Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing ResponsibilityOxford University Press, 2002 - 200 ˹éÒ In this book, Russell examines Hume's notion of free will and moral responsibility. It is widely held that Hume presents us with a classic statement of the "compatibilist" position--that freedom and responsibility can be reconciled with causation and, indeed, actually require it. Russell argues that this is a distortion of Hume's view, because it overlooks the crucial role of moral sentiment in Hume's picture of human nature. Hume was concerned to describe the regular mechanisms which generate moral sentiments such as responsibility, and Russell argues that his conception of free will must be interpreted within this naturalistic framework. He goes on to discuss Hume's views about the nature and character of moral sentiment; the extent to which we have control over our moral character; and the justification of punishment. Throughout, Russell argues that the naturalistic avenue of interpretation of Hume's thought, far from draining it of its contemporary interest and significance, reveals it to be of great relevance to the ongoing contemporary debate. |
à¹×éÍËÒ
The Necessity of Moral Sentiment | 9 |
The Elements of Responsibility | 85 |
Retributive Feeling and the Utility of Punishment | 137 |
Pride Fortune and the Godless Man | 154 |
A Qualified Defence of Hume | 170 |
187 | |
193 | |
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Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility Paul Russell ªÁºÒ§Êèǹ¢Í§Ë¹Ñ§Ê×Í - 2002 |
Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility Paul Russell ªÁºÒ§Êèǹ¢Í§Ë¹Ñ§Ê×Í - 2002 |
Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility Paul Russell ªÁºÒ§Êèǹ¢Í§Ë¹Ñ§Ê×Í - 1995 |
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according to Hume action agent antilibertarian argument arouse aspect of Hume's basis blame causation cause character traits classical compatibilist classical interpretation Clearly compatibilism compatibilist strategy concerned connexion constant conjunction context David Hume determinism distinction emotion emphasis Enquiry essential external feelings freedom and responsibility Hobbes human nature Hume claims Hume's account Hume's discussion Hume's position Hume's principles Hume's remarks Hume's theory Hume's views Humean idea of necessity important indirect passions inference insofar intention interpretation of Hume's issue libertarian liberty arguments liberty of indifference liberty of spontaneity Malebranche matter ment metaphysical moral character moral evaluation moral freedom Moral Luck moral realm moral responsibility moral sentiments necessity argument noted ontology P. F. Strawson perceptions person philosophical problem qualities of mind rationalistic reason regard relevant retributive practices retributivism sceptical Schlick significance Smith specific Spinoza Spinozist spontaneity argument Strawson theory of responsibility tion Treatise