Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 มี.ค. 2017 - 248 หน้า Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
จากด้านในหนังสือ
ผลการค้นหา 1 - 5 จาก 53
หน้า 1856
... Democracies : Theoretical Perspectives Susan Rose - Ackerman 4 Anti - fraud Politics in the European Union : Multi - level Disjuncture of Legitimacy and Effectiveness LO 5 Ariyoshi Ogawa Internal Party Organization in the Italian ...
... Democracies : Theoretical Perspectives Susan Rose - Ackerman 4 Anti - fraud Politics in the European Union : Multi - level Disjuncture of Legitimacy and Effectiveness LO 5 Ariyoshi Ogawa Internal Party Organization in the Italian ...
หน้า 1863
... Democracy: Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland. Chapter 4 Ariyoshi Ogawa is Professor of European ... Democracies (2004). Chapter 5 Junko Kato is Professor of the Graduate School of Law and Politics at the University of ...
... Democracy: Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland. Chapter 4 Ariyoshi Ogawa is Professor of European ... Democracies (2004). Chapter 5 Junko Kato is Professor of the Graduate School of Law and Politics at the University of ...
หน้า 1866
... (democracy), whether or not it is an advanced state. The interplay between these elements in a given country creates unique power relationships and structure for that country. The less competitive these three elements are, the more ...
... (democracy), whether or not it is an advanced state. The interplay between these elements in a given country creates unique power relationships and structure for that country. The less competitive these three elements are, the more ...
หน้า 1869
... democracies work better. As mentioned above, there is a parallel in the development of theories of political clientelism and political corruption because these two phenomena are closely related. In Chapter 1, Masaya Kobayashi basically ...
... democracies work better. As mentioned above, there is a parallel in the development of theories of political clientelism and political corruption because these two phenomena are closely related. In Chapter 1, Masaya Kobayashi basically ...
หน้า 1871
... democracy, elected officials should act as the agents of those who have elected them. Similarly, bureaucrats should be ultimately accountable to elected officials and the broader public. Thus, 'misuse' means deviation from the public ...
... democracy, elected officials should act as the agents of those who have elected them. Similarly, bureaucrats should be ultimately accountable to elected officials and the broader public. Thus, 'misuse' means deviation from the public ...
เนื้อหา
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
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คำและวลีที่พบบ่อย
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes