponding rewards in heaven as by pity for the distresses of their fellow-creatures, or a disinterested wish to do the will of God."2 Something similar may be said, not only of the "good deeds" of Muhammedans, but of those of many Christians. Did not Paley expressly define virtue as "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness"? 3

4

Such views, however, cannot hold their ground against the verdict of the scrutinising moral consciousness. They have been repeatedly contradicted by the great teachers of morality. Confucius required an inward sincerity in all outward practice, and poured scorn on the pharisaism which contented itself with the cleansing of the outside of the cup and platter. He said that, "in the rites of mourning, exceeding grief with deficient rites is better than little demonstration of grief with superabounding rites; and that in those of sacrifice, exceeding reverence with deficient rites is better than an excess of rites with but little reverence.' "Sacrifice is not a thing coming to a man from without; it issues from within him, and has its birth in his heart. When the heart is deeply moved, expression is given to it by ceremonies." " The virtuous man offers his sacrifices" without seeking for anything to be gained by them."7 "The Master said, 'See what a man does. Mark his motives.' " 8 The popular Taouist work, called The Book of Secret Blessings,' inculcates the necessity

"5

1 Cf. Montefiore, Hibbert Lectures,

P. 531.

2 Lane, Modern Egyptians, p. 293. 3 Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, i. 7 (Complete Works, ii. 38).

4 Cf. Legge, Religions of China, p.

261 sq.; Girard de Rialle, Mythologie comparée, p. 214.

5 Lî Kî, ii. 1. 2. 27. Cf. Lun Yü, iii. 4. 3.

6 Li Kî, xxii. I.

7 Ibid. xxii. 2.

8 Lun Yü, ii. 10. I sq.

of purifying the heart as a preparation for all right-doing.1 The religious legislator of Brahmanism, whilst assuming in accordance with the popular view that the fulfilment of religious duty will be always rewarded to some extent, whatever may be the motive, maintains that the man who fulfils his duties without regard to the rewards which follow the fulfilment, will enjoy the highest happiness in this life and eternal happiness hereafter. According to the Buddhistic Dhammapada, "if a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, pain follows him, as the wheel follows the foot of the ox that draws the carriage.. . . If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows him, like a shadow that never leaves him." In his description of the Buddhists of Mongolia, the Rev. James Gilmour observes :-"Mongol priests recognise the power of motive in estimating actions The attitude of the mind decides the nature of the act. He that offers a cup of cold water only, in a proper spirit, has presented a gift quite as acceptable as the most magnificent of donations."4 With reference to the Hebrews, Mr. Montefiore says: "If it were true that the later Judaism of the law laid exclusive stress in its moral teaching upon the mere outward act and not upon the spirit—upon doing rather than being, as we might nowadays express it we should scarcely find that constant harping upon the heart as the source and seat of good and evil. What more legal book than Chronicles? Yet it is there that we find the earnest supplication for a heart directed towards God. . . . The eudæmonistic motive is strongest in Deuteronomy; it is weakest with the Rabbis."5 Few sayings are quoted and applied more frequently in the Rabbinical literature than the adage which closes those tractates of the Mishna which deal with the sacrificial law :-"He that brings few offerings is as he that brings many; let his heart be directed

1 Douglas, Confucianism and Taouism, p. 272.

2 Wheeler, History of India, ii. 478. 3 Dhammapada, 1 sq.

4 Gilmour, Among the Mongols, p.

239.

5 Montefiore, op. cit. pp. 483, 533. I Chronicles, xxii. 19; xxviii. 9; xxix. 18 sq. 2 Chronicles, xi. 16; xv. 12; xvi. 9.

heavenward."1 The same faults which Jesus chastises in the hypocritical Rabbis of his day are also chastised in the Talmud. It is said, "Before a man prays let him purify his heart," 2 and, "Sin committed with a good motive is better than a precept fulfilled from a bad motive." Rabbi Elazar says, "No charity is rewarded but according to the degree of benevolence in it, for it is said, 'Sow (a reward) for yourselves in giving alms as charity, you will reap according to the benevolence."" 4 Nor is the doctrine which requires disinterested motives for the performance of good deeds foreign to Muhammedan moralists. "Whatever we give," says the author of the Akhlâk-i-Jelâli, "should be given in the fulness of zeal and good-will.. We should spend it simply to please God, and not mix the act with any meaner motive, lest thereby it be rendered null and void." 5

1 Montefiore, op. cit. p. 484. 2 Ibid. p. 174.

3 Nazir, fol. 23 B, quoted by Hershon, Treasures of the Talmud, p. 74.

4 Succah, fol. 49 B, ibid. p. 11.

5 Quoted by Ameer Ali, Ethics of Islâm, p. 38 sq.

CHAPTER XII

FORBEARANCES AND CARELESSNESS

-CHARACTER

THE observation has often been made that in early moral codes the so-called negative commandments, which tell people what they ought not to do, are much more prominent than the positive commandments, which tell them what they ought to do. The main reason for this is that negative commandments spring from the disapproval of acts, whereas positive commandments spring from the disapproval of forbearances or omissions, and that the indignation of men is much more easily aroused by action than by the absence of it. A person who commits a harmful deed is a more obvious cause of pain than a person who causes harm by doing nothing, and this naturally affects the question of guilt in the eyes of the multitude. A scrutinising judge of course carefully distinguishes between wilfulness and negligence, whereas, to his mind, a forbearance is morally equivalent to an act. The unreflecting judge, on the other hand, is much less concerned with the question of wilfulness than with the distinction between acting and not-acting. Even the criminal laws of civilised nations take little cognisance of forbearances and omissions;1 and one reason for this is that they evoke little public indignation. Even if it be admitted that the rules of beneficence, so far as details are concerned, must be left in a great measure to

1 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, ii. 113. Hepp,

Zurechnung auf dem Gebiete des Civilrechts, p. 115 (Roman law).

the jurisdiction of private ethics, the limits of the law on this head, as Bentham remarks, seem to be capable of being extended a good deal farther than they seem ever to have been extended hitherto." And he appropriately asks, "In cases where the person is in danger, why should it not be made the duty of every man to save another from mischief, when it can be done without prejudicing himself, as well as to abstain from bringing it on him?" 1

2

The more scrutinising the moral consciousness, the greater the importance which it attaches to positive commandments. This is well illustrated by a comparison between Old and New Testament morality. As Professor Seeley observes, "the old legal formula began 'thou shalt not,' the new begins with thou shalt.' The young man who had kept the whole law-that is, who had refrained from a number of actions-is commanded to do something, to sell his goods and feed the poor. Condemnation was passed under the Mosaic law upon him. who had sinned, who had done something forbidden--the soul that sinneth shall die ;-Christ's condemnation is pronounced upon those who had not done good—‘I was an hungered and ye gave me no meat.' The sinner whom Christ habitually denounces is he who has done nothing." This characteristic is repeatedly manifested in His parables—as in the case of the priest and Levite who passed by on the other side; in the case of Dives, of whom no ill is recorded except that a beggar lay at his

1 Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 322 sq. To a certain extent, however, this has been admitted by legislators even in the Middle Ages. Frederick II.'s Sicilian Code imposed a penalty on persons who witnessed conflagrations or shipwrecks without helping the victims, and a fine of four augustales on anyone who, hearing the shrieks of an assaulted woman, did not hurry to her rescue (Constitutiones Napolitana sive Siculæ, i. 28, 22 [Lindenbrog, Codex legum antiquarum, pp. 715, 712]). Bracton says (De Legibus

et Consuetudinibus Anglia, fol. 121,

vol. ii. 280 sq.) that he who could rescue a man from death and did not do it, ought not to be exempt from punishment. It was a principle of the Canon law that he who does not prevent the infliction of an injury upon his neighbour when it lies in his power to do so, is to be regarded as an accomplice in the offence (Geyer, Lehre von der Nothwehr, p. 74. Gregory IX. Decretales, v. 12. 6. 2: Qui potuit hominem liberare a morte, et non liberavit, eum occidit ").

2

Seeley, Ecce Homo, p. 176.