weapon. If violence by rioters mounts beyond the control capability of the police, trained military forces should be called in. We should not attempt to convert our police into combat troops equipped for urban warfare. The true source of police strength in maintaining order lies in the respect and good will of the public they serve. Great harm is likely to result from the use of military weapons of mass destruction by police forces which lack the command and control and firearms discipline of military units. Improper action could destroy the concept of civilian police as a public service agency dependent for effective operations on community cooperation and support. Overall recommendations.-The development of modern, nonlethal control equipment has languished because police departments lack the resources for tests and evaluation. The decentralized nature of law enforcement and the absence of standard criteria have also limited market opportunities. As a result, private industry has been reluctant to invest in research and development of new police equipment. Accordingly, the Commission recommends: The Federal Government should undertake an immediate program to test and evaluate available nonlethal weapons and related control equipment for use by police and control forces. ■Federal support should be provided to establish criteria If these recommendations are adopted, the result will be better maintenance of law and order and better control of disorders with fewer risks to police and the public. Use should be made of the technology and resources of the Department of Defense and other appropriate Federal agencies. FIRE DEPARTMENTS AND CIVIL DISORDERS Of the 23 cities studied by the Commission, most reported arson and fires accompanying the disorders, ranging from the burning of police barricades in Jackson, Mississippi, to the 682 riot-connected fires listed by the Detroit Fire Department. Fire departments face problems equal in difficulty to the control problems of law enforcement agencies. MAJOR FIRE DEPARTMENT PROBLEMS IN CIVIL DISORDERS Abnormal number of fires.--The basic problem for fire departments during a civil disorder is lack of resources to cope with an abnormal number of fires in one area while maintaining some coverage for other areas. Detroit had as many fires in the 5 days of disorder as it usually has in a month. No other city approached this number of fires during a disorder, but fire problems were still critical. For example, during the 4 days of disorder in Newark, the fire department responded to 250 fire calls, plus 64 false alarms, and 50 emergencies where no fire existed. Of these 364 calls, 166 took place on the first day of the disorder. Fire departments are not organized or equipped to cope with an abnormal number of fires on a sustained basis. There are more than 23,500 public fire departments in the United States, and only 285 have 100 or more employees. Only 19 cities have more than 1,000 paid employees, ranging from 13,917 in New York City to 1,061 in New Orleans. But total strength is far from the number of men available to fight a fire. Regular hours of duty mean that only 201 to 35 percent of personnel are on duty at any one time. The situation is even more critical in the suburban communities surrounding the core city, for many of these departments depend to a very large extent on volunteer firemen even for routine fires, and few have as many as 25 men normally on duty. Shortages of equipment, particularly reserve equipment necessary for a full utilization of all available manpower, also inhibit efforts to combat widespread fires. During the Detroit disorder, 41 suburban communities furnished men and about 56 pieces of equipment to augment the 92 pieces of equipment of the city department. The danger in relying on mutual aid agreements comes from the possibility that adjoining communities may be simultaneously involved in a disorder and unable to release men or equipment. Malicious or nuisance false alarms.-False alarms have often plagued fire departments during disorders. These alarms overload incoming communication systems and deplete manpower and equipment needed for actual fires. Attacks on and harrassment of firemen.-In many of the cities experiencing civil disorders, firemen have been harassed, and even attacked, primarily by thrown objects. These, plus fear of attack, have seriously interfered with the work of firemen. Firemen can no longer depend upon community assistance, but must be ready for open hostility. Overtaxed communication facilities.-Fire department communication capabilities have been severely taxed during disorders. At headquarters, increased number of alarms overload incoming telephone lines, and impose heavy burdens on dispatchers. In the field, frequencies have been overloaded, while the use of diffrent frequencies by fire units, law enforcement agencies and National Guard forces has created confusion. The Commission has requested that the Federal Com munications Commission provide sufficient frequencies to permit communication during disorders among all agencies of government involved in control. Identification of a civil disorder fire problem.-The fire problem in a civil disorder has usually developed after the initial disturbance. The time interval may be a matter of hours, as in Detroit, or a matter of days, as in Los Angeles in 1965. In order to insure efficient response, fire chiefs must identify the start of a problem as early as possible both to activate emergency plans and to avoid an initial overcommitment of resources. Water supply problems. Numerous fires reduce water pressure, and malicious openings of hydrants deplete water supplies. Logistical support.-Extended firefighting operations by large numbers of personnel and equipment have created serious logistical problems. Sufficient manpower and equipment must be on hand not only to combat the fires but also to avert long hours of duty leading to exhaustion. Special feeding and rest facilities near the center of operations should be provided. The availability and state of repair of reserve equipment creates additional difficulties when this equipment is pressed into service during an emergency. Large scale glass breakage during disorders has damaged tires of firetrucks. Hose problems have been acute. Most fire departments lack the heavy stream equipment that is most efficient in handling riot-caused fires. Forced withdrawals because of attacks on firemen and rapid reassignment to new threatened areas have prevented recovery of hose. Damage from large scale operations, as well as from sabatoge, has further reduced hose inventories. ■Compute the units needed to service critical areas, while maintaining minimum protection for the remainder of the community. ■ Jointly evaluate total needs with cooperating agencies and schedule required assignments in advance. Select command-post sites, providing for a command room, adequate parking of apparatus, sufficient access and maneuver, communication facilities, and space for personnel for extended periods of time. Provide for coded signals to implement responses, to activate command posts, and to recall off-duty personnel. Choose special teams of men and equipment for commitment, including normally, one or two pumpers, a ladder truck, a chief officer, necessary heavy equipment, and communication facilities. ■Review the adequacy of the water supply and plan for foreseeable problems in advance. ■ Develop plans for actual operations at the scene of fires. ■ Provide a way to screen incoming alarms to avoid duplication of response and depletion of resources. Coordination and liaison with other units.-Fire departments must be an integral part of the planning to coordinate all government agencies and private groups involved in control operations, in particular with law enforcement agencies and the National Guard. Effective liaison must be established well in advance of emergencies; lines of communication to the police will provide both information for the prompt recognition of special fire problems and police protection. Tests of all agreements are a necessity. Protection of firemen.-A fireman is neither trained nor equipped to control rioters. To be effective, he must be able to devote his entire attention to fire control activities. Since firemen have a professional responsibility and duty to respond to all fires, protection furnished by outside sources may be necessary for the personal well-being of firemen, and for effective firefighting operations. Thus, if firemen are attacked or severely harassed or interfered with in their operations, either police or National Guardsmen should be assigned to fire units to furnish effective protection. In order to ensure that proper protection will be immediately available if needed, advance commitments and assignments are necessary. Firemen must establish and maintain liaison with top police officials and National Guard officers. Personal protective equipment for firemen and apparatus may also be necessary-covered cabs, eye shields, and crash helmets, as well as covering material for fire engines. Adequate communication equipment.-Adequate communications between headquarters and field operations are essential-additional telephones to receive alarms; direct-line telephones to command posts and key officials; portable two-way radios; radio links to other agencies and cooperating fire departments; equipment for reserve units; and reliable means to direct fire-fighters to fire scenes. Periodic exercises and tests are necessary. Logistical support. To ensure adequate logistical support, fire departments must make an inventory of all equipment and supplies, repair or replace inoperative or defective equipment, and ensure adequate repair and maintenance facilities. Sufficient quantities of hose, particularly heavy stream and large diameter hose, are required. Training. Because operations during civil disorders differ substantially from normal operating procedures, training must be carried out at operational and command levels. Command level training is of special im 291-729 O-68-19 portance, for many fire department officials lack experience in wide-scale operations. Tactical exercises will help train senior staff officers and test communications and command capabilities. Training and planning conferences.-The Commission recommends training conferences for the Nation's fire departments. Nationwide or areawide conferences among top fire department officials will promote exchanges of information relating to basic plans for responding to disorders and the preparation of training programs and materials for both operational and command levels. The Federal Government should assume the responsibility for instituting and funding such conferences. Improved community relations.-Fire departments, like police departments, must improve their relations with the communities they serve in order to gain the community cooperation and assistance that are essential for effective firefighting. This requires getting out of the firehouse and becoming acquainted with the people in the neighborhood. Fire department officials have an obligation to develop programs to achieve these goals. STATE RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISORDERS A major civil disorder may require control forces beyond the personnel and equipment of a single city. When this occurs in an American city, the response will necessarily be far different than it would be in many foreign countries. The reported success of various foreign countries in rapidly suppressing civil disorders is due principally to their capability to rapidly deploy and command large numbers of specially trained and equipped riot-control personnel. This is possible because most foreign countries have large national police forces under centralized control. Because a national police force is contrary to American tradition and because the use of Federal forces in domestic violence is limited by the Constitution, governing statutes, and precedent, in this country state forces alone will be available in the great majority of civil disorders in this country. The state forces presently available to assist local law enforcement agencies are the state police and the National Guard. STATE POLICE FORCES All states except Hawaii have a state police department, highway patrol, or department of public safety. Together they number approximately 32,500 sworn personnel. All but seven states have under 1,000 men. The great majority of them have only a few hundred. In most states, these officers are responsible for policing the entire highway system and must be generally dispersed over the entire state. Thus, state police departments find it difficult to mobilize sufficient numbers of men to be of appreciable help in assisting local police control a civil disorder. In fact, traffic supervision rather than law enforcement is the chief function in more than half of the states. Twelve of the 49 departments lack full police powers. Only five spend less than half time on traffic; 27 spend three-quarters or more time on traffic. Only eight spend over 15 percent of their time on control of criminal activities. In the comparatively few states where the depart ments spend appreciable time on crime control, they may be the principal law enforcement agency for many rural areas. To divert these forces to riot control activities would strip rural areas of police protection. Although state police recruits in 44 states receive training in crowd and riot control tactics, the average number of hours for such training is approximately 10, as compared to 39 for the state traffic code and 38 for accident investigation. Thus, most state police forces lack the necessary manpower, training, and operational structure to assist local police effectively in controlling civil disorders. In the great majority of states, only the National Guard can furnish effective assistance. NATIONAL GUARD During the period from the end of World War II through February of 1968, the National Guard has been summoned to aid in controlling civil disturbances approximately 100 times in 33 states. Eighteen took place during the summer of 1967 (June through August). The performance of Guard forces in certain recent disorders, particularly in Newark and Detroit, raised doubts regarding their capabilities for this type of mission. Their performance also poses a serious challenge to the Nation. Because of the limitations of state police and the restrictions on the use of Federal forces, the National Guard is the only organization with sufficient manpower and appropriate organization and equipment which can materially assist local police departments in riot control operations. After hearing testimony and reviewing evidence of the Guard's performance in riot-control operations in several cities, this Commission recommended immediate action to improve the Guard's effectiveness. These recommendations included: (1) increased riot control training; (2) review of the standards for National Guard officers; and (3) a substantial increase in Negro personnel in both Army and Air National Guard. These recommendations provoked changes in the Guard. Our evaluation will take these changes into account. Background information on the Guard Certain difficulties experienced by the Guard in responding to civil disorders result from the dual nature of its organization and mission. On one hand, it is a state militia organized, trained, and equipped to protect life and property and preserve order and public safety within the state it serves. On the other hand, it has a Federal mission to provide organized units of trained personnel with sufficient and suitable equipment to augment the Active Army and Air Force in time of war or national emergency. National Guard officials maintain that their primary duty is to be ready to respond to the Federal mission. The Guard's force structure is tailored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enable its immediate integration into the Active Army and Air Force. The Army prescribes standards for enlistment, and for the appointment and promotion of officers; the Army directs. training. A Federal order to duty has priority over a state call. The Federal Government pays for 90 percent of the operating costs, virtually all of the equipment, and nearly half the cost of the physical installations and facilities. Yet members of the Guard take an oath of allegiance to the state. Unless called into Federal service, and except when on an annual 2 weeks' tour of active duty, the Guard is under the control of the Governor, who appoints officers. When on state duty, the Guard is paid by the state and is subject to state or local control. The concept of a state militia is enhanced by the hometown makeup and traditions of Guard units. This dual nature of Guard makeup and mission must be taken into account when Guard capabilities for use in riot control operations are assessed, and when responsibility for improvements is fixed. Here we consider the Guard's control capabilities in terms of personnel, organization, planning, training and equipment, as presently in being. Personnel Resources Sufficiency of manpower. The total strength of the National Guard is determined by Congress in response to requirements set by the Department of Defense. The manpower level has varied little over the past several years. Although the National Guard Bureau and the Adjutants General of the state participate in the process, establishing Guard strength in any state and allocating Guard units to a particular state are primarily Federal functions based upon the needs of the Active Army in the event of a national emergency. A Governor can refuse the total Guard manpower allocated to his state, in which case the excess manpower is assigned to other states. A Governor can also increase the total man power assigned, but there would be no Federal recognition or support of the additional units. In the recent past, no state has called its total Guard force to active duty to deal with civil disorders. Since 1957, the average proportion of the force employed has been 9 percent; in only two instances has a state employed more than 50 percent of Guard strength. California called out 60 percent for the Watts riot in 1965. Michigan called 85 percent for the Detroit disorder in 1967, but held 20 to 25 percent in reserve near Detroit. New Jersey employed 31 percent of its Guard in Newark, Wisconsin about 43 percent for Milwaukee. Even if civil disorders increase somewhat in frequency and magnitude, Guard strength appears generally adequate to assist local law enforcement units. Other factors must, however, be considered. First, without the pressure of the accelerated draft in times. of international crisis, the Guard usually has difficulty maintaining its strength. Second, no state has yet experienced more than one major civil disorder at any one time. Two or more major disturbances would probably necessitate outside help. Third, control of an extremely severe or prolonged disorder would undoubtedly be beyond the present capabilities of any state. And, fourth, repeated disorders in a state would create manpower problems since calling the same units to duty several times in a short period would cause severe dislocations for the men involved. In summary, no state alone has the resources to support a Guard force capable of controlling all potential disorders, but no state can be expected to maintain a force of that strength. Elsewhere in this Report the Commission will consider the problem of obtaining outside aid. Quality of Guard officers.-Total manpower is not the only factor in an evaluation of Guard capabilities for control purposes. Proper leadership at all levels is vital to prevent the indiscriminate riot control measures utilized by some Guard units in recent disorders. Evidence presented to the Commission concerning Guard performance in recent control operations. brought into question the caliber and competence of certain Guard officers. Some displayed inferior leadership below the level needed to handle the extremely sensitive operations of controlling disorder in an American city. As a result, the Commission recommended that the qualifications and performance of all Guard officers be reviewed. This recommendation was intended not as a reflection on the entire officer corps of the Guard, but rather to suggest that objective tests be used to replace or retrain officers who failed to meet minimum standards of leadership. Prompt action was taken on the Commission's recommendations. A special board was formed to make a general assessment of the qualifications and performance of all Reserve Component officers. The Com mission assumes that the Department of the Army will continue these efforts and will work with the states to upgrade or eliminate officers who lack the necessary leadership attributes. The responsibility to improve Guard leadership does not rest solely with the Federal Government. Governors appoint Guard officers, and they too must exercise responsibility to improve Guard leadership by selecting only the well qualified. Negro personnel in Guard units.-Evidence from Detroit indicates that Active Army troops were more effective than National Guard units in controlling the disorder. According to many observers, the higher percentage of Negroes in the Active Army was a significant contributing factor. After reviewing this evidence and examining the percentage of Negroes in Guard units, this Commission recommended immediate efforts to increase substantially the number of Negroes in Army and Air National Guard units. (See letter to President Johnson, p. 318.) The Department of Defense responded in two ways: (a) On August 31, 1967, a special board was convened to study the extent of Negro participation in the Army National Guard and Reserve, to explore the reasons why Negroes were not fully participating, and to suggest a program to increase their participation substantially. On October 16, 1967, the board issued its report and recommended steps to recruit and retain additional Negro personnel. (b) The New Jersey National Guard was authorized a temporary 5 percent overstrength-865 additional spaces-in its paid drill strength. The purpose was to test methods of increasing Negro participation in the Army and Air National Guard. An intensive recruiting program was immediately instituted to obtain qualified Negroes for the additional positions. By the end of December 1967, approximately 1,300 Negroes had expressed interest in the Guard. Of 723 whose applications were fully processed, 397 were actually enlisted into the Army and Air National Guard. Thus, approximately 46 percent of the overstrength positions have been filled, amounting to an increase of Negro participation in the New Jersey Guard from 1.7 percent on December 31, 1966, to 3.97 percent at the end of December 1967. The program continuing. is The Commission commends these efforts. Although it is too early to determine whether the New Jersey program will be a complete success, preliminary results indicate that Negro participation in the Guard can be increased. The Commission recommends that the findings of the special board and the results of the New Jersey experiment be fully utilized to stimulate additional Negro participation. If necessary, overstrengths should be authorized. Every effort must be made to ensure fair assign ments and promotions for Negroes. Increased Negro participation in the Guard will have meaning only if there is a fair proportion of Negro officers in command of integrated units. Organization Unit organization in the Guard is identical to Active Army organization. Command and control arrangements are also identical, ensuring close supervision of troops and quick and flexible reaction to changing situations. Command organization of the Guard is currently undergoing a modification which brings into a sharp focus potential conflicts between the state and Federal mission of the National Guard. In the opinion of experienced consultants, the basic military element that lends itself most effectively to riot control is the battalion. However, the current plan splits support-type battalions between various states with the resulting loss of at least one unified battalion in each state where divisions are split. The Commission recommends that the Department of Defense reconsider alignment of units between the states in order to ensure that state needs for unified command and control in riot operations are fully taken into account. Planning The importance of planning in effective control operations cannot be overemphasized. Planning is particularly important for the National Guard because it needs to mobilize a large number of men from a variety of locations and occupations, be sure they are properly equipped, deploy them rapidly in effective units to the scene of the disorder, and provide adequate logistical support for expanded operations. The Department of the Army in August 1967, instructed all National Guard commands to develop riotcontrol plans. A revised training schedule issued at the same time required an 8-hour command-post exercise to develop plans or exercise previously developed plans. All National Guard units have now met this require ment. The commanding general of the U.S. Continental Army Command has dispatched liaison teams to review all state National Guard riot-control plans and to assure that they are coordinated with plans drawn by state and local civil officials. The Army has also developed planning packets for certain cities. These include maps and other information necessary for control operations. The Department of the Army and the National Guard Bureau have provided a basic framework which helps the states construct appropriate riot-control plans. The states now have a clear responsibility to develop them. In order to help appropriate Federal and state offi |