CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (concluded)

Refutation of the opinion that moral emotions only arise in consequence of moral

judgments, p. 100 sq.-However, moral judgments, being definite expressions

of moral emotions, help us to discover the true nature of these emotions,

p. 101.—Disinterestedness and apparent impartiality characteristics by which

moral indignation and approval are distinguished from other, non-moral,

kinds of resentment or retributive kindly emotion, pp. 101-104.- Besides,

a moral emotion has a certain flavour of generality, p. 104 sq.-The analysis

of the moral emotions which has been attempted in this and the two pre-

ceding chapters holds true not only of such emotions as we feel on account of

the conduct of others, but of such emotions as we feel on account of our own

conduct as well, pp. 105-107.

CHAPTER V

THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS

We may feel disinterested resentment, or disinterested retributive kindly emotion,

on account of an injury inflicted, or a benefit conferred, upon another person

with whose pain, or pleasure, we sympathise, and in whose welfare we take a

kindly interest, p. 108.-Sympathetic feelings based on association, p. 109

sq.-Only when aided by the altruistic sentiment sympathy induces us to take

a kindly interest in the feelings of our neighbours, and tends to produce

disinterested retributive emotions, p. 110 sq. —Sympathetic resentment to be

found in all animal species which possess altruistic sentiments, p. 111 sq.-

Sympathetic resentment among savages, p. 113 sq.-Sympathetic resentment

may not only be a reaction against sympathetic pain, but may be directly

produced by the cognition of the signs of anger (punishment, language, &c.),

pp. 114-116.-Disinterested antipathies, p. 116 sq.-Sympathy springing

from an altruistic sentiment may also produce disinterested kindly emotion,

p. 117. Disinterested likings, ibid.-Why disinterestedness, apparent im-

partiality, and the flavour of generality have become characteristics by

which so-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive

emotions, p. 117 sq.-Custom not only a public habit, but a rule of conduct,

p. 118.—Custom conceived of as a moral rule, p. 118 sq.-In early society

customs the only moral rules ever thought of, p. 119.-The characteristics of

moral indignation to be sought for in its connection with custom, p. 120.-

Custom characterised by generality, disinterestedness, and apparent im-

partiality, p. 120 sq.-Public indignation lies at the bottom of custom as a

moral rule, p. 121 sq.-As public indignation is the prototype of moral dis-

approval, so public approval is the prototype of moral approval, p. 122.—

Moral disapproval and approval have not always remained inseparably con-

nected with the feelings of any special society, p. 122 sq.-Yet they remain

to the last public emotions-if not in reality, then as an ideal, p. 123.—

Refutation of the opinion that the original form of the moral consciousness

has been the individual's own conscience, p. 123 sq.—The antiquity of moral

resentment, p. 124.—The supposition that remorse is unknown among the

lower races contradicted by facts, p. 124 sq.-Criticism of Lord Avebury's {

statement that modern savages seem to be almost entirely wanting in

moral feeling, pp. 125–129. —The antiquity of moral approval, p. 129 sq.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS

Our analysis to be concerned with moral concepts formed by the civilised mind,

p. 131.-Moral concepts among the lower races, pp. 131-133.-Language a

rough generaliser, p. 133.-Analysis of the concepts bad, vice, and wrong,

p. 134. Of ought and duty, pp. 134-137.-Of right, as an adjective, pp.

137-139.-Of right, as a substantive, p. 139 sq.-Of the relations between

rights and duties, p. 140 sq.-Of injustice and justice, pp. 141-145.-Of

good, pp. 145-147.—Of virtue, pp. 147–149. — Of the relation between virtue

and duty, p. 149 sq.-Of merit, p. 150 sq.-Of the relation between merit

and duty, p. 151 sq.-The question of the super-obligatory, pp. 152–154.—

The question of the morally indifferent, pp. 154-157.

-

CHAPTER VII

CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS

How we can get an insight into the moral ideas of mankind at large, p. 158.-The

close connection between the habitualness and the obligatoriness of custom,

p. 159.-Though every public habit is not a custom, involving an obligation,

men's standard of morality is not independent of their practice, p. 159 sq.-

The study of moral ideas to a large extent a study of customs, p. 160.-But

custom never covers the whole field of morality, and the uncovered space

grows larger in proportion as the moral consciousness develops, p. 160 sq.-

At the lower stages of civilisation custom the sole rule for conduct, p. 161.-

Even kings described as autocrats tied by custom, p. 162.-In competition with

law custom frequently carries the day, p. 163 sq.-Custom stronger than law

and religion combined, p. 164.-The laws themselves command obedience

more as customs than as laws, ibid.-Many laws were customs before they

became laws, p. 165.—The transformation of customs into laws, p. 165 sq.-

Laws as expressions of moral ideas, pp. 166-168.—Punishment and indemni-

fication, p. 168 sq.-Definition of punishment, p. 169 sq.-Savage punishments

inflicted upon the culprit by the community at large, pp. 170-173.-By some

person or persons invested with judicial authority, pp. 173-175.-The develop-

ment of judicial organisation out of a previous system of lynch-law, p. 175.—

Out of a previous system of private revenge, p. 176.-Public indignation

displays itself not only in punishment, but to a certain extent in the custom of

revenge, p. 176 sq.—The social origin of the lex talionis, pp. 177–180.-The

transition from revenge to punishment, and the establishment of a central judi-

cial and executive authority, pp. 180-183.-The jurisdiction of chiefs, p. 183 sq.

-The injured party or the accuser acting as executioner, but not as judge,

p. 184 sq.-The existence of punishment and judicial organisation among a

certain people no exact index to its general state of culture, p. 185.—The

supposition that punishment has been intended to act as a deterrent, p. 185 sq.

-Among various semi-civilised and civilised peoples the criminal law has

assumed a severity which far surpasses the rigour of the lex talionis, pp. 186–

188.-Wanton cruelty not a general characteristic of the public justice of

savages, pp. 188-190. --Legislators referring to the deterrent effects of punish-

ment, p. 190 sq.-The practice of punishing criminals in public, p. 191 sq.-

The punishment actually inflicted on the criminal in many cases much less

severe than the punishment with which the law threatens him, p. 192 sq.-

The detection of criminals was in earlier times much rarer and more uncertain

than it is now, p. 193.—The chief explanation of the great severity of certain

criminal codes lies in their connection with despotism or religion or both,

pp. 193-198.-Punishment may also be applied as a means of deterring

from crime, p. 198 sq.—But the scope which justice leaves for determent pure

and simple is not wide, p. 199.-The criminal law of a community on the

whole a faithful exponent of moral sentiments prevalent in that community

at large, pp. 199-201.

CHAPTER VIII

THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE SUBJECTS OF ENLIGHTENED

MORAL JUDGMENTS

Definitions of the term ""
conduct," p. 202 sq.-The meaning of the word " act,"

p. 203 sq.-The meaning of the word "intention,” p. 204.—There can be

only one intention in one act, p. 204 sq.-The moral judgments which we

pass on acts do not really relate to the event, but to the intention, p. 205 sq.

-A person morally accountable also for his deliberate wishes, p. 206.—A

deliberate wish is a volition, p. 206 sq.-The meaning of the word “ motive,"

p. 207.-Motives which are volitions fall within the sphere of moral valuation,

ibid.—The motive of an act may be an intention, but an intention belonging

to another act, ibid.-Even motives which consist of non-volitional cona-

tions may indirectly exercise much influence on moral judgments, p.

207 sq.-Refutation of Mill's statement that "the motive has nothing to

do with the morality of the action," p. 208 sq.-Moral judgments really

passed upon men as acting or willing, not upon acts or volitions in the abstract,

p. 209.-Forbearances morally equivalent to acts, p. 209 sq.-Distinction

between forbearances and omissions, p. 210.-Moral judgments refer not

only to willing, but to not-willing as well, not only to acts and forbearances,

but to omissions, p. 210 sq.-Negligence, heedlessness, and rashness, p. 211.

-Moral judgments of blame concerned with not-willing only in so far as this
not-willing is attributed to a defect of the "will," p. 211 sq.-Distinction
between conscious omissions and forbearances, and between not-willing to
refrain from doing and willing to do, p. 212.-The "known concomitants of
acts," p. 213.-Absence of volitions also gives rise to moral praise, p. 213 sq.
-The meaning of the term "conduct," p. 214.-The subject of a moral
judgment is, strictly speaking, a person's will, or character, conceived as the
cause either of volitions or of the absence of volitions, p. 214 sq.-Moral judg-
ments that are passed on emotions or opinions really refer to the will, p. 215 sq.

-

CHAPTER IX

THE WILL AS THE SUBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE INFLUENCE OF

EXTERNAL EVENTS

Cases in which no distinction is made between intentional and accidental injuries,

pp. 217-219.-Yet even in the system of self-redress intentional or foreseen

injuries often distinguished from unintentional and unforeseen injuries, pp.

219-221.-A similar distinction made in the punishments inflicted by many

savages, p. 221 sq.-Uncivilised peoples who entirely excuse, or do not pun-

ish, persons for injuries which they have inflicted by mere accident,

p. 222 sq.-Peoples of a higher culture who punish persons for bringing

about events without any fault of theirs, pp. 223-226.—At the earlier

stages of civilisation gods, in particular, attach undue importance to the

outward aspect of conduct, pp. 226-231.-Explanation of all these facts,

pp. 231-237.-The great influence which the outward event exercises upon

moral estimates even among ourselves, pp. 238-240.—Carelessness generally

not punished if no injurious result follows, p. 241.-An unsuccessful attempt

to commit a criminal act, if punished at all, as a rule punished much less

severely than the accomplished act, p. 241 sq.- Exceptions to this rule,

p. 242. The question, which attempts should be punished, p. 243.-The

stage at which an attempt begins to be criminal, and the distinction between

attempts and acts of preparation, p. 243 sq.-The rule that an outward

event is requisite for the infliction of punishment, p. 244 sq.-Exceptions to

this rule, p. 245.—Explanation of laws referring to unsuccessful attempts, pp.

245-247.-Moral approval influenced by external events, p. 247.-Owing

to its very nature, the moral consciousness, when sufficiently influenced by

thought, regards the will as the only proper object of moral disapproval or

praise, p. 247 sq.

CHAPTER X

AGENTS UNDER INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY

An agent not responsible for anything which he could not be aware of, p. 249.-

The irresponsibility of animals, pp. 249-251.- Resentment towards an

animal which has caused some injury, p. 251.—At the lower stages of civilisa-

tion animals deliberately treated as responsible beings, ibid.-The custom of

blood-revenge extended to the animal world, pp. 251-253.-Animals exposed

to regular punishment, pp. 253-255.-The origin of the medieval practice of

punishing animals, p. 255 sq.-Explanation of the practice of retaliating upon

animals, pp. 256-260.-At the earlier stages of civilisation even inanimate

things treated as if they were responsible agents, pp. 260-262.—Explanation

of this, pp. 262-264.-The total or partial irresponsibility of childhood

and early youth, pp. 264-267.-According to early custom, children some-

times subject to the rule of retaliation, p. 267.-Parents responsible for the

deeds of their children, p. 267 sq.-In Europe there has been a tendency to

raise the age at which full legal responsibility commences, p. 268 sq.—The

irresponsibility of idiots and madmen, p. 269 sq.-Idiots and insane persons

objects of religious reverence, p. 270 sq.-Lunatics treated with great severity

or punished for their deeds, pp. 271-274.-Explanation of this, p. 274 sq.-

The ignorance of which lunatics have been victims in the hands of lawyers,

pp. 275-277.-The total or partial irresponsibility of intoxicated persons,

p. 277 sq.-Drunkenness recognised as a ground of extenuation, pp. 278-280.

-Not recognised as a ground of extenuation, p. 280 sq.—Explanation of
these facts, p. 281 sq.

CHAPTER XI

66

MOTIVES

Motives considered only in proportion as the moral judgment is influenced by

reflection, p. 283.-Little consideration for the sense of duty as a motive, ibid.

-Somewhat greater discrimination shown in regard to motives consisting of

powerful non-volitional conations, p. 283 sq.-Compulsion as a ground

of extenuation, p. 284 sq.- Compulsion by necessity," pp. 285-287.-Self-

defence, pp. 288-290.-Self-redress in the case of adultery, and other

survivals of the old system of self-redress, pp. 290–294.—The moral distinc-

tion made between an injury which a person inflicts deliberately, in cold

blood, and one which he inflicts in the heat of the moment, on provocation,

pp. 294-297.-Explanation of this distinction, p. 297 sq.—The pressure of

a non-volitional motive on the will as a ground of extenuation, p. 298 sq.—

That moral judgments are generally passed, in the first instance, with refer-

ence to acts immediately intended, and consider motives only in proportion as

the judgment is influenced by reflection, holds good not only of moral blame,

but of moral praise, pp. 299–302.

CHAPTER XII

FORBEARANCES AND CARELESSNESS-CHARACTER

Why in early moral codes the so-called negative commandments are much more

prominent than the positive commandments, p. 303.--The little cognisance

which the criminal laws of civilised nations take of forbearances and omis-

sions, p. 303 sq.-The more scrutinising the moral consciousness, the greater

the importance which it attaches to positive commandments, p. 304 sq.-Yet

the customs of all nations contain not only prohibitions, but positive injunc

tions as well, p. 305. -The unreflecting mind apt to exaggerate the guilt of

a person who out of heedlessness or rashness causes harm by a positive act,

ibid.-Early custom and law may be anxious enough to trace an event to

its source, pp. 305-307.-But they easily fail to discover where there is guilt

or not, and, in case of carelessness, to determine the magnitude of the

offender's guilt, p. 307 sq.-The opinion that a person is answerable for all

the damage which directly ensues from an act of his, even though no foresight

could have reasonably been expected to look out for it, p. 308 sq.—On the

other hand, little or no censure passed on him whose want of foresight or

want of self-restraint is productive of suffering, if only the effect is sufficiently

remote, p. 309 sq.-The moral emotions may as naturally give rise to judg-

ments on human character as to judgments on human conduct, p. 310.-Even

when a moral judgment immediately refers to a distinct act, it takes notice of

the agent's will as a whole, p. 310 sq.-The practice of punishing a second or

third offence more severely than the first, p. 311 sq.-The more a moral

judgment is influenced by reflection, the more it scrutinises the character

which manifests itself in that individual piece of conduct by which the judg-

ment is occasioned, p. 312 sq.-But however superficial it be, it always refers

to a will conceived of as a continuous entity, p. 313.

CHAPTER XIII

WHY MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE PASSED ON CONDUCT AND CHARACTER-MORAL

VALUATION AND FREE-WILL

Explanation of the fact that moral judgments are passed on conduct and character,

p. 314. The correctness of this explanation proved by the circumstance that

not only moral emotions, but non-moral retributive emotions as well, are felt

with reference to phenomena exactly similar in nature to those on which

moral judgments are passed, pp. 314-319.-Whether moral or non-moral, a

retributive emotion is essentially directed towards a sensitive and volitional

entity, or self, conceived of as the cause of pleasure or the cause of pain, p.

319.-The futility of other attempts to solve the problem, p. 319 sq.--The

nature of the moral emotions also gives us the key to the problem of the co-

existence of moral responsibility with the general law of cause and effect, p.

320.-The theory according to which responsibility, in the ordinary sense of

the term, and moral judgments generally, are inconsistent with the notion

that the human will is determined by causes, p. 320 sq.-Yet, as a matter of

fact, moral indignation and moral approval are felt by determinists and

libertarians alike, p. 321 sq.-Explanation of the fallacy which lies at the bot-

tom of the conception that moral valuation is inconsistent with determinism,

p. 322. - Causation confounded with compulsion, pp. 322-324.—The differ-

ence between fatalism and determinism, pp. 324–326.—The moral emotions

not concerned with the origin of the innate character, p. 326.