cent of the self-reported rioters, but only 34.9 percent of the noninvolved, said that they talked about Negro rights nearly every day.

The self-reported rioters also were more likely to have attended a meeting or participated in civil rights activity. Of the rioters, 39.3 percent-but only 25.7 percent of the noninvolved-reported that they had engaged in such activity.

In the Newark survey, respondents were asked how much they thought they could trust the local government.141 Only 4.8 percent of the self-reported rioters, compared with 13.7 percent of the noninvolved, said that they felt they could trust it most of the time; 44.2 percent of the self-reported rioters and 33.9 percent of the noninvolved reported that they could almost never trust the government.

In the Detroit survey, self-reported rioters were much more likely to attribute the riot to anger about politicians and police than were the noninvolved.142 Of the self-reported rioters, 43.2 percent-but only 19.6 percent of the noninvolved—said anger against politicians had a great deal to do with causing the

riot. Of the self-reported rioters, 70.5 percent, compared with 48.8 percent of the noninvolved, believed that anger against the police had a great deal to do with causing the riot.

Perhaps the most revealing and disturbing measure of the rioters' anger at the social and political system was their response to a question asking whether they thought "the country was worth fighting for in the event of a major world war." 143 Of the self-reported rioters, 39.4 percent in Detroit and 52.8 percent in Newark shared a negative view. In contrast, 15.5 percent of the noninvolved in Detroit and 27.8 percent of the noninvolved in Newark shared this sentiment. Almost none of the self-reported counterrioters in Detroit-3.3 percent-agreed with the self-reported rioters.

Some comments of interviewees are worthy of note: Not worth fighting for-if Negroes had an equal chance it would be worth fighting for.

Not worth fighting for—I am not a true citizen so why should I?

Not worth fighting for-because my husband came back from Vietnam and nothing had changed.

In response to the President's questions to the Commission about the riot environment, we have gathered information on the pre-riot conditions in 20 of the cities surveyed.144 We have sought to analyze the backgrounds of the disorders in terms of four basic groupings of information:

The social and economic conditions as described in the 1960 census, with particular reference to the area of each city in which the disturbance took place;

■Local governmental structure and its organizational capacity to respond to the needs of the people, particularly those living in the most depressed conditions;

The extent to which Federal programs assisted in meeting these needs; and

The nature of the grievances in the ghetto community. It is sometimes said that conditions for Negroes in the riot cities have improved over the years and are not materially different from conditions for whites; that local government now seeks to accommodate the demands of Negroes and has created many mechanisms for redressing legitimate complaints; that Federal programs now enable most Negroes who so desire, to live comfortably through welfare, housing, employment or antipoverty assistance; and that grievances are harbored only by a few malcontents and agitators. Our findings show the contrary. In the riot cities we surveyed, we found that Negroes were severely disadvantaged, especially as compared with whites; that local government is often unresponsive to this fact; that Federal programs have not yet reached a significantly large proportion of those in need; and that these facts

create a reservoir of unredressed grievances and frustration in the ghetto.145

THE PATTERN OF DISADVANTAGE

Social and economic conditions in the riot cities 146 constituted a clear pattern of severe disadvantage for Negroes as compared with whites, whether the Negroes lived in the disturbance area or outside of it.147 When ghetto conditions are compared with those for whites in the suburbs, the relative disadvantage for Negroes is even greater.

In all the cities surveyed, the Negro population increased between 1950 and 1960 at a median rate of 75 percent.148

Meanwhile, the white population decreased in more than half the cities-including six which experienced the most severe disturbances in 1967. The increase in nonwhite population in four of these cities was so great that their total population increased despite the decrease in white population.149 These changes were attributable in large part to heavy in-migration of Negroes from rural poverty areas and movement of whites from the central cities to the suburbs.

Yet they were twice as likely to be unemployed as whites.154

In cities where they had greater opportunities to work at skilled or semi-skilled jobs, proportionately more Negro men tended to be working, or looking for work, than white men. Conversely, the proportion of men working, or looking for work, tended to be lower among Negroes than whites in cities that offered the least opportunities for skilled or semi-skilled labor.155

■ Among the employed, Negroes were more than three times as likely to be in unskilled and service jobs as whites.156

■ Negroes earned less than whites in all the surveyed cities, averaging barely 70 percent of white income, and were more than twice as likely to be living in poverty."

157

■ However, family "responsibility" was strongly related to opportunity. In cities where the proportion of Negro men in better-than-menial jobs was higher, median Negro family income was higher, and the proportion of children under 18 living with both parents was also higher. Both family income and family structure showed greater weakness in cities where job opportunities were more restricted to unskilled jobs.150

Fewer Negroes than whites owned their own homes. Among nonhomeowners, Negroes paid the same rents, yet they paid a higher share of their incomes for rent than did whites. Although housing cost Negroes relatively more, their housing was three times as likely to be overcrowded and substandard as dwellings occupied by whites.160

LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE

In the riot cities surveyed, we found that:

■ All major forms of local government were represented.

In a substantial minority of instances, a combination of at-large election of legislators and a "weak-mayor" system resulted in fragmentation of political responsibility and accountability.

■The proportion of Negroes in government was substantially smaller than the Negro proportion of population.

Almost all the cities had some formal grievance machinery, but typically it was regarded by most Negroes interviewed as ineffective and was generally ignored.

All major forms of municipal government were represented in the 20 cities examined.161 Fourteen had a mayor-city council form of government, five had a council-city manager, and one had a commission.162

The division of power between the legislative and executive branches varied widely from city to city. Of the mayor-council cities, eight could be characterized as "strong mayor/weak city council" systems in the sense that the mayor had broad appointive and veto powers. 163 Five could be characterized as "weak mayor/ strong council" forms, where the city council had broad appointive and veto powers.164 In one city, Milwaukee, such powers appeared to be evenly balanced."

165

In 17 of the 20 cities, mayors were elected directly.166 Mayors were parttime in eight cities. 167 Almost all the cities had a principal executive, either a mayor or a city manager, who earned a substantial annual salary.168 Terms of office for mayors ranged from 2 to 4 years.169

In eight cities, all legislators were elected at large and therefore represented no particular legislative ward or district.1 170 Six of these cities also had either a city manager or a "weak-mayor" form of government. In these cases, there was heavy reliance upon the city council as the principal elected policymaking authority. This combination of factors appeared to produce even less identification by citizens with any particular elected official than in the 12 cities which elected all legislators from wards or districts 171 or used a combination of election by districts and at large.172

The proportion of Negroes in the governments of the 20 cities was substantially smaller than the median proportion of Negro population-16 percent. Ten percent of the legislators in the surveyed cities were Negroes.173 Only in New Brunswick and Phoenix was the proportion of legislators who were Negroes as great as the percentage of the total population that was nonwhite. Six cities had no Negro legislators.174 Only three cities had more than one Negro legislator: Newark and Plainfield had two, and New Haven had five. None of the 20 cities had or had ever had a Negro mayor or city manager. In only four cities did Negroes hold other important policymaking positions or serve as heads of other municipal departments.175 In seven cities Negro representatives had been elected to the State legislature.176

In 17 of the cities, however, Negroes were serving on boards of education.177 In all 17 cities which had human relations councils or similar organizations, Negroes were represented on the boards of such organizations.

178

One of the most surprising findings is that in 17 of the 20 surveyed riot cities, some formal grievance machinery existed before the 1967 disorders-a municipal human relations council or similar organization authorized to receive citizen complaints about racial or other discrimination by public and private agencies.1 Existence of these formal channels, however, did not necessarily achieve their tension-relieving purpose. They were seldom regarded as effective by Negroes who were interviewed. The councils generally consisted of prominent citizens, including one or more Negroes, serving part time and with little or no salary.

With only one exception, the councils were wholly advisory and mediatory, with power to conciliate and make recommendations but not to subpoena witnesses or enforce compliance.179 While most of the councils had full-time paid staff, they were generally organized only as loosely affiliated departments of the city government.180 The number of complaints filed with the

councils was low considering both the size of the Negro populations and the levels of grievance manifested by the disorders. Only five councils received more than 100 complaints a year.181 In almost all cases, complaints against private parties were mediated informally by these councils. But complaints against governmental agencies usually were referred for investigation to the agencies against whom the complaints were directed. For example, complaints of police misconduct were accepted by most councils and then referred directly to the police for investigation.

In only two cities did human relations councils attempt to investigate complaints against the police. In neither case did they succeed in completing the investigation.182

Where special channels for complaints against the police existed, the result appears to have been similar. In several of the cities, police-community relations units had been established within the police department, in most instances within two years before the disorder.183 However, complaints about police misconduct generally were forwarded to the police investigative unit, complaint bureau or police chief for investigation.

In all the cities which had a police-community relations unit, during the year preceding the disorder, complaints against policemen had been filed with or forwarded to the police department.184 In at least two of these cities the police department stated that the complaints had been investigated and that disciplinary action had been taken in several cases.185 Whether or not these departments in fact did take action on the complaints, the results were never disclosed to the public or to complainants. The grievances on which the complaints were based often appeared to remain alive.

FEDERAL PROGRAMS

What was the pattern of governmental effort to relieve ghetto conditions and to respond to needs in the cities which experienced disorders in 1967?

We have attempted no comprehensive answer to this large and complex question. Instead, we have surveyed only the key Federal antipoverty programs in Detroit, Newark, and New Haven-cities which received substantial Federal funds and also suffered severe disorders.

Among the large number of Federal programs to aid cities, we have concentrated on five types, which relate to the most serious conditions and which involve sizeable amounts of Federal assistance. We have sought to evaluate these amounts against the proportion of persons reached.18

We conclude that:

While these three cities received substantial amounts of Federal funds in 1967 for manpower, education, housing, welfare and community action programs, the number of persons

assisted by those programs in almost all cases constituted only a fraction of those in need.

In at least 11 of the 15 programs examined (five programs in each of the three cities), the number of people assisted in 1967 was less than half of those in need.

In one of the 15 programs, the percentage rose as high as 72 percent.

■The median was 33 percent.

Manpower

Our study included all major manpower and employment programs including basic and remedial education, skill training, on-the-job training, job counseling, and placement.187

A 1966 Department of Labor study of 10 slum areas, as well as our own survey of 20 disorder areas, indicates that underemployment may be an even more serious problem for ghetto residents that unemployment. However, our measurement of need for manpower programs is based on unemployment figures alone because underemployment data are not available for the three cities surveyed. The Department of Labor estimates that underemployment rates in major central-city ghettos are a multiple of the unemployment rate.

In Detroit, during the first three quarters of 1967, Federal funds, obligated in the amount of $19.6 million, provided job training opportunities for less than one-half of the unemployed.

During the first 9 months of 1967, the labor force in Detroit totaled 650,000 persons, of whom 200,000 were Negroes. The average unemployment rate for that period was 2.7 percent for whites and 9.6 percent for Negroes. The total average number unemployed during that period was 31,350, of whom 19,200 (61 percent) were Negroes.

During the same period, there were 22 manpower programs (excluding MDTA institutional programs) in various stages of operation in Detroit. Twenty of the programs provided for 13,979 trainees.188

In Newark, in the first half of 1967, $2.6 million of Federal funds provided job training opportunities for less than 20 percent of the unemployed.189 And in New Haven, during the first three quarters of 1967, Federal funds in the amount of $2.1 million provided job training opportunities for less than one-third of the unemployed.190

Education

For purposes of comparing funding to needs, we have limited our examination to two major Federal education programs for the disadvantaged: The Title I program under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) and the Adult Basic Education Program. Title I provides assistance to schools. having concentrations of educationally disadvantaged children, defined as children from families having annual incomes of less than $3,000 or supported by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.

(AFDC). Title I supports remedial reading, career guidance for potential dropouts, reduced pupilteacher ratios, special teacher training, educational television and other teaching equipment, and specialized staff for social work, guidance and counseling, psychiatry and medicine. The Adult Basic Education program is designed to teach functionally illiterate adults to read.

In order to measure the total Federal contributions to state and local educational expenditures, we have also included such other Federal programs as Head Start, for disadvantaged preschool children; the larger institutional Manpower Development and Training Programs; the Teacher Corps; library material and supplementary education projects under Titles II and III of ESEA; and vocational education programs.

In Detroit, during the 1967-68 school year, $11.2 million of ESEA Title I funds assist only 31 percent of the eligible students. Adult Basic Education reaches slightly more than 2 percent of the eligible beneficiaries. Federal contributions to the Detroit public school system add about 10 percent to state and local expenditures. 191

In Newark, during the 1967-68 school year, $4 million of ESEA Title I funds assist about 72 percent of the eligible students. The number of persons reached by the Adult Basic Education program is only approximately 6 percent of the number of functionally illiterate adults. Federal contributions to the Newark public school system add about 11 percent to state and local expenditures.192

In New Haven, during the 1967-68 school year, ESEA Title I funds in the amount of $992,000 assist only 40 percent of the eligible students in the middle and senior high schools. Although all eligible beneficiaries in 14 target elementary schools are aided, none of the eligible beneficiaries in 19 non-target elementary schools is reached. Adult Basic Education reaches less than 4 percent of eligible beneficiaries. Federal contributions to the New Haven public school system add about 7 percent to state and local expenditures. 193 Housing

The major Federal programs we have examined which are, at least in part, designed to affect the supply of low-income housing, include urban renewal, low rent public housing, housing for the elderly and handicapped, rent supplements, and FHA below market interest rate mortgage insurance (BMIR).

To measure the extent of need for low-income housing, we have used the number of substandard and overcrowded units. 194 In measuring the size of housing programs, we have included expenditures for years before 1967 because they affected the low-income housing supply available in 1967.

In Detroit, a maximum of 758 low-income housing units have been assisted through these programs since

1956. This amounts to 2 percent of the substandard units and 1.7 percent of the overcrowded units.195 Yet, since 1960, approximately 8,000 low-income units have been demolished for urban renewal.

Similarly, in Newark, since 1959, a maximum of 3,760 low-income housing units have been assisted through the programs considered. This amounts to 16 percent of the substandard units and 23 percent of the overcrowded units. 196 During the same period, more than 12,000 families, mostly low-income, have been displaced by such public uses as urban renewal, public housing and highways.

In New Haven, since 1952, a maximum of 951 lowincome housing units have been assisted through the programs considered. This amounts to 14 percent of the substandard units and 20 percent of the overcrowded units.197 Yet since 1956, approximately 6,500 housing units, mostly low-income, have been demolished for highway construction and urban renewal.

Welfare

We have considered four Federally assisted programs which provide monetary benefits to low-income persons: Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).198

In Detroit, the number of persons reached with $48.2 million of Federal funds through the four welfare programs during fiscal year 1967 was approximately 19 percent of the number of poor persons. 199 In Newark, the number of persons reached with $15 million was approximately 54 percent.200 In New Haven, the number reached with $3.9 million was approximately 40 percent.201

Community Action Programs

We have considered such community action programs as neighborhood service centers, consumer education, family counseling, low-cost credit services, small business development, legal services, programs for the aged, summer programs, home economics counseling, and cultural programs.202

In Detroit, the number of persons reached by $12.6 million of community action funds in 1967 was only about 30 percent of the number of poor persons. Federal funding of these programs averaged approximately $35 for each poor person. 203 In Newark, the number of persons reached by $1.9 million was about 44 percent. Federal funding of these programs averaged approximately $21 for each poor person.204 In New Haven, the number reached by $2.3 million was approximately 42 percent. Federal funding averaged approximately $72 for each poor person. 205

GRIEVANCES

To measure the present attitudes of people in the riot cities as precisely as possible, we are sponsoring two attitude surveys among Negroes and whites in

15 cities and four suburban areas, including four of the 20 cities studied for this chapter. These surveys are to be reported later.

In the interim we have attempted to draw some tentative conclusions based upon our own investigations and the more than 1200 interviews we conducted relatively soon after the disorders.206

In almost all the cities surveyed, we found the same major grievance topics among Negro communities— although they varied in importance from city to city. The deepest grievances can be ranked into the following three levels of relative intensity:

Our conclusions for the 20 cities have been generally confirmed by a special interview survey in Detroit sponsored by the Detroit Urban League.211

Police practices were, in some form, a significant grievance in virtually all cities and were often one of the most serious complaints.212 Included in this category were complaints about physical or verbal abuse of Negro citizens by police officers, the lack of adequate channels for complaints against police, discriminatory police employment and promotion practices, a general lack of respect for Negroes by police officers, and the failure of police departments to provide adequate protection to Negroes.

Unemployment and underemployment were found to be grievances in all 20 cities and also frequently appeared to be one of the most serious complaints.213 These were expressed in terms of joblessness or inadequate jobs and discriminatory practices by labor unions, local and state governments, state employment services and private employment agencies.

Housing grievances were found in almost all of the cities studied and appeared to be among the most serious complaints in a majority of them.21+ These included inadequate enforcement of building and safety codes, discrimination in sales and rentals, and overcrowding.

The educational system was a source of grievance in almost all the 20 cities and appeared to be one of the most serious complaints in half of them.215 These

Detroit, July 1967

centered on the prevalence of de facto segregation, the poor quality of instruction and facilities, deficiences in the curriculum in the public schools (particularly because no Negro history was taught), inadequate representation of Negroes on school boards, and the absence or inadequacy of vocational training.

Grievances concerning municipal recreation programs were found in a large majority of the 20 cities and appeared to be one of the most serious complaints in almost half.216 Inadequate recreational facilities in the ghetto and the lack of organized programs were common complaints.

The political structure was a source of grievance in almost all of the cities and was among the most serious complaints in several.217 There were significant grievances concerning the lack of adequate representation of Negroes in the political structure, the failure of local political structures to respond to legitimate complaints and the absence or obscurity of official grievance channels.

Hostile or racist attitudes of whites toward Negroes appeared to be one of the most serious complaints in several cities.218

In three-fourths of the cities there were significant grievances growing out of beliefs that the courts ad

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