The capability of a police department to control a civil disorder depends essentially on two factors: proper planning and competent performance. These depend in turn upon the quantity and quality of police manpower, the training of patrolmen and police commanders, and the effectiveness of their equipment.

This portion of the Supplement will review the adequacy of police planning, training, and equipment to deal with civil disorders, together with the Commission's recommendations for improvement.

When underlying tensions are present and they exist in every American city with a large minority population—a minor incident can turn a crowd into a mob. Last summer an appreciable number of incidents were triggered by police actions—some serious, such as the shooting of a suspect, but usually by routine activities such as an arrest.

The way policemen approach an incident often determines whether it is contained or develops into a serious disorder. Experienced police administrators con

sulted by the Commission repeatedly stressed the need for good judgment and common sense among police officers called to the scene of an incident in neighborhood where tensions exist. They warned against using sirens and flasher lights in situations that will attract crowds. They cautioned against over-responding to an incident with too much visible force-riot guns and helmets may only aggravate a tense situation. Yet they also pointed out that control has sometimes been lost because an insufficient number of police were on hand to control a disorder in its initial stages. A major lesson of the 1967 disorders was that it takes a seasoned senior officer to make the all-important initial assessments and decisions that will contain an incident.

If an incident develops, and a crowd begins to threaten lawlessness and acts of violence, the police must act promptly and with a sufficient display of force to make clear their intent and capacity to suppress disorder and insure the public safety.

PLANNING

Effective preparation for disorder requires careful planning. Large numbers of police officers must be mobilized, deployed, and directed by senior officers. They must have adequate logistical support, particularly if extended operations are necessary.

Mobilization planning. To mobilize enough policemen to handle a riot emergency is difficult, even in large cities. In one major city with a population of more than 1 million, an area of 140 square miles, and a police force of nearly 5,000 men, no more than 192 patrolmen were on duty when a major civil disorder erupted. Of these, only 44 were in the riot area. The difficulties in mobilizing additional men were described by the police commissioner:

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that mobilization is inherently a time consuming operation, no matter how efficient. After a man is notified, he must dress and travel to his reporting point. Once he has checked in and has been equipped, he must be turned around and transported to a command post or an assembly point. There he must be briefed on the situation that exists, the location of the riot area, his duties, and other details required to make him effective once he is deployed. He must then be actually committed to the area of involvement. The time lapse in this entire procedure ranges from 11⁄2 to 2 hours.

By the time sufficient manpower was brought in, the disorder had developed beyond the control capability of the police department.

Adding to this difficulty is the fact that the standard training for police operations is basically different from that required for riot control. Traditional police training seeks to develop officers who can work independently and with little direct supervision. But the control of civil disturbances requires quite different performance-large numbers of disciplined personnel, comparable to soldiers in a military unit, organized and trained to work as members of a team under a highly unified command and control system. No matter how well-trained and skilled a police officer may be, he will be relatively ineffectual in dealing with civil disturbances so long as he functions as an individual. Thus, a major civil disturbance requires a police department to convert itself, suddenly, into a different type of organization with new operational procedures.

To cope with the difficulties of this transition, a police department needs a plan that can mobilize and deploy needed manpower with a minimum deviation from established operating procedures, and with minimum curtailment of essential police services.

A study conducted for the Commission by the International Association of Chiefs of Police of 30 major police departments found that, while all had some form of written mobilization plan, the quality of the plans varied greatly. Principal defects were in the following areas: procedures for implementing the plan; provi

sion for relief of reserve forces after the plan has been activated; accounting for personnel dispatched to a disorder; predesignation of assembly areas or command posts in the various areas of the cities where trouble might be expected; logistical support of police and other law enforcement officers engaged in control activities; flexibility in planning to cope with disorders of varying natures and magnitudes; and unnecessarily complicated planning that deviated excessively from normal operations.

Because of these deficiencies in the mobilization plans of the leading police departments, and in response to many requests for assistance, the Commission has prepared a model plan, which can be adapted to local requirements. Currently used as training material in the Conferences on the Prevention and Control of Civil Disorders sponsored by the Department of Justice in response to Commission recommendations, the plan will be revised as additional information is developed by these conferences. The Commission recommends that the Department of Justice disseminate the revised plan to police departments across the country and make it available in federally sponsored training on riot control methods.

Operational planning. Operational planning is a necessary complement to mobilization planning. It provides guidance to the police command and the men of the steps necessary to control the disorder, and it includes command and control mechanisms, communication, intelligence, means to combat inflammatory rumors, and tactics.

(1) Command and control and communications.Whether the shift from normal routine police operations to an emergency basis is smooth and effective depends upon the speed with which the police can provide unified command and control. Under ordinary conditions, a police dispatcher controls the movement of men and equipment from a central position to places where they are needed. In most police departments the system works well enough so long as the demands on the dispatcher are within the capabilities of the man and his equipment.

Many local police departments called upon to control civil disorders have had serious problems in commanding and controlling the large numbers of men required to work together as an effective, coordinated team. The problem has been compounded by the shortage of on-duty supervisors and staff at certain periods of the day. It is one thing to assemble a large force; it is quite another to provide appropriate direction and leadership.

Effective command and control in a civil disorder depends upon communications, and communications is a function both of planning and of equipment. Relatively few police departments have adequate communications equipment or frequencies. Forty-two percent of all police departments studied by the

Commission had no special radio frequency for emergencies.

The lack of emergency frequencies overloads normal frequencies. This may not only preclude effective command and control of police in the area of a civil disorder but may also undermine the ability of the police to provide vital services to the remainder of the city.

The absence of adequate communication facilities is particularly acute with respect to outside police assistance. Approximately 50 percent of all police. agencies surveyed had inadequate means to coordinate with neighboring jurisdictions. Incompatible radio frequencies were found to have handicapped the effective use of neighboring police departments. When local and state police must cooperate with National Guard units, the need for communications coordination is urgent.

We believe that the critical communications and control problems arising from the present shortage of frequencies available to police departments require immediate attention. Accordingly, we recommend that the Federal Communications Commission make sufficient frequencies available to police and related public safety services to meet the demonstrated need for riot control and other emergency use.1

Miniaturized communications equipment for officers on foot is critically needed for command and control in civil disorders, particularly if the riot commanders are to exercise effective command and control over police units in control operations. At the present time police officers can generally communicate only to headquarters and only from a police vehicle. This Commission, therefore, endorses the recommendations made by the Crime Commission that the Federal Government assume the leadership in initiating and funding portable radio development programs for the police.2

(2) Intelligence.-The absence of accurate information both before and during a disorder has created special control problems for police. Police departments must develop means to obtain adequate intelligence for planning purposes, as well as on-the-scene information for use in police operations during a disorder.

An intelligence unit staffed with full-time personnel should be established to gather, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate information on potential as well as actual civil disorders. It should provide police administrators and commanders with reliable information essential for assessment and decisionmaking. It should use un

'This recommendation was previously made to the FCC in a letter from the Commission, a copy of which is included in the appendix. The FCC has taken steps to make additional frequencies available.

This recommendation was previously made in a letter to the Department of Justice, a copy of which is included in the appendix.

dercover police personnel and informants, but it should also draw on community leaders, agencies, and organizations in the ghetto.

Planning is also necessary to cope with the ever present problem of rumors. A rumor collection center will enable police and other officials to counter false and inflammatory reports by giving accurate information rapidly to community leaders and others in troubled areas. Evaluation of rumors can also provide important information about potential disorders.

In one large city, for example, a "Rumor Central" unit established in the Commission on Human Relations has played an important role in averting trouble. When a Negro, after an argument, was shot to death by a white store owner who was placed in custody by the police, a rumor spread through the neighborhood that the white man would not be arrested. This false information was picked up by a radio station and broadcast. But Rumor Central, which received some 500 telephone calls about the incident, obtained the facts from the police and gave those facts to community leaders and news media. This appreciably assisted the police in alleviating tension.

(3) Tactics. In dealing with disorders, police have traditionally relied principally on the use of various squad formations and tactics to disperse crowds. These tactics have been of little or no value in some recent disorders marked by roving bands of rioters engaged in window breaking, looting, and firebombing.

Studies made for the Commission indicate that the police are aware of the deficiency. Many police departments admitted that traditional riot control methods and squad tactics were wholly ineffective or only partially useful in the disorders. But no new and practical response to the recent types of disorders has emerged. Few departments have evolved new tactics against rioters. Even fewer have sent trained personnel to consult with officials in cities that have experienced civil disorders.

Tactics recommended for dealing with the type of disorders experienced last summer, as well as those that may develop in the future, are also presented in the model operations plan discussed below.

(4) Recommendations for operational planning.The Commission believes that model operations plans are needed now to provide guidelines for police departments in coping with civil disorders, including types of disorders that may develop in the future.

Acting on these convictions, the Commission has developed a model operations plan after consultation with leading police officials. Like the mobilization plan. this plan is also being used in the Department of Justice training conferences and is now undergoing final revision. The Commission recommends that this plan be distributed to local and state police depart

ments in the same manner as the proposed model mobilization plan.

Obtaining outside assistance

When should a mayor or local police chief call for state assistance? The answer is difficult partly because of the problem of determining when outside assistance is actually necessary, and partly because local officials may be understandably reluctant to admit that they cannot control the disorder.

No amount of planning will provide an automatic solution to this problem. Sound judgment on the part of mayors and police chiefs remains the only answer. Yet once the decision has been made, proper advance planning will help speed assistance.

Outside forces will need a relatively long lead time before response. A survey of National Guard capabilities, for example, shows that an average of 4 to 6 hours is required from the time of notification to the time of arrival of an effective complement of men.

Local authorities must not wait until the critical moment to alert a neighboring jurisdiction, the state police, or the National Guard. Outside control forces will then be unable to mobilize and respond on time. All agencies that may be asked to help control a civil disturbance must be alerted at an early stage and kept informed.

These problems will be further discussed in the section on the National Guard and state-local planning.

Logistical planning

Commission studies disclosed serious deficiencies in police plans for logistical support. Many of these plans appear to assume that supplies and equipment will be on hand or will be available in the amounts required. The moment of need is too late to find out whether they are.

Regular police vehicles are usually inadequate for transporting and supplying large numbers of police, particularly since the men should be moved in units. Furthermore, a disorder extending over a long period of time will require the resupply of expended items and probably food and shelter for police personnel. In one city, when the failure to plan for these contingencies kept an entire police force on 24-hour duty, physical exhaustion seriously impaired police effectiveness.

A major problem in certain of the 1967 disorders arose from the large number of persons arrested. Facilities to transport, detain, process, feed, and house them were totally inadequate and no emergency or contingency planning had been done. This logistical problem is discussed in Chapter 13, the Administration of Justice Under Emergency Conditions.

TRAINING

The Commission survey on the capabilities and preparedness of selected police departments showed that

the most critical deficiency of all is in the area of training. Recruits receive an average of 18 hours of riotcontrol training; programs range from 62 hours to only 2. Little additional training is provided for supervisory and command officers.

Moreover, although riot control tactics require the work of highly disciplined and coordinated teams, almost all departments train policemen as individuals. Of the 19 departments reporting some post-recruit training for riot-control units, five limit training to the use of firearms and chemicals. In many cases, the training program is built around traditional military formations that have little applicability to the kinds of civil disorders experienced by our cities. Yet 50 percent of all the departments surveyed reported that they were generally satisfied with their training programs and planned no significant changes.

Basic riot control should be taught in recruit school, and intensive unit training should be conducted subsequently on a regular basis. Without this kind of training, police officers cannot be expected to perform effectively in controlling civil disturbances. Training supervisory and command personnel in the control of civil disorders must also be a continuing process.

Emergency plans and emergency operations must be reviewed in the classroom and practiced in the field. Yet few departments test their mobilization and operational plans. As a result, when carefully planned variations from the normal chain-of-command, communications sysems, and unit assignments go into effect at a time of riot emergency, policemen are often unfamiliar with them. The most thoroughly developed emergency plan is useless unless all personnel fully understand it before it is put into operation.

Of the 30 police departments surveyed not a single one reported coordinated training with fire units. Yet recent experience shows a clear need for police-fire teamwork in riots. Even more revealing, only two of the departments surveyed have undertaken coordi nated training with other community agencies required in a riot emergency. Only two departments reported coordinating their riot control training with the National Guard and state police.

In order to strengthen police training, the Commission recommends:

■ Departments should immediately allocate whatever time is recessary to reach an effective level of riot control capability. The need for training in civil disorder prevention and control is urgent.

■ Training must include all levels of personnel within the police agency, especially commanders. Post-recruit riot training must be a continuing process for all personnel which builds upon recruit training rather than duplicates it.

Riot-control training must be provided to groups expected to function as teams during actual riot conditions. Required levels of teamwork can be achieved only through team training. All special riot-control units must receive additional and

intensive training in tactics and procedures, as well as in special equipment and weapons.

■ Mobilization plans and emergency procedures must be reviewed in the classroom and practiced in the field. All members of the department must be familiar with riot plans at all times.

■Mayors and other civil officials must recognize the need and accept the responsibility for initiating regional training and coordination with military and state police personnel, as well as with other agencies of local government.

Police agencies must review and become familiar with recent riot experience so that training programs can be realistically adjusted in the light of anticipated problems.

■ In order to help law enforcement agencies improve their knowledge and strengthen their capabilities to prevent and control civil disorders, a national center and clearinghouse should be established to develop, evaluate, and disseminate riot prevention and control data and information. This center should be part of the proposed National Institute for Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recommended by the President and awaiting action by Congress.

A suggestion has been made that national observer teams be established and assigned to the scene of incipient or developing disorders. These teams would study the effectiveness of control techniques and organization, recommend improvements, and make this information available to public officials. The Commission endorses the recommendation and suggests further that the disorder observer teams be made an integral part of the proposed national center.

POLICE CONTROL EQUIPMENT

Personal equipment.-A serious hazard faced by police officers during disorders is injury from bottles, rocks, and other missiles thrown by rioters. Yet few police departments can furnish every man assigned to civil disturbance duty with the proper equipment to protect head, face, and eyes. The Commission has found that protective clothing, boots, and gloves are generally not available for the police, although most police administrators recommend their procurement and use. Police officers must have the proper personal equipment and clothing to safeguard them against the threat of bodily harm.

Police weapons.-On the basis of a survey made of 30 major police departments, the Commission found that many police forces are inadequately equipped or trained for use of even conventional riot control weapons and materiel. For example, although the police baton has proven to be a very effective weapon in situations where a low level of physical force will control a disorder, many police departments fail to instruct their men in the proper use of this control weapon. The value of the police baton should not be overlooked and police administrators should assure that

proper training in its correct and most effective use is given to all police officers.

The only equipment found to be in adequate supply in police departments was hand guns. Experience has

shown that these are relatively poor and ineffective weapons for dealing with a civil disorder.

The most serious deficiencies, however, are in advanced nonlethal weapons. Riot control authorities regard nonlethal chemical agents, such as tear gas, as the single most valuable and effective type of middlerange weapons in controlling civil disorders. In listing the priority of force to be applied in a disorder, the FBI manual on riot control, as well as Army and National Guard doctrine, prescribes the use of tear gas (CS and CN) before resorting to firearms. According to the FBI riot control manual: "They are the most effective and most humane means of achieving temporary neutralization of a mob with a minimum of personal injury."

While most of the police departments surveyed possessed some chemical weapons with varying degrees of supplies on hand, they lacked sufficient gas masks to equip even 30 percent of their personnel. The lack of gas masks restricts use of gas by many police forces.

Police and other civil officials have also been inhibited by the unfavorable psychological reaction to the use of any gas or chemical weapon. An additional restraint is created by the presence of large numbers of innocent people in the disorder area who would be affected by the traditional massive use of tear gas.

The recent development of new containers and projectile devices by the U.S. Army now makes it possible to use CS discriminatingly against small groups and even individuals. Police departments could use them to deal effectively and appropriately with looters and snipers.

Some police departments have recently been equipping police officers with a liquid tear gas device. Initial reports indicate that, though less effective than CS, it provides a useful method of dealing with unruly and dangerous individuals. Used properly, it renders offenders harmless for 10 to 15 minutes. Projectors now in production promise to give police a means of acting against lawless small groups or individuals up to a distance of 30 feet.

The use of distinctive colors and odors either added to a chemical agent or projected from a separate device may be an additional way to help police not only identify those engaged in vandalism and other illegal acts, but also deter others.

The exaggerated reports of sniping in many cities experiencing disorders created unwarranted apprehension among some police administrators. This concern has led to a belief in some communities that police officers should be armed with highly destructive implements of war.

The Commission believes that equipping civil police with automatic rifles, machine guns, and other weapons of massive and indiscriminate destructive force is not warranted by the evidence. Chemical agents provide police forces with an effective and more appropriate